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ABSTRACT 
Arms Racing and Conflict in the Third World: 1970-2000 
by 
Victor C. Marin 
In this dissertation I investigate the relationship between arms races and the probability 
of militarized conflict onset. The research question is critically important on at least two 
fronts: first, many policy makers and scholars alike believe ramping up military forces is 
the best way to deter military conflict (the peace through strength argument) while 
others suggest arms races do nothing but lead states towards militarized conflict. 
Second, this dissertation fills a research gap present since the end of the Cold War since 
research on arms races by the scientific community of conflict scholars has slowed 
dramatically since the end of the Cold War and findings remain inconclusive. The Steps 
to War research program (Vasquez, 1993; Senese and Vasquez, 2008), however, 
suggests arms races are one of the central provocateurs of militarized conflict and 
warfare between states. Using this theoretical approach I frame arms races as 
dangerous events in the global arena and provide a clear theoretical account of the 
international system, the incentives for arming, and the linkage between arms racing 
and international conflict. The central theoretical argument suggests arms races lead 
states into conflict with one another. I test my expectations through a regional analysis 
of minor powers from three geographic areas: Latin America, Africa, and the Middle 
East over the period 1970-2000. In an important departure from the majority of 
previous quantitative arms race and conflict studies I utilize the actual weapons 
stockpiles of states (as opposed to defense expenditure data) as the primary measure of 
an arms race. The empirical results not only shed insight into the likelihood observing 
international conflict when preceded by arms racing but also indicate whether certain 
types of arms racing - air as opposed to sea or ground racing, for example - may be 
more likely to develop into conflict than other forms. 
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Chapter 1 
An Introduction to the Ongoing Problem 
1.1 Introduction 
Weapons fuel war. When bargaining, negotiations, diplomacy and coercion 
finally break down interstate conflict is prosecuted successfully or unsuccessfully by the 
weapons each state has accumulated over time. As the endeavor of international 
relations and international conflict scholarship has shown, war is a dynamic and 
complex event. The factors leading to interstate conflict are many and the literature has 
produced a compelling set of theoretical approaches and empirical findings. 
Considerations regarding the influence of factors such as power, alliances, deterrence 
strategies, and domestic politics - to name just several topics - have all provided a 
richer understanding of the outbreak and process of international conflict. 
Yet, given a host of conditions that may or may not precipitate international 
warfare weapons themselves remain one of the few necessary conditions for the 
existence of internotionol conflict. With this simple fact in mind I seek to examine 
theoretically and evaluate empirically the relationship between arms racing and 
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international conflict. That is, can arms racing between states reasonably predict 
incidents of international conflict? 
1.2 The Anthropology of Arms 
Arms racing is most often discussed and examined in the context of political 
science or history. From an anthropological perspective, however, the pursuit of 
weaponry and strength through arms has been a very real part of the development of 
mankind. Evolutionary anthropologist Richard Wrangham (1999) is explicit: "Warfare 
has traditionally been considered unique to humans. It has, therefore, often been 
explained as deriving from features that are unique to humans, such as the possession 
of weapons [emphasis added] or the adoption of a patriarchal ideology" (I).1 So from 
the earliest of times we know man sought to arm himself whether for hunting, personal 
defense, or survival. 
Indeed, a swath of anthropological research has focused upon the creation and 
use of various 'weapons systems' by primitive man and early hominids. Raymond Dart 
(1959) investigated some of the earliest evidence of man-made weapons: the sharpened 
bones of large game animals. His research sought to understand how "...primitive 
sapient man at Kalkbank 15,000 years ago and the still more primitive protoman 
Australopithecus prometheus about 1,000,000 years ago at Makapansgat obtained these 
spiral blades" (91). Using the archaeological evidence of antelope femurs that had been 
sharpened into weapons he concluded "...that a simple, but intelligence-demanding 
To be clear, the Wrangham piece actually seeks to determine whether a specific form of warfare -
coalitionary killing - is present in other species such as chimpanzees. 
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technique of making spiral blades and stabbing tools from humeri or femora had been 
invented by Australopithecus and was being carried on nearly a million years later by 
Kalkbankman"(91). 
Naturally, mankind advanced and so too did weapons technology. Stiner (1993) 
notes "Upper Palaeolithic and Late Stone Age assemblages of Eurasia and Africa...seem 
to be full of projectile weapons, along with shaft straighteners, wrenches, or throwing 
boards" (70). In "The Origins of Weapon Systems" (1994) Malcolm Farmer discusses the 
anthropological importance of understanding the implementation of the bow and arrow 
and throwing dart weapons used by early man since each represented a significant 
advancement in weapons technology. 
In a related piece on prehistoric man's hunting proclivities, Peterson (1998) 
highlighted the rational nature of prehistoric man's decisions to use various weapons 
depending on the prey. She concludes that "Technological change in hunting weapons 
clearly should not be viewed as a by-product of a unilinear evolutionary scheme: from 
spear...to atlatL.to bow and arrow. It is perhaps more realistic to view weapon system 
diversity as enabling hunters to choose among tools appropriate for season, game 
species, topography, environmental situation (land vs. water), and milieux (single vs. 
communal hunt) (386). 
A recent string of anthropology research has focused on the role weapons may 
have played in determining the fates of Neanderthals and early man. One of the most 
critical topics in paleoanthropology notes Shea (2001) is the extent to which 
Neanderthals and early man may have coexisted. He says current research shows 
4 
"Neanderthals and early modern humans now appear to have been contemporaries, 
possibly different species, who competed with each other for the same niche in West 
Eurasian environments" but that "Only modern humans emerged from the Middle 
Paleolithic successfully" (38). A possible answer supported by recent archaeological 
evidence from Shea (2007) and Churchill and Rhodes (2007) is that Neanderthals, while 
utilizing relatively advanced weapons, failed to develop the projectile weapons used by 
early modern man, most notably projectile spears and the bow and arrow system. Their 
evidence therefore suggests a superior form of weaponry employed by early man likely 
had a non-trivial impact on the extinction of Neanderthals. 
Although only a small sampling of anthropological and archaeological research 
the works discussed above provide compelling insight into the utility of weapons for 
survival and violence against others. In summary, at least part of the anthropological 
enterprise suggests weapons have been an indispensable part of human social 
evolution. So although such early uses of weapons may not be directly comparable to 
their use in modern day arms racing, what remains distinctly true is that weapons then 
and now represent an ability to meaningfully influence the world around someone. 
That is to say then, just as now, weapons provide powerful leverage. 
Thus, the pursuit and use of weapons has in many ways permeated the human 
experience to this very day. As such, the scientific study of arms racing and 
international conflict becomes very much a study of the human condition. Why do 
states arm? How do they arm? What are the consequences of increased levels of 
arming? Although I will consider these and other related questions in the context of 
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political science, recognizing that the phenomenon of arming and arms racing is at least 
as cultural and anthropologically motivated as it is political legitimizes the research 
question from the very outset; arms racing is not a fad, it is not random, and it is most 
certainly not an artifact of twentieth century super power interactions. These reasons 
alone make the study of arms racing indispensable to our collective understanding of 
international relations and, more specifically, international conflict. 
Hence, this is a dissertation about the relationship between arms racing and 
interstate conflict. The theoretical argument I lay out suggests arms races increase the 
chance for militarized conflict between states; to test this hypothesis I analyze the minor 
powers of the international system from 1970 to 2000 located in three important 
regions: the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. I pursue two broad goals in this 
research: first, the scholarly tradition linking arms racing to the onset of international 
conflict continues to lack any clear consensus; theoretical and empirical progress has 
been somewhat sporadic and so whether and how arms racing between a pair of states 
affects the likelihood of experiencing international conflict remains ripe for additional 
research. A recent piece by Gibler et al. (2005) argues similarly in their claim that 
"...little conclusive social science evidence exists as to whether arms races deter, 
escalate, or are spurious to conflict" (1). 
Second, the overwhelming majority of prior arms race and conflict studies 
focused on the major powers of the system2 with a preponderance of the Third World 
failing to receive much scholarly attention. As a result, the end of the Cold War (while a 
2
 Mullins (1987), however, did produce a quantitative study of militarization and economic development 
which analyzed a set of 48 minor power African states. 
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global public good) stymied future research on arms racing and conflict for both major 
and minor powers. As such, I shift the focus away from the handful of major powers in 
the system and instead investigate the relationship between arms racing and conflict 
amongst the nearly 100 minor powers that comprise the Middle East, Africa, and Latin 
American regions of the international system. 
I therefore proceed by recognizing the need for theoretical and empirical 
progress in the scholarly literature as well as the importance of developing a more 
stringent conceptual model of an arms race and using this model to investigate the 
relationship between arms racing and international conflict. Portions of this research 
will therefore center upon a crucial presentation and explanation of the arms race 
model I develop and utilize in this dissertation. Although I present my model of arms 
racing as an important contribution from this research I note here and later that 
ultimately this research is about explaining the onset of international conflict. To do so, 
however, requires a clear conception of how and why arms racing begins as well as an 
accurate definition and model of arms racing in order to establish a defensible empirical 
relationship between arms racing and conflict. 
1.3 Defining and Discussing Arms Racing 
It is prudent to offer here the definition of arms racing to be used throughout 
this dissertation as well as a brief discussion of how arms racing has been involved in 
recent international interactions. This is because popular conceptions of arms racing 
seem to misinterpret when and how an arms race actually begins. Countless cable news 
7 
channels often erroneously report the outbreak of an arms race or perhaps a potential 
arms race about to develop between some countries or region: "The general media now 
tends to equate it [arms racing] with any substantive development, progress, or buildup 
in weapons acquisition, but it takes two to compete [emphasis added]" (Tertrais, 2001: 
123). Additionally, a real arms race also takes both time and contention over issues to 
develop. They do not spring up rapidly and do not appear suddenly when some state 
just happens to disagree with the policy of another. 
Thus, the underlying theme of my research as alluded to above is real arms 
racing occurs only with sufficient time and reasonable motive. A definition of arms 
racing as it will be used throughout my investigation should help clarify much of what 
will follow: 
Definition: an arms race is a bilateral (dyadic) interaction in which both states 
consciously and observably increase their level of weapons stockpiles 
over an extended period of time against one another due to some 
underlying animosity over an issue/s. An arms race therefore 
involves reciprocal motive, increased arming, and time.3 
3
 In an expansive essay on arms racing, Colin Gray (1971) presented a similar definition of arms racing in 
an effort to capture the contentious and interactive nature of the phenomenon. He defined arms racing 
to be "Two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing 
or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and restructuring their respective military postures with a 
general attention to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behavior of the other parties" 
(40). Schelling and Halperin (1961) offer the following definition: "'Arms Race' refers to the interaction 
between two or more adversaries' military programs, to a tendency for each side's program to respond to 
what the other is doing. The arms level that each is willing to support depends on the level the other side 
has reached" (34). 
8 
This was certainly the case with the most well cited arms race to date, that 
between the United States and Soviet Union." A span of nearly fifty years and the quest 
for global hegemony fueled what eventually became a massive nuclear arms race 
between the two powers. The traditional focus on the Cold War arms race is just but 
one example of the larger pattern of scholarly attention that has been paid primarily to 
the major power states of the international system with much of the relevant literature 
oriented towards understanding arms racing in the context of the most 
powerful/important states in the system. Temporally, this has meant a particular focus 
on the racing that occurred amongst the European powers of the nineteenth century 
(mostly naval racing) as well as before and during the interwar period of the two World 
Wars and subsequent Cold War arms race of the twentieth century. 
Yet, in the context of the massive arms race, the Cold War passed rather 
unceremoniously. Today the Western European powers are at peace with each other, 
Russia and the United States have enjoyed normalized diplomatic relations and regular 
state visits since the dissolution, and China seems to understand that its continued 
economic success is intimately tied to future trade with the United States as well as 
reasonable periodic political concessions. This is not to suggest relations between the 
major powers are in perfect harmony; in the summer of 2007 Russian President Vladimir 
Putin accused the United States of instigating a "new round of the arms race" through 
the development of a missile defense shield (Shchedrov, 2007). 
4
 Some argue arms races (including that between the Soviet Union and the United States) may be the 
product of internal forces (such as bureaucratic momentum). I touch upon this notion in the literature 
review chapter that follows. 
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Indeed, old habits die hard; even with the shared experience of the Cold War, 
the overall trend towards democratization, and the potential for significant economic 
losses it would be foolish to blindly assume that no serious arms competition can or will 
ever spring up again between the major powers of the international system. However, 
major powers such as Russia, China, and the United States are the 'celebrities' of the 
international system, so to speak; even the most mundane of actions by such states 
receive close scrutiny and analysis. In this regard, military buildups and diplomatic 
deterioration between a pair of major powers will likely be at the very least 
documented from the outset so that appropriate pacifying measures and solutions can 
be developed quickly. It is not clear the beginnings of a potential arms race between a 
pair of minor states would receive such important early intervention. 
1.4 Why Minor Powers? 
It is true the majority of the scientific literature on arming and conflict has dealt 
with the major powers of the international system and understandably so. The past two 
hundred years of international relations have been undeniably shaped by the actions of 
major power states such as Prussia and Germany, Great Britain, France, Russia, and the 
United States especially during the twentieth century. Many analysts believe the 
international landscape of the future will be determined in large part by the actions of 
the United States and rising China. Indeed the pursuit of military superiority and the use 
of these weapons in the conflicts and wars between the major powers have affected 
billions of people throughout the world. 
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Yet, the importance of major powers in international relations in no way 
diminishes the role minor powers have played and continue to play in the international 
system. Small states have also sought to survive and influence their surroundings by 
building up military forces and waging conflict against others. Thus, an updated 
approach to the study of arms racing and international conflict should perhaps focus 
upon the minor powers of the international system. The forces of globalization have 
indeed made the world much smaller and minor powers now play a more important role 
in the stability of the international system: "...there can be no guarantee that a crisis in 
one of the world's micro-states will be containable, either locally or regionally. The 
threat to our stability is mutual, whether we be citizens of the small territory at the 
centre of the crisis or of a larger nation which finds itself drawn in" (Harden 1985: 1). 
My research therefore investigates whether the arming patterns of minor powers 
support the theoretical expectations presented later in this chapter: do minor power 
states engage in arms buildups and are these dyadic competitions associated with the 
onset of interstate conflict? 
Some would argue minor states have always been important players in the 
global arena but such claims are less evident when the traditional international relations 
scholarship is reviewed. Power Transition Theory, hegemonic stability, and the realist 
paradigm are all theoretical approaches and research agendas explicitly concerned with 
the consequences of major power interactions. Even Immanuel Wallerstein's (1979) 
World Systems framework conceptualized the globe as a three tiered system in which 
the Core (rich, powerful, industrialized nations) was supported and perpetuated by the 
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subservient Semi-Periphery and Periphery states. Although Semi-Periphery states might 
have some chance of economic development and ascension the majority of states 
would be confined to the rather inconsequential Periphery. 
Fortunately, there is some evidence to suggest the conventional wisdom may be 
shifting. Lemke's (2002) Regions of War and Peace partially inspires my approach 
because it adopts the traditionally major power oriented Power Transition Theory and 
applies it to a regionally based, minor power focused study of international conflict. He 
echoes the concern above regarding the importance of minor powers and notes: 
"We might be asked whether the Third World matters. This question is 
normatively offensive. Of course the Third World matters. Most of humanity 
lives in the Third World...mankind's ancient civilizations arose in The Third 
World...most of the material resources that facilitate the easy life those in the 
developed world enjoy are...from the Third World. Obviously, the Third World 
matters" (13). 
His quote shows at the very least there are normative concerns that highlight the 
importance of studying minor power states. Consider, for example, the swath of 
problems most minor power states in this analysis face: poverty, disease, and 
government corruption in Africa; authoritarianism, human rights violations, and 
terrorism in the Middle East; and economic underdevelopment, social exclusion, and 
increasingly leftist government regimes in Latin America. Latin America, for example, is 
home to some of the poorest nations in the Western world such as the lower Central 
American isthmus and the Andean group of nations including Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. 
Perhaps better known is the ongoing battle against illegal drug proliferation and 
exportation in many of these Latin American states. The narcotics trade alone 
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contributes to the illicit employment of many of Latin America's poorest citizens as well 
as to the political instability and ineffectiveness of the ruling governments. 
In Africa, the basic requirements for human survival are in short supply daily. A 
range of bacterial and viral diseases threaten millions each day and the necessary drug 
therapies such as antibiotics and vaccinations are in constant short supply. The lack of 
food sources and potable water cause significant amounts of death each day as well. 
Even more, political factions and violent guerilla groups undermine many of the 
legitimately elected African governments and propagate terror, violate human rights, 
and use violence against civilians regularly. The Middle East, even with its massive oil 
revenues, suffers from similarly low standards of living and deplorable human rights 
enforcement. Additionally, Middle Eastern states struggle constantly to suppress the 
destabilizing effects of terrorist activity and attacks upon their citizens. 
Just as important, however, recent and current political events serve to highlight 
the overwhelming relevance of analyzing and understanding the behavior of not just 
minor powers but regionally contained minor powers involved in arms racing. Arms 
racing in the Middle East tends to stoke the fears and apprehensions of the larger global 
community with even more urgency. For example, the large expansion of both the 
Iranian and Iraqi militaries in the 1980's was of serious concern to all states in the 
Middle East region. Additionally, Israel's arming behavior affects the entire region 
especially with respect to states such as Iran, Syria, and Egypt. 
Some of the more important and closely watched recent international 
developments have also involved the acquisition and production of various arms and 
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weapons. In the summer of 2007 the United States drew criticism for fanning a regional 
arms crisis in the Middle East through a massive sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia in an 
effort to counterbalance against an increasingly belligerent Iranian government. Steven 
Wright, a professor at Qatar University, notes that "It is a flawed logic for Washington to 
see the arms sales as a means of strengthening its position against Iran and enhancing 
regional security" (Janardhan, 2007). 
Furthermore, Iran has been steadily bolstering its military forces over the last 
decade reports the Associated Press (Shetty, 2005). Their ramping up of military forces 
can be attributed to longstanding Iranian grievances with surrounding neighbors and 
most recently the deterioration of diplomatic relations with the United States as well as 
Iran's potential to become involved (negatively) in Iraqi affairs of state. In mid July of 
2008, Iran conducted a series of medium and long range missile tests which Tehran 
indicated were a direct response to recent Israeli war games and weapons 
demonstrations against Iran. The Iranian air force commander General Hossein Salami 
quickly indicated the missiles were a display of Iranian power and the weapons would 
"demonstrate our resolve and might against enemies who in recent weeks have 
threatened Iran with harsh language" (Hirsh, 2008). 
In Latin America, a region often associated with social unrest and domestic 
political instability but not necessarily interstate conflict, the threat of regional military 
instability has been introduced by the arms increases of several states. Venezuela's 
Hugo Chavez has bolstered his populist/socialist rhetoric with real increases in his 
country's military portfolio that have concerned more moderate neighboring states and 
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frustrated United States officials. His administration has upheld a commitment 
instituted a decade ago to increase the numbers and raw capability of its military forces. 
Flush with significant buying power from its oil revenues Venezuela continues to expand 
its military hardware by making large purchases from states like Russia, China, and Iran 
who are often sympathetic (though perhaps not explicitly) towards Venezuela's socialist 
and anti-American rhetoric. 
Raul Zibechi (2007), a contributor to the Americas Program in Washington, DC, 
notes Venezuela has a keen interest in offsetting the advantages Chile has enjoyed due 
to its excellent political relationship with the United States who continues to send 
advanced weaponry and arms to the Chilean military. In attempting to achieve regional 
military superiority, Venezuela is also fortifying itself against Colombia (another 
American ally) and taking actions meant to reinforce claims by the Chavez 
administration of an imminent invasion by the United States military. Specifically, 
Zibechi notes about Venezuela's pursuit of arms: 
"It [Venezuela] also seeks to buy anti-air M l Tor missiles (similar to the ones just 
acquired by Iran), 24 SU-30 jetfighters, 30 transport and attack Mi-35 
helicopters, all from Russia, and half a dozen Military Corvettes and a dozen 
Spanish transport airplanes. Until now Venezuela has spent US$3 billion in 
weapons and now there is speculation that it could acquire between five and 
nine conventional submarines (diesel-electric). Although it doesn't amount to 
talk about a regional arms race, the truth is that Chavez appears to be 
developing a defense strategy" (Americas Program, July, 2007). 
In the Andean region of South America, states including Chile, Peru, and Bolivia 
continue to harbor disdain for one another as the result of territorial acquisitions and 
losses dating back to the end of the nineteenth century. Peru has raised concerns about 
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recent Chilean arming citing the behavior as having the potential to inflame an already 
tense relationship amongst the Andean group (UPI, 2009). With Chile's apparent goal of 
becoming the regional military power Peru now faces the choice of either standing 
down or ramping up its own arms portfolio. Additionally, there is a concern about the 
potential for building strong militaries with advanced weaponry in Latin America due to 
its relatively high development when compared to the Middle East and Africa, for 
example. 
Even Africa, a continent with no shortage of humanitarian crises, plays host to 
dangerous arms competitions amongst countries in both the north and southern 
regions. Ethiopia and Somalia continue to modify their militaries as a result of their 
sustained distrust and violent history with one another. Egypt, Algeria, and Libya all play 
crucial roles in the arming and militarization of North Africa. In less economically 
developed Southern Africa territorial concerns several years ago incited states such as 
Namibia and Botswana to seek increased armaments and military capacity in their 
efforts to settle land disputes in the region. Observers of the crisis between Namibia 
and Botswana did not hesitate to identify the situation as a legitimate regional arms 
race (Vines, 1996). 
What these brief synopses should suggest is that minor power arms racing is 
very much pandemic, produces unwanted and dangerous regional implications, and can 
quite easily develop into larger crises affecting the major powers. The stories above 
show how some of the most important events of the modern international landscape 
tend to involve issues related to arms and arms acquisitions. Although many more 
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examples surely exist, these brief synopses support my central argument that arms carry 
significant meaning and implications for states in the international system. Yet, even if 
arms competitions do not lead to conflict amongst these states, minor powers are 
exhausting crucial and scarce resources on weapons and military expansion as opposed 
to alleviating some of the major social and economic problems they continue to face. 
This is because for states in each of these regions even low levels of resources 
devoted to the military and arms races affects the ability of each state to remedy some 
of the many domestic social, political, and humanitarian issues (and in many cases, 
crises) they face. Indeed, the Central Intelligence Agency's World Fact Book (2008) 
analyzes the military expenditures of states as a percentage of their gross domestic 
product (GDP).5 For 2005-2006 none of the top fifteen ranked states6 are major powers. 
The top seven states are all in the Middle East, five of the remaining top fifteen ranked 
states are African nations, and a majority of the top forty ranked states are also spread 
out between the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America:7 
Table 1.1 
CIA World Fact Book: Military Expenditures 
5
 Table 3.1 is taken directly from the CIA World Fact Book located online at 
https://www.cia.gOv/librarv/publications/the-world-fac1:book/index.html 
6
 The top fifteen ranked states spent from a minimum of 5.5% to a maximum of 11.4% of their GDP on the 
military. The United States ranked 28th with 4.06%. 
7
 The top fifteen ranked are from highest to lowest are Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, 
Yemen, Armenia, Eritea, Macedonia, Burundi, Syria, Angola, Mauritania, and Maldives. 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
Country 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Israel 
Yemen 
Armenia 
Eritrea 
Macedonia 
Burundi 
Syria 
Angola 
Mauritania 
Maldives 
Kuwait 
Turkey 
El Salvador 
Morocco 
Singapore 
Swaziland 
Bahrain 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Brunei 
China 
Greece 
Chad 
United States 
Libya 
Russia 
Tajikistan 
Cuba 
Djibouti 
Cyprus 
Zimbabwe 
Namibia 
Colombia 
Gabon 
Egypt 
Turkmenistan 
Mil. Exp. (% of GDP) 
11.40 
10.00 
10.00 
8.60 
8.60 
7.30 
6.60 
6.50 
6.30 
6.00 
5.90 
5.90 
5.70 
5.50 
5.50 
5.30 
5.30 
5.00 
5.00 
4.90 
4.70 
4.50 
4.50 
4.50 
4.30 
4.30 
4.20 
4.06 
3.90 
3.90 
3.90 
3.80 
3.80 
3.80 
3.80 
3.70 
3.40 
3.40 
3.40 
3.40 
Date 
2005 est. 
2005 est. 
2005 est. 
2006 
2006 
2006 
2006 
FY01 
2006 est. 
2005 est. 
2006 est. 
2005 est. 
2006 
2006 
2005 est. 
2006 
2005 est. 
2006 
2003 est. 
2005 est. 
2006 
2006 
2005 est. 
2006 
2006 
2005 est. 
2006 
2005 est. 
2005 est. 
2005 
2005 est. 
2006 est. 
2006 
2005 est. 
2006 
2006 
2005 est. 
2005 est. 
2005 est. 
2005 est. 
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In addition a large portion of the minor power states listed above are actually 
increasing the size of their military forces at a rate equal to or higher than some of the 
most important major powers of the system. These basic figures alone indicate 
'problem areas' - states and regions that appear to be spending significant resources on 
their militaries - and I argue it is critically important to understand whether these and 
other minor powers are involved in dangerous arms racing within their regions and if 
arms racing is facilitating interstate conflict amongst such states. I have also argued that 
from a research perspective there is much yet to be learned from studying the minor 
powers of the international system. 
It is clear minor power states continue to gain influence in the international 
arena and the data above indicates minor powers are engaged in the same type of 
arming behavior as major powers; again, the rankings above clearly show a large 
number of developing nations continue to spend significant amounts of scarce 
resources on their militaries. As Lemke (2002) notes a majority of people live in the 
developing world and thus the governments of minor powers are increasingly important 
to not only the fates of their own citizens but to the fortunes of people living in 
neighboring states and around the world. 
Taking this a step further, arms and especially arms races amongst minor powers 
therefore have the potential to be enormously destructive for an overwhelming number 
of the world's citizens. Sample (2002) concludes "...we must remember that a 
significant segment of the world's population lives in minor states, and wars between 
them destroy individual lives just as surely as any general war" (670). Given the 
19 
resources expended on military expansion come at the expense of critical economic, 
social, and humanitarian development for many of these states it is entirely appropriate 
to want a better understanding of the arming behavior and conflict propensity of such 
minor power states. 
1.5 Focusing on Issues 
Issues drive international politics amongst states. They are present in every 
facet of international relations and shape the relationships states have with one 
another. Indeed, if there were no issues over which states competed then there would 
be little reason for states to interact and virtually no likelihood for militarized conflict. 
Keohane (1984) effectively described such a situation as 'harmony' and noted "Harmony 
is apolitical. No communication is necessary, and no influence need be exercised" (53). 
Keohane, of course, concluded harmony is essentially absent in world politics and this 
absence of harmony means states must grapple with issues constantly. Thus, the power 
of issues lies in the extent to which they affect the interactions of states: specifically, 
issues provide a context for states to become concerned with one another. Depending 
on the issue, a shared concern can quickly become serious tension and contention. My 
dissertation, therefore, is about identifying such states in competition with one another 
and determining if these states arms race and, ultimately, become involved in conflict 
with one another. 
The theory employed in this dissertation is rooted in the steps-to-war approach 
to international relations (Vasquez, 1993; Senese and Vasquez, 2008) which utilizes an 
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issue based understanding of arms racing and international relations: the notion of 
contention over issues is therefore the foundational assumption of my theory of arms 
racing and conflict. That is, to understand and properly study arms races means to 
correctly identify not just whether pairs of states were increasing their arms over time 
but whether any given pair of states are actually directing these increases against one 
another. The importance of this theoretical orientation is explained in Senese and 
Vasquez (2008) who argue convincingly: "The fundamental factors that distinguish 
states that never go to war from those that do center on the issues that divide them 
[emphasis added] and, more importantly, how they handled those issues" (174). 
Recall the general statement made earlier that arms racing requires time and 
motive: in this dissertation I identify arms racing based on a set of operational criteria 
that will require a certain increase in overall arms stockpiles over some period of time 
and in the context of some observable tension directed against the opposing state. This 
notion of underlying tension amongst states is a critically important part of my analysis 
of arms racing in this dissertation: I argue issues drive the international politics between 
states and that it is contention and disagreement over such issues that precede arms 
races. 
Issues are a foundational concept in my dissertation because they explain why 
certain states become concerned with other states and how contention over such issues 
can lead to arms racing and potential conflict. My claim is bolstered by the influential 
work of Mansbach and Vasquez (1981) who argue clearly that "Substantive issues lie at 
the heart of politics, providing not only an overall purpose to contention, but having a 
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major impact on the way in which contention is conducted" (69). A recent piece of 
research by Hensel et al. (2008) begins with the simple assertion that "Contentious 
issues are important sources of militarized conflict" (117). Indeed, the role of issues in 
shaping international relations has shaped the research agendas of some of the most 
important scholars involved in international relations/conflict studies. 
The importance of issues amongst states permeates my dissertation and is the 
foundation of the steps-to-war theory (Vasquez, 1993; Senese and Vasquez, 2008) I 
advance later in chapter three. Issues are the antecedent factors that produce 
contention and competition amongst states which then encourages these states to 
engage one another in dangerous arms racing. Conversely, if there are no issues at 
stake then there is little reason to expect disagreement, arms competitions, and, 
ultimately, conflict between states. Noting that the realist paradigm has been explicitly 
concerned with explaining why states fight Mansbach and Vasquez (1981) suggest 
realists fail to realize "...cooperation/conflict is almost an epiphenomenon of the 
attempt to get actors to shift their issue position" (233). 
The steps-to-war theory I discuss in chapter three relies heavily on the notion 
that the salience of issues directly affects how states will interact with one another in 
the international system and assumes there can be no discussion of arms racing and 
certainly no potential for conflict unless there are issues over which states are 
competing with one another. In his seminal work and the first comprehensive 
presentation of the steps-to-war theory Vasquez (1993) notes without qualification that 
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"All wars begin with issues..." (124). For him, war and international conflicts are the 
direct results of states unable to resolve salient issues. 
Such issues forcefully and quickly bring states into contention with one another 
and set into motion the use of 'power politics' that all too often funnels states down the 
path to militarized conflict (Vasquez 1983; 1993). Since issues are the primary reasons 
for the dangerous competition and contention amongst states that leads such states 
into conflict with one another then it becomes absolutely critical to shift the focus away 
from notions of power and capability exclusively. Instead, Vasquez (1993) argues, 
scholars must understand the factors that bring about disagreement and tenuous 
relations at the very outset - the issues themselves: "The way to peace is...to 
understand what kinds of issues are prone to violence and how they might be dealt with 
differently" (151).8 
Issues have indeed become an indispensable component in a variety of 
important research programs.9 While only a sampling of related research topics, the 
issue based approach to international relations research has been used in studies of 
territory and conflict (Vasquez, 1995; Hensel, 1996), rivalry formation and conflict 
(Vasquez, 1996; Valeriano, 2003), rivalry termination (Bennett, 1996), alliances and 
conflict (Gibler, 1997), and the enforcement of negotiated peace settlements (Werner, 
1999). New and important research in the area of foreign policy decision making also 
8
 Of course, Vasquez (1993; 1995, 2000) has argued and provided empirical evidence suggesting territory 
to be the most salient of all issues for states. 
91 would note here this has not been the case, however, in much of the arms race literature. The role of 
issues in arms racing and conflict is something I therefore develop throughout the following chapters. 
Hence, I posit my orientation around the role of issues in arms racing and conflict as a primary 
contribution of this dissertation. 
23 
incorporates the issue based approach to international relations and the foreign policy 
behavior of states. In their two-good theory of foreign policy decision making Palmer 
and Morgan (2006) begin their theory by noting "In developing our model, we begin 
with the notion that politics, whether international or domestic, occurs over issues...The 
essence of politics is the struggle among political actors to achieve favorable outcomes 
on issues" (19). 
Even some of the exclusively rational choice and formal approaches to the study 
of conflict and war have identified issues as at least a partial explanation for states' 
inability to avoid militarized conflict. Fearon (1995), for example, theorized that war 
results when states are unable to converge their individually held preferences within a 
mutually acceptable bargaining range.10 He argues such bargaining failures are primarily 
the result of states' incentives to misrepresent information as well as the inability to 
credibly commit to a proposed negotiated settlement. Nonetheless, Fearon notes the 
outbreak of war may also be due to the indivisibility of issues: 
"States might be unable to locate a peaceful settlement both prefer due to issue 
indivisibilities. Perhaps some issues, by their very natures, simply will not admit 
compromise. Though neither example is wholly convincing, issues that might 
exhibit indivisibility include abortion in domestic politics and the problem of 
which prince sits on the throne of, say, Spain, in eighteenth- or nineteenth-
century international politics...War-prone international issues may often be 
effectively indivisible, but the cause of this indivisibility lies in domestic political 
and other mechanisms rather than in the nature of the issues themselves" (381-
382). 
This refers to the 'rationalist' explanation for war in which rationally motivated states are unable to 
achieve ex ante agreements that would avoid costly warfare. 
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Unfortunately, one of the fundamental problems with previous arms race and 
conflict studies has been the failure to incorporate issues as the primary factors that 
drive arms races and conflict.11 Scholars either assumed all states were in competition 
with one another all of the time or chose to study the influence of arms racing on the 
escalation patterns of states already involved in serious conflict. Since both approaches 
dismiss the centrality of issues in producing contention and competition amongst states 
such strategies are problematic for analyzing the effects of arms racing on international 
conflict. 
As I continue to emphasize one of my primary goals in this dissertation is to 
utilize the issue based approach to international relations in my analysis of arms racing 
and international conflict. This is because intuitively states where tension is present are 
the only states likely to be arms racing one another. Hence, as I argue theoretically in 
chapter three the presence of contentious issues is the very first step in my analysis of 
arms racing and conflict: there must be some underlying level of tension - contention 
over issues - driving a hostile relationship between states. Only in such states is an 
analysis of arms racing and the subsequent likelihood of conflict appropriate. 
In some of the brief examples discussed earlier it is clear the role issues play in 
creating and proliferating tension and competition amongst states. In the Middle East, 
the issue of a sovereign Palestinian homeland continues to drive much of the regional 
hostility. Issues related to natural resources such as oil, arms transfers, and 
11A recent piece by Rider (2009) argues many previous arms race studies have ignored the factors that 
actually produce arms races to begin with. He notes "Most arms race research focuses on the 
consequences of arms races, but this focus has come at the expense of an equally important question: 
why do states engage in arms races in the first place?" (Rider, 2009). The author suggests it is issues -
territorial issues, specifically - that drive arms races between states. 
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militarization as well as religious (Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims) and ethnic divisions (Arabs 
and Persians) also contribute to ongoing tensions between many states in the Middle 
East. In Latin America, leftist regimes continue to clash with more democratic and 
market based governments. Some leftist governments exploit the favorable 
relationship neighboring democracies enjoy with the United States to incite interstate 
competition and fan domestic populist rhetoric.12 Longstanding territorial claims and 
access to natural resources also sustain contentious relations in the region. Lastly, 
African nations face a host of potentially troublesome issues daily. Ethnic tensions and 
border claims13 - many the result of colonial gerrymandering - continue to strain the 
governments of many African nations. Precious resources and corrupt, militaristic 
governments also strain relationships between neighboring states. Simply put, 
contention over issues drives tension between states and provides the context in which 
arms racing can develop and lead to interstate conflict. 
1.6 Leaving the Realist Paradigm Behind 
It is important to note here, however, the issue-based, steps-to-war approach I 
adopt in this dissertation is perhaps in contrast to previous arms racing and conflict 
studies utilizing what scholars have come to collectively refer to as the realist paradigm. 
In modern political science and international relations scholarship the realist paradigm 
12
 This was seen most recently with Venezuela's condemnation of Colombia's attack against guerilla 
groups in Ecuador. In criticizing the United States for sanctioning Colombia's actions Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez claimed "It must be said: They, the empire [The United States] and its lackeys 
[Colombia], are war. We are peace. We are the path to peace" (Romero, 2008). Please see full article at: 
http://www.nvtimes.com/2008/03/06/world/americas/06venez.html 
Disputes between Somalia and Ethiopia over the decision in 1948 by the Allied nations to grant the 
Ogaden region to Ethiopia reflect this ongoing problem exactly. 
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has developed and proliferated through the works of scholars such as Morgenthau 
(1948), Waltz (1979), and Mearsheimer (2001), to name only a few. Yet, many 
international relations scholars argue the origins of the realist paradigm can be traced 
back to the ancient scholars and historians of Greece and the surrounding 
Mediterranean system of city-states. Among others, Cusack and Stoll (1990) note: "The 
roots of realism in the study of international politics stretch back thousands of years and 
across cultures. It is clearly recognizable in Thucydides' (400 B.C/1954) work on the 
Peloponnesian War..." (19). 
Few would debate realism has had an immeasurable effect on the field of 
international relations and most would agree it has been to varying degrees the 
dominant theoretical account of how states operate in the international system. 
Valeriano (2009) even contends that "Realism remains the dominant paradigm of 
international relations theory" (179). Indeed, some of the most important international 
relations scholars have worked diligently to "...provoke a debate about the realist 
paradigm..." in the hopes such a debate would "...loosen its grip on the field" (Vasquez, 
1998: 190). To a certain extent, the work of such dissenters has proven fruitful; 
although the realist paradigm has enjoyed considerable longevity its utility as a 
systematic, scientifically sound approach to understanding the international interactions 
of states has diminished significantly. 
In many ways the realist paradigm - massive as it may be - has been hijacked by 
its own theoretical offshoots. Consider just three of the most important realist authors 
introduced earlier. Morgenthau (1948) - often considered the father of classical realism 
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- argued the principal goal of man (and therefore states) is to acquire power over 
others. Much of his theoretical argument about power is derived from assumptions 
regarding the nature of man as developed earlier in Thomas Hobbes' classic treatise 
Leviathan in 1651. For Hobbes, man exists in a state of nature where life is more often 
than not 'brutish and short'; as a result, power is the most direct means by which man 
(a state) can combat the threats posed by others and flourish. Thus, Morgenthau 
posited man's nature provides the incentives for states to acquire power in the 
international system. 
Waltz (1979) argued differently. In his neorealism, the morality of man plays no 
role in the decisions states make towards one another. He argues the international 
system is anarchic and thus lacking any supreme authority or enforcement mechanism 
and that the system is also structured and the structure of the international system 
cannot be meaningfully changed by any one state. Since states cannot change the rules 
of the system and because the intentions of others are always uncertain they attempt to 
acquire a favorable distribution of power. Given that Waltz assumes states seek security 
above all else, the rational strategy for all states is to bolster their own prospects for 
survival by pursuing as much power as possible for themselves. The importance of the 
structure of the system in Waltz's account of international relations has led some to 
refer to his theory as structural realism. 
Mearsheimer's (2001) work provides another twist on the realist paradigm. He 
utilizes the same basic assumptions of previous realist scholarship but argues states 
must not only pursue power but use it whenever possible to preempt and defeat 
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military threats from other states. Herein lies the 'tragedy' of international politics: the 
perpetual desire of states to acquire more and more power through whatever means 
necessary including the use of military force against other states. Therefore, the 
structure of the system motivates states to pursue power but the accumulation of 
power cannot simply be for defensive purposes (survival) as neorealists argue; instead, 
it is a political imperative that states act aggressively and use their military power 
whenever possible to neutralize potential threats and hazards from other states in the 
international system. The end result is an international system where the most 
important actors - the major powers - are in constant conflict with one another. 
Hence, what is seen here are three different realist scholars with three different 
versions of realism and investigating other realist scholars would produce similarly 
varied accounts of realism. Thus, the realist paradigm has faced strict criticisms for its 
propensity to vary its assumptions and tenets from scholar to scholar. In his critique of 
the realist paradigm Vasquez (1998) provided strong arguments suggesting realism was 
now a degenerative research program. His arguments are grounded in a philosophy of 
science approach using logical standards found in the work of Lakatos (1970). The 
essential argument advanced by Lakatos (1970) and utilized by Vasquez (1998) involves 
the idea of theory falsifiability. It is this principal that realists and the realist paradigm 
have continued to violate with each iteration of realism. 
The problem is acute. If assumptions and basic tenets of a theory continue to 
change and shift from generation to generation, or even from author to author, then it 
becomes virtually impossible to falsify a theoretical argument since the theory can be 
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revised to account for all potential empirical outcomes (evidence). Vasquez (1998) thus 
notes: 
"Lakatos (1970: 116-117) sees a research program as degenerating if its auxiliary 
propositions increasingly take on the characteristic of ad hoc explanations that 
do not produce any novel (theoretical) facts and new "corroborated" empirical 
content...A degenerating problemshift or research program, then, is 
characterized by the use of semantic devices that hide the actual content-
decreasing nature of the research program through reinterpretation (Lakatos, 
1970: 119). In this way, the new theory or set of theories is really ad hoc 
explanations intended to save the theory (Lakatos, 1970:117)" (243:244). 
As a result, the realist paradigm has lost credibility amongst many scholars who 
find it nearly impossible to identify 'realism' proper. Instead, most tend to view realism 
as suffering from the exact form of degenerative theory shifts and ad hoc revisions 
outlined by Vasquez (1998) above and since each version of realist doctrine therefore 
appears to explain something different many conclude realism ultimately explains very 
little at all. This fact alone makes it very difficult to adopt a realist approach to my study 
of arms racing and conflict in this dissertation even if for some it would seem a natural 
choice. 
Beyond the philosophy of science problems associated with the realist paradigm 
there is at least one important theoretical deficiency (which I have already alluded to 
numerous times above) that is especially problematic for an analysis of arms racing and 
interstate conflict. A strict interpretation of realism suggests all states must be worried 
about all other states, all of the time. Since the system is anarchic states can only rely 
upon themselves and must assume all other states are potential threats, if not outright 
enemies. The logical choice for any state wishing to compete and survive is to thus 
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pursue a strategy of arming as much as possible with the understanding that other 
states in the system are likely pursuing the same strategy. Realist scholars argue such 
competitions for security invariably lead states into the familiar security dilemma. Jervis 
(1976) summarizes the above dynamic succinctly: 
"The roots of what can be called the spiral model reach to the anarchic setting of 
international relations. The underlying problem lies neither in limitations on 
rationality imposed by human psychology nor in a flaw in human nature, but in a 
correct appreciation of the consequences of living in a Hobbesian state of 
nature. In such a world without a sovereign, each state is protected only by its 
own strength. Furthermore, statesmen realize that, even if others currently 
harbor no aggressive designs, there is nothing to guarantee that they will not 
later develop them" (62). 
The quote by Jervis (1976) clearly reiterates the realist strategy that all states 
should arm against all other states all of the time. Unfortunately, this is simply not the 
case. If states acted as realists theorize, then the international system would be one of 
perpetual and large scale arming and continual militarized conflict. Any casual observer 
of international politics knows this is not the case. Practically speaking, states lack the 
economic resources to behave as realists expect: a true attempt by any state to arm 
itself against all other states (or even many other states) would exhaust its resources on 
all fronts in little to no time. 
Apart from the practical inability for states to perpetually arm themselves 
against all other states there is a more theoretically oriented explanation for why states 
are not following realist doctrine all (or even most) of the time. It is a fact most states, 
most of the time have no reason to compete (arm) against one another. This means one 
of the central assumptions of realism - that states must assume the worst intentions 
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about others - is in direct contradiction to what is borne out in the real world everyday. 
Vasquez (1993) notes this much in arguing that "The great mistake of realism has been 
to assume that a struggle for power is a constant verite of history..." (148). As a result, 
the critical policy prescription derived from this realist assumption must be rejected: 
most states should not be concerned with most other states at any given moment in 
time and thus should not pursue a policy of increased arming against them. 
This is true of even the most 'important' states in the international system. 
Consider the case of the United States, for example. Right now in 2009 there are but a 
handful of states that most scholars and policy makers alike would consider of serious 
concern to the United States: Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela come to mind first. 
Perhaps some might include Russia in this list but even though tensions between the 
United States and Russia have fluctuated from relatively good to relatively poor the 
prospect of any serious militarized conflict remains quite low. My point is made even 
stronger when discussing minor powers - the focus of this dissertation - and their 
relationships with one another. These are states with primarily regional concerns that 
simply do not have meaningful enough political relations and interactions with most 
other states throughout the international system such that they would engage in arms 
racing with these states; that is, their interests and concerns are with a select group of 
states with which they inhabit a certain geographical region. 
The inability of the realist paradigm to provide an accurate description of the 
international system as I have characterized it above stems from one critical oversight: 
the role of issues in international relations. In their comprehensive offering of an issue 
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based approach to international politics Mansbach and Vasquez (1981) identified the 
realist paradigm as an approach to international politics that focused too much on 
power and not enough on the issues that drive states towards either peace or conflict: 
"The issue challenge to the realist paradigm stems from the claim that the single 
issue of power fails to account for the existence of a global community, primitive 
has it may be, and the patterns of cooperation and peace that are actually more 
characteristic of it than war and conflict...The belief that the struggle for power is 
the dominant issue fails to accommodate the multiplicity of values and stakes for 
which actors both cooperate and compete" (11). 
They conclude by explicitly noting how "...the realist paradigm ignores issue as a 
significant variable" (Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981: 23). Hence, as I have made clear I 
adopt the issue based approach to international relations in my dissertation and assume 
only between states where contentious issues exist can there be arms racing and -just 
as the steps to war theory suggests - arms races are one of the critical events that lead 
states down the path to militarized conflict. 
1.7 Dissertation Roadmap 
Again, at least some scholars would agree that the arms race literature has 
suffered on two primary fronts: the absence of strong theoretical motivation and a 
general lack of consistent empirical findings. As I have mentioned in this introductory 
chapter I seek to improve on both areas by utilizing an important and clearly developed 
theoretical framework - the-steps-to-war theory - that provides the logic linking arms 
races to militarized conflict. This theoretical framework coupled with the empirical 
results provided in the following chapters establishes a strong and positive relationship 
between arms racing and conflict. 
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Thus, the plan of the dissertation is as follows: chapter two presents a review of 
the relevant literature in an effort to locate my research question within this specific 
stream of quantitative arms race scholarship; chapter three follows where I lay out the 
steps-to-war theory as characterized most notably by Vasquez (1993) and Senese and 
Vasquez (2008) that provides the theoretical account linking arms racing to conflict 
onset from which I derive the central testable hypothesis; chapter four contains the 
design approach which details the data, methods, and operationalizations of the key 
concepts and variables; chapters five, six, and seven show the empirical results 
separately for each of the three regions analyzed (the Middle East, Africa, and Latin 
America); chapter eight concludes the dissertation with a summary discussion of the 
empirical results, additional implications, as well as suggestions for future related 
research. 
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Chapter 2 
Arms Racing: Revisiting Some Selected Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
One of the earliest and most well known mathematical and formalized 
approaches to the study of international relations focused upon arms races and their 
implications for states and the international system. Among other scholarly 
contributions, Lewis F. Richardson (1960) contributed to the study of international 
conflict by offering an explicit and formalized model of arms racing. Even as a relative 
'outsider' to the study of political science and international relations (originally a 
mathematician and meteorological expert) Richardson recognized the centrality of arms 
racing to the escalation of international crises and the onset of interstate conflict. 
Indeed, Richardson argued the outbreak of World War I was significantly 
provoked by the uncontrolled arms racing of the European powers including Germany, 
Great Britain, France, and Russia. This chapter begins with a discussion of Richardson's 
invaluable contribution to the quantitative and scientific study of arms racing and 
international conflict, surveys some of the more important and relevant quantitative 
arms race research, and concludes with a brief overview of my intended contributions. 
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2.2 Richardson's Contribution 
The Richardson model - a set of differential equations - conceptualizes arms 
racing as an international interaction driven by the behavior and perceptions that the 
involved states have of one another. Specifically, State A's arms portfolio varies over 
time as a function of State B's arms stockpile; as State B increases its arms stockpile so 
attempts State A to match these increases. That is: "In an arms race, the opposing sides 
try, with some success, to maintain a balance of power...the ratio, or the difference, 
between their armaments remains fairly stably near to a constant" (Richardson 1960, 
23).u Although the primary component of the Richardson arms race model is indeed 
the armament level exhibited by the other state the total level of weaponry a state 
achieves is also determined by the amount of 'grievances' State A holds towards State B 
as well as a parameter representing the fatigue and costs associated with maintaining 
and expanding an arsenal: 
Note that while the objective is to maintain a balance of power through arming, the equations 
nonetheless allow for the possibility of the arms race to become unstable and 'blow up'. 
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The Richardson Linear Theory of Two Nations 
dx/dt = ky- ax + g 
dy/dt = lx-j3y + h 
where the change in x's arms over time t is a function of the menaces posed by y, some positive defense 
coefficient k, some negative constant or representing the fatigue and costs of maintaining defenses, and 
some parameter g symbolizing the grievances held against the opposing state 
Although Richardson himself believed there was a strong relationship between 
arms racing and the likelihood of international conflict (as did other scholars), the 
quantitative conflict literature since his original study has been much less consistent 
regarding the effects of arms races on conflict. Scholars have indeed approached the 
study of arms racing in a variety of ways since Richardson's original study.16 Although 
most researchers have analyzed arms racing out of the belief that arms races lead states 
into war with one another the actual results of these studies have found no such 
consistent relationship. Therefore, my own research in this dissertation is partially 
motivated by some of the inconsistencies found in the quantitative literature.17 
Taken from Chapter 2 of Richardson (1960). 
An early piece by Huntington (1958) distinguished between quantitative arms races and qualitative 
arms races where qualitative arms racing refers to a state "...replacing its existing forms of military force 
(normally weapons systems) with new and more effective forms of force" (24). Some scholars argue, 
however, qualitative advancements are relatively rare and usually confined to only the most powerful 
states in the system and so research has tended to focus upon quantitative arms racing. 
Some early studies critique the specification of the Richardson model itself. Majeski and Jones (1981) 
identified twelve cases of purported arms racing and concluded the Richardson model was overly 
restrictive and failed to properly specify any of the twelve cases (in seven cases the dyad's expenditures 
were entirely independent of one another while in the other five only some level interdependence could 
be established). Additionally, Stoll (1982) argues that Richardson's equations make it extremely difficult 
to determine whether empirical results obtained from estimating his differential equations are being 
driven by external factors (your enemy's arms acquisitions) or internal factors (bureaucratic momentum). 
Since the two main explanatory parameters undoubtedly suffer from multicollinearity, the unfortunate 
implication is that the Richardson model will tend to provide coefficients that describe a given data set 
quite well regardless of whether the true underlying data generating process was externally or internally 
driven. 
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A typical quantitative, mathematically oriented piece of arms race research in 
the Richardsonian tradition is Lambelet et al. (1979). This piece added to the theoretical 
discussion by arguing the process of arms racing is driven through some combination of 
mutual and self-stimulation. Although the Richardson model clearly indicates arms 
racing is about both external threat (mutual stimulation) in addition to some internal 
constraints (the fatigue associated with maintaining defenses) Lambelet et al. (1979) 
noted that "While the possibility of self-stimulation is not altogether ignored in the work 
of Richardson and his followers, the emphasis is clearly on the mutual-stimulation 
(action-reaction, positive feedback) mechanism in arms races" (49). Hence, they used 
the Richardson model shown above as an example of arms racing driven primarily -
though not completely - through mutual stimulation. In this approach, an arms 
competition occurs through an action-reaction process where each move (arms 
increase) is matched or exceeded by the other state. Therefore, the arms race is almost 
entirely the result of two states reacting to one another, hence a mutual stimulation 
dynamic. 
The authors, however, argued self-stimulation may be playing a larger role in 
driving arms races and should be included in a unified theory of arms racing. The self 
stimulation approach adopts the traditional bureaucratic/incrementalist framework 
popularized in the studies of budgetary politics. Self stimulated arms racing is thus 
conducted through a host of domestically driven factors such as "bureaucratic inertia, 
technological momentum, economic and political vested interests, autistic perceptions, 
or some broad, sociological concept such as the military industrial complex" (Lambelet 
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et al. 1979: 49). Their contribution was important because the authors used data to 
empirically evaluate the extent to which mutual-stimulation and self-stimulation drives 
arms racing. Using defense expenditure data for the United States and Soviet Union 
from 1945-1975 to model the American-Soviet arms race they concluded neither a 
purely mutual nor purely self-stimulated approach adequately modeled the process of 
arms racing between the United States and Soviet Union.18 
In addition to the theoretical considerations discussed above19 there has been a 
substantial literature dealing with the modeling and quantitative study of arms racing 
not all of which I can reasonably cover in this literature review. Indeed, in a 
comprehensive review piece of the arms race literature over the ten year period 1970-
1980 Moll and Leubbert (1980) claim "We found over eighty studies in addition to the 
reviews, and we suspect that our survey has not been exhaustive" (157). With this in 
mind, some of the earliest quantitative and statistical estimations of arms racing were 
also developed by Lambelet (1971; 1979). These pieces used basic econometric 
techniques such as OLS regression to help bring the study of arms racing into the 
quantitative, empirically rooted scientific study of international relations and conflict. 
The focus was on understanding defense expenditures in the context of overall GNP 
figures and how such spending related to the onset and maintenance of arms racing. 
Specifically, Lambelet et al. (1979) found that "...mutual and self-stimulation tend to be about equally 
important in the United States...Mutual stimulation is seen to be important in the Soviet Union too, even 
more so than in the US...The most striking finding, however, is how large self-stimulation seems to loom in 
the USSR. Thus, overall the conclusion would be that Soviet self-stimulation is largely what keeps the 
arms race going" (62). 
19
 See Lambelet (1975) for some additional theoretically focused discussion of arms racing and conflict. 
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Lambelet (1986) himself notes these early pieces suffered from some very 
obvious econometric problems, most notably a low number of observations and high 
number of model parameters. However, these early pieces tend to investigate more the 
strategies for modeling the arms race itself. In contrast, I am concerned more with the 
relationship between arms racing and conflict and less so with a priori considerations of 
what theoretical and/or statistical factors may be influencing the arms race.20 To 
reiterate again, although I develop my own model of arms racing the dependent 
variable of interest is the presence of international conflict and not the arms race itself. 
2.3 Chronicling Relevant Quantitative Studies of Arms Racing 
The following is an overview of a series of related arms race studies conducted 
over the past several decades. I review these studies because they are important and 
relevant precursors for my dissertation for several reasons. First, the studies reviewed 
in this section represent a collection of related quantitatively oriented studies that 
produced conflicting empirical results regarding the relationship between arms racing 
and international conflict and war.21 Second, each of the following quantitative arms 
race and conflict studies employed empirical data from the now widely used Correlates 
of War data project (Singer and Small, 1972; Small and Singer, 1982; Sarkees, 2000). 
20
 Obviously, variations in the actual modeling of an arms race can affect the likelihood of observing 
international conflict. However, the research focused on the modeling of the arms race itself presented 
above in Lambelet (1971; 1979; 1986) as well as in Lambelet (1973; 1987) and Isard and Anderton (1985) 
and Anderton (1989) is somewhat removed from my focus on arms racing and conflict (to which Lambelet 
[1975] is more related). 
These studies are not explicitly concerned with modeling the arms race or determining what factors 
may be driving arms racing; their primary focus is investigating whether arms racing leads states into 
conflict with one another. 
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Variables such as defense expenditures used to model arms racing, power, and 
instances of international conflict are all drawn directly from the COW project. 
Hence, although I abandon the use of defense expenditure data in my 
dissertation the population of cases I analyze as well as the data I use to measure my 
dependent and control variables are all drawn from COW as well. Most importantly, 
however, is an observation made by Sample (1997) who notes "...attempts to find a 
direct link between arms races and war have met with mixed success, suggesting that 
conceptual, measurement, and sample differences in quantitative studies have affected 
the results of the studies..." (8). My overarching goal, therefore, is to resolve some of 
the inconsistent empirical results produced by the following group of studies 
This dissertation is therefore located within a thread of quantitative arms racing 
and international conflict literature of which one of the early standard pieces is Wallace 
(1979). Analyzing a set of almost 100 militarized interstate disputes, he found that over 
90% of those disputes which escalated to war involved an arms race. Such ostensibly 
strong results attracted some criticism, however; for one thing, the Wallace study 
selected on the dependent variable (conflict) so that it was unclear whether a 
population of cases existed that experienced an arms race but failed to reach conflict or 
war status. More specifically, scholars such as Weede (1980) criticized his population 
sample for consisting mostly of an abundance of World War I and World War II dyads. 
The dyads obtained from the two major world wars alone, it was argued, were driving a 
majority of the empirical results.22 Additionally, Weede argued that Wallace's approach 
2219 of 23 of Wallace's (1979) conflict dyads that escalated to war were World War l/ll dyads. 
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could not decipher whether the outbreak of war was the result of the arms race itself or 
instead an inability of one state to match the other state's rate of arming. 
Several years later, Diehl (1983) raised additional concerns. His criticism was 
linked to Wallace's (1979) actual construction of the arms race index. The problem, 
Diehl argues, is multifaceted: to begin with, Wallace's analysis determines only whether 
the disputants are engaged in some form of rapid buildup but offers no confirmation of 
whether the rapid buildup is actually directed against one another; even more troubling 
notes Diehl (1983) is that the arms racing index is a simple multiplicative function. That 
is, under Wallace's (1979) construction an 'arms race' can be coded if one state has a 
very low arming index but if its opponent has a very high arming index. These two 
indices multiplied together would therefore give the impression of a bilateral arms race 
when, in fact, only one state is really engaged in a rapid buildup.23 
Thus, Diehl (1983) conducted a reformulated analysis in which a new measure of 
arms racing was utilized that was "...constructed from the newly revised COW file on 
military expenditures...for each side in the three years prior to the initiation of the 
dispute" (208). His results linking arms racing and the likelihood of international conflict 
were far less conclusive: only about 25% of the disputes involving an ongoing arms race 
escalated into war. Diehl (1985) followed up his own study by investigating the 
likelihood of a unilateral arms buildup or a bilateral arms race ending in capitulation or 
war. Surprisingly, the presence of an arms race seemed to have little effect on 
23
 Diehl uses the example of State A having an arms index of 100 (very high) but state B having an index of 
1 (very low); multiplied together, this yields an arming index of 100 but betrays the fact that state B is not 
really engaged in a rapid buildup at all. 
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hindering a compromise or capitulation outcome (the 'no war' case) and unilateral 
stockpiling turned out to have little effect on the probability of victory. 
Horn (1987) entered the debate by introducing yet another measure of a rapid 
mutual military buildup (arms race) that differed from Wallace's (1979). Relative to 
previous indices of racing, Horn's requirements for the presence of an arms race are 
more demanding. His measure analyzed major power disputes over the period 1816-
1980: for an arms race to occur, a country's defense expenditures in the ten years 
preceding a dispute must be on average higher than in the entire temporal domain 
under scrutiny. Additionally, this increased spending must be higher in the second half 
of the period (that is, the last five years of the ten year window) than in the first half. 
This requirement ensures the arms race is actually spiraling upwards and not 
decelerating as time progresses. His principle findings using this measure are that 
longer lasting arms races - those spanning at least twelve years - are by far more war 
prone than shorter duration arms races - those lasting six years - which yielded no 
significant relationship. 
What becomes clear at this point is that the empirical record concerning arms 
racing among major powers and the likelihood of international conflict is inconsistent, 
to say the least. The quantitative literature discussed above analyzing the relationship 
between arms racing and war ranges the gamut from extreme (Wallace, 1979) to very 
weak correlation (Diehl, 1983,1985). In an attempt to reconcile these conflicting results 
Sample (1996; 1997) reconsiders Wallace's (1979) findings by using the alternative arms 
racing indices reviewed earlier from Diehl (1983) and Horn (1987). 
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In these two pieces, Sample slightly reconfigures Wallace's original dispute set 
(such as eliminating dispute dyads that formed towards the end of the world wars and 
removing dyads that entered into arms racing and/or conflict due to alliance 
involvement, for example) and then applies the Diehl and Horn measures separately to 
determine whether the relationship originally presented by Wallace holds. In so doing, 
Sample (1997) concludes that "Regardless of the measure used to determine racing 
behavior, and regardless of the dispute set used, the proposition that arms races are 
positively associated with the escalation of disputes to war is upheld by the data" (17).24 
Her most comprehensive assessment of the debate is found in Sample (1998a). 
With the advantage of a larger available data set and improved methodological 
techniques, she conducts a multivariate analysis of the effect of major power arms 
racing and the likelihood of escalation to war. Using Horn's (1987) measure, she 
conducts the multivariate analysis over the temporal domain 1816-1993 involving all 
major power dispute dyads (approximately 230, 18 of which escalate to war). In an 
effort to rule out potential spurious correlations or intervening/omitted variable bias 
she includes several control parameters such as the presence of a territorial issue, a 
recent power transition, or the presence of nuclear weapons among other control 
variables. Utilizing a far more rigorous design, Sample's (1998) results still present a 
positive and non-random association between the presence of an arms race and the 
likelihood of escalation to war among major powers. While some of the additional 
24
 Regarding one of the primary critiques of Wallace's (1979) original study, Sample (1997) notes that 
"Removal of controversial dyads from the World Wars does not alter the findings substantially (or in the 
assumed direction)" (7). 
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model parameters show significance and in the expected direction, her primary 
explanatory variable - arms racing - remains positive and significant in each iteration of 
her empirical model. 
Nonetheless, large scale studies of the effects of arms racing came to a halt not 
long after the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union. After all, all of 
the pieces reviewed above were focused strictly on major power dyadic racing and 
conflict.25 This is not to suggest, however, that absolutely no arms racing research has 
been conducted since Sample (1998a) over the past several years.26 Bolks and Stoll 
(2000) and Stoll (2006) analyzed great power naval arms race competitions in the 
nineteenth century. Gibler et al. (2005) revisits the connection between arming and war 
by adopting Thompson's (2001) strategic rival dataset to then code for the presence of 
arms racing amongst these rivals. His objective is to eliminate the possibility of 
empirical bias by using the strategic rival dataset (qualitatively coded) in place of a 
traditional rivalry data set which already assumes the presence of militarized disputes. 
In so doing, the authors find that arms racing indeed has a positive effect upon dispute 
onset as well as escalation to war. 
Studies Using Weapons Stockpiles 
In addition to the lack of new arms race research, very few arms race studies (old 
or new) have incorporated the use of weapons stockpiles as quantitative indicators of 
Sample (2002), however, does update her earlier multivariate studies by including minor power and 
mixed dyads into the analysis finding that minor power dyads are also more likely to escalate from 
militarized disputes to war during an arms race. 
26
 For important and insightful formal modeling work on arms racing, see Kydd (1997; 2000, 2005). 
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increased arming. As I argue throughout and as I explain more fully in my research 
design chapter later much of this dissertation is based on the assumption that arms 
stockpiles are a fundamental component of arms races. Conceptualizing this approach 
was motivated largely by Bolks and Stoll (2000) and Stoll (2006). Introduced just above, 
both pieces are concerned with understanding naval arms race competitions among 
some of the world's great powers since the nineteenth century. Most importantly, the 
authors measure their naval arms races by collecting data on the number of capital 
ships maintained by each state's respective navy. Thus, in their effort to comprehend 
the decisions of states to increase and fortify their naval reserves Stoll (2006) and Bolks 
and Stoll (2000) incorporate the use of actual war ship figures for the various major 
powers over time. As Bolks and Stoll argue: "After all, wars are not fought with currency 
but with weapons and people" (2000: 589). This is my thesis exactly. 
One study in particular represents, broadly, several of the central goals of this 
dissertation. McCubbins (1983) utilizes not only weapons stockpile data in his analysis 
of arms racing between the United States and Soviet Union but also investigates arms 
racing across different weapons systems of both states. He identifies six unique 
weapons systems present in both countries: strategic interceptors, tactical S.A.M, 
tactical aircraft, tanks, antitank missiles, and strategic bombers. His theoretical 
argument, however, suggests that different weapons systems have different policy 
goals; therefore, arms races are likely to occur between weapons systems with mutually 
incompatible policy goals as opposed to competitions between the same weapons 
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type. Although restricted to only the United States and Soviet Union over a period of 
about 10 years (roughly 1965-1975), McCubbins (1983) is nonetheless a good example 
of a research design that used weapons stockpile data not just in place of defense 
expenditures data but also as a means by which to analyze different types of arms 
racing.28 
Still, in much of the literature I have reviewed the most popular method for 
measuring arms racing has involved the defense expenditures of states. The studies 
discussed throughout this dissertation have almost all used defense expenditure data as 
the primary measure of arms racing. The problem with this traditional reliance upon 
defense expenditure data is one of validity: do defense expenditures accurately 
measure the phenomenon of interest (dyadic arms racing)? It is entirely possible the 
final defense spending figure presented by one state in one year contains expenditure 
elements that were not included in another state's defense figures for the same year. 
For example, a state could report money spent on tanks as well as funds used for 
troop salaries, medical expenses, paid leave, pensions, research and development, or 
even subsidized weapons for allied states. Contrast that defense expenditure figure 
with one of a state who reports only money spent on the production and maintenance 
of critical weapons systems and vehicles. In addition to uncertainty about the 
27
 This theoretical approach is, of course, different than my own (and other approaches) that argue arms 
races occur between the same types of weapons. His own theoretical account is likely driven by the 
unique case of the United States, Soviet Union, and the presence of nuclear weapons in which some 
weapons were indeed specifically meant for either offensive nuclear attacks or nuclear deterrence. It 
should be noted he obtained mixed empirical results. 
28 
Other scholars have utilized weapons stockpiles such an approach but in limited fashion: Ward (1984) 
adopted the use of American and Soviet stockpile counts to analyze the Cold War arms race while 
Lambelet (1973) relied primarily on troop levels and personnel. 
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composition of defense expenditures other issues of concern include problems with 
exchange rates, the international political economy, and variations in domestic political 
economic systems. Given these complications the reliance upon defense expenditure 
figures suddenly becomes less attractive.29 Mullins (1987) summarizes the problem 
noting that "Nations also keep their accounts in all sorts of ways (and often change 
those ways), to the points where the defense budget means something different in 
virtually every state for which it is reported" (41). 
Nonetheless, I do not believe previous and/or current studies making use of 
defense expenditure data lack substantive value. Whatever the shortcomings, states 
have taken and continue to take military expenditures seriously so the use of this data 
no doubt seemed a natural first step in attempts to uncover the relationship between 
military buildups and conflict and, in general, defense expenditure data probably 
provides a decent estimate of when states become involved in racing with one another. 
What I argue is the following: to the extent that empirical data is always an imperfect 
measure of some concept, any inaccuracies with arms stockpile data should be far more 
benign than those associated with defense expenditure figures. Simply put, arms races 
should be measured with arms stockpiles; hence, even though Diehl (1985: 252) makes 
a case for the use of military expenditure data, Diehl and Crescenzi (1998) - covered in 
more detail next - later argue that using armament stockpiles may indeed be a better 
way to move the literature forward. 
29
 Anderton (1989) indeed notes "The majority of empirical arms race studies use military expenditures to 
measure defense capability" but that "From a conceptual level, military expenditures are an unreliable 
measure of defense...significant parts of military expenditures are allocated to areas other than 
procurement, maintenance, and research and development" (352). 
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The most familiar arms race of the twentieth century, for example, was a clear 
example of two states intensely focused on the weapons stockpiles of each other. The 
United States and Soviet Union monitored closely the levels of ballistic missile and 
nuclear warheads each were developing in an effort to gain and maintain a first strike 
capability. The fewer missiles/warheads the Soviet Union possessed relative to the 
United States, the logic dictated, the more likely the United States could launch a first 
strike attack destroying a majority of the Soviet's offensive weaponry and therefore 
limiting the ability for a Soviet retaliation (and vice-versa).30 
So while military expenditures were no doubt of interest and importance to both 
the Soviets and Americans, it was the actual numerical counts of missiles of both the 
United States and Soviet Union relative to one another that were used to determine the 
other's military capabilities in the context of preventing a first strike capability. An even 
clearer example of the salience of raw numbers for states involved in arms racing is 
discussed by Stoll (2006). In his analysis of major power naval arms racing during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries he illustrates concisely how the arming behavior of 
one state undoubtedly affected the arming decisions of other competitor states: 
"...the American navy made its decisions based on the size of the British navy. 
And from about the turn of the twentieth century, the British navy set its size 
based on the size of the German navy. Consider the consequences of this. As 
the German navy increased in size, the British navy increased in size. This drove 
the size of the American navy. This, in turn drove the size of the Japanese navy. 
So indirectly the size of the German navy influences the size of the Japanese 
navy...In a few cases, a navy did not have as its goal the size of a particular major 
power, but a more generic major power. The British navy is the best example of 
30
 At least some analysts and observers would argue neither the Soviet Union nor the United States ever 
gained a first strike capability and, as a result, could not reasonably dismiss the potential for mutually 
assured destruction (MAD) since a preemptive strike would fail to completely disarm the other side. 
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this. The goal of the British navy for about the first half of the nineteenth 
century, was to be as large (or a bit larger) than the next largest navy. Later, its 
goal was to be as large as the next two biggest navies; the so-called 'two-power 
standard'" (Stoll, 2006: 7-8). 
So, just as weapons have mattered greatly for the major powers of the 
international system throughout history I argue weapons are just as significant for minor 
powers concerned with their security and survival. I explain the role and 
implementation of the weapons stockpile data I use in my empirical analyses later in the 
research design of chapter four. 
Suggestions for Future Arms Race Studies: Diehl and Crescenzi (1998) 
I draw attention here to a particularly relevant article published by Diehl and 
Crescenzi in 1998 cited just earlier. In this piece both authors recognized an ongoing 
debate over much of the past arms race research as well as how best to move forward 
with new studies. In an effort to identify some of the more important concerns and 
challenges that might face scholars hoping to contribute to the body of quantitative 
arms race and conflict literature in the future Diehl and Crescenzi (1998) offered several 
specific ways through which future studies could improve scholars' understanding of the 
effects of arms races on international conflict. Their suggestions for how future studies 
should be crafted are important because many of them are related to the decisions and 
strategies I use throughout this dissertation in my analysis of arms racing and militarized 
conflict. Below I review some of Diehl and Crescenzi's (1998) more critical proposals so 
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that readers may reflect upon and reference these as they progress through the 
dissertation. 
One of the biggest concerns voiced by the authors relates to the propensity for 
most arms race studies to focus exclusively on conflict escalation as opposed to conflict 
onset. In simplest terms, the problem with such a research design is that while it may 
inform us about how arms races either increase or decrease the intensity of an already 
ongoing conflict these studies do nothing to uncover the relationship between arms 
races and the likelihood of militarized conflict starting in the first place. Hence, they 
believe future studies can contribute by analyzing whether arms races heighten or 
lessen the probability that militarized conflict will begin between a pair of competing 
states. As I have made clear, understating the relationship between arms races and 
conflict onset is focus of this dissertation. 
Besides focusing on conflict escalation, the authors believe a majority of 
previous studies have been satisfied with analyzing only the major powers of the 
system. Although properly understanding the arming behavior and conflict propensity 
of the most powerful states in the system will always be vital Diehl and Crescenzi (1998) 
argue minor powers continue to play an increasingly pertinent role in the international 
system. Furthermore, they believe the theoretical approaches that suggest arms races 
incite conflict amongst major powers are equally suited to explaining the role of arms 
races amongst minor powers and thus there is not a unique 'barrier' to studying the 
small states of the system. In addition, since minor powers compose a majority of the 
states in the international system they provide a larger population over which to 
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empirically test theories of arms racing and conflict therefore lessening the chance that 
results will be skewed due to a relatively small-N (as is the case with studies using only 
major powers). In this dissertation I analyze most of the system's minor powers located 
across three distinct geographical regions. 
A third recommendation made involves the importance of using multivariate 
models. As most scholars will understand, the use of multivariate statistical models can 
help guard against omitted variable bias - that is, the possibility that some alternative 
theoretical explanation(s) is actually driving the empirical results. The decision (and 
ability) to use multivariate models is less of an issue today than at the time Diehl and 
Crescenzi (1998) published their article; however, scholars now realize using many 
control variables has the potential to produce statistical results just as biased and 
inaccurate as simple bivariate estimations (I discuss this more in later chapters). As a 
result, I construct my multivariate models using two specific control variables that are 
associated not just with conflict onset but also perhaps the arms race variable itself. 
Doing so provides a robust test of my primary independent variable: the presence of an 
arms race. 
The recommendation made by Diehl and Crescenzi (1998) perhaps most central 
to this dissertation is their belief future arms race studies should abandon military 
expenditure data in favor of weapons stockpile data. A majority of previous quantitative 
arms race studies have relied heavily upon expenditure data as the primary measure of 
whether states are involved in an arms race. Although a reasonable approach, the 
authors argue there are in fact a host of problems associated with such expenditure 
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data (as I discussed earlier) such as the inability to determine whether states are 
reporting the correct figures and problems related to currency exchange rates 
temporally and cross-sectionally (across time and countries). Wherever possible, they 
urge, scholars should use the actual weapons stockpiles of states as the primary 
measure of whether militaries are expanding rapidly over time since states are 
concerned about tangible arms and not arms budgets (Diehl and Crescenzi, 1998). One 
of my primary contributions in this dissertation, hence, is the comprehensive use of 
weapons stockpile data organized along three broad types of arms (ground, air, and sea) 
to analyze arms races between states. 
Each of the suggestions made by Diehl and Crescenzi (1998) above are important 
in their own right and I believe represent valuable insight into how quantitative arms 
race research might best proceed. As a result, it may be useful for readers to keep in 
mind the suggestions of Diehl and Crescenzi as a reference point for understanding and 
comparing to the decisions I make throughout this dissertation. In the final chapter of 
this dissertation I revisit their important piece as it anchors a large section recapitulating 
what has been accomplished. I draw out each of their main suggestions in more detail 
and offer summaries of how my own research has responded to each of their points. 
2.4 Dissertation Contributions and Research Goals 
I position my research as a logical next step in the quantitative arms racing and 
conflict research tradition. My research is a large-N analysis of the relationship between 
arms racing and international conflict. In broadest terms the goal is to provide new 
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empirical evidence that can help illuminate further our collective understanding of 
international conflict and under what conditions it is likely to occur. To do so, however, 
necessitates a clear definition and scientific operationalization of the primary 
explanatory variable - the dyadic arms race - as well as a logical theory explaining how 
arms racing can increase the probability for militarized conflict. 
This is important because increased militarization and arms racing have been 
conspicuous features of the international political arena and many political scientists 
continue to view arming and arms racing as common behavior for sovereign states 
operating in the international system: "The quest for military power and its employment 
as a tool of national purpose have long been deemed among the principal activities of a 
state, and indeed the ability to employ military force is often considered a central 
defining property of an independent state" (Mullins, 1987:1). 
The above quote does not reference arms racing specifically but it does allude to 
the incentives states have to arm themselves. The literature review earlier showed how 
some scholars have attempted to conceptualize arms racing and its role in international 
relations and interstate conflict. The theory in chapter three that follows specifies the 
how the decisions that leaders make in the face of contentious and salient issues can 
often bring about dangerous arms races and increase the probability of interstate 
conflict. Yet, the central question persists: given an appropriate model of arms racing 
what is the impact of arms racing upon the onset of international conflict? 
The steps-to-war theoretical framework I present in chapter three suggests (1) 
states are often in contention with one another over issues, (2) the decisions leaders 
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make can quickly lead their states into dangerous arms races and (3) arms racing is best 
understood as primarily an interactive process driven by each state's reaction to the 
other's arms increases as well as their respective grievances over salient issues. As I 
have reviewed in this chapter the empirical record thus far has shown to varying 
degrees a generally positive association between arms racing and the likelihood of 
observing international conflict. However, I offer new empirical support of an important 
theory of arms racing and conflict based on what I believe to be an improved 
conceptualization and measure of arms racing. 
To summarize, I argue previous studies have either relied too heavily upon 
defense expenditure data to model an arms race - thus ignoring the grievances and 
contentious issue component altogether - or have attempted to analyze arms racing 
and conflict by using states already involved in some form of ongoing international 
conflict to then predict more international conflict - problematic from a social scientific 
methodological standpoint. Furthermore, the empirical evidence from previous studies 
suggests a positive relationship between arms racing and international conflict but to 
significantly different degrees. As well, most of these studies were conducted primarily 
with cases involving major powers and interstate war.31 The inconsistent empirical 
record is likely due to the absence of a widely adopted arms race model as well as a 
general lack of theoretical development by much of the empirical works cited in this 
chapter and throughout my research.32 
31
 Though Sample (2002) did perform an analysis involving minor power and mixed dyads. 
Recall Sample's (1998) claim that the most important way forward for arms race scholars might be 
through theoretical development. 
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Hence, I argue this dissertation offers progress on all fronts: first, a theoretical 
orientation grounded in the issue based approach to international relations as well as 
the broader steps-to-war theoretical framework guides the expectation that arms racing 
leads states towards dangerous conflict; second, an arms race model defined by a 
contentious relationship, mutual increases in arms stockpiles (not expenditures), and 
developed over an extended period of time produces an accurate and generally 
applicable conception of the arms race; and third, an explicit focus on dyadic arms 
racing and conflict amongst minor powers provides a clear set of cases over which to 
test the theoretical claims. In attempting to move the literature forward I intend to 
therefore provide a much clearer understanding of international conflict through a 
better conceptualization of arms racing and I believe my empirical results suggest dyadic 
arms racing to be an additional 'correlate of conflict'. 
56 
Chapter 3 
A Linkage Between Arms Racing and Conflict 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical foundations linking arms racing to the 
onset of international conflict as suggested by the steps-to-war theory. The steps-to-
war research program is the appropriate theoretical framework for my study because 
(among other reasons) it builds directly off of the issue based approach to international 
relations. After establishing the centrality of issues I present the step-to-war theory as 
outlined by Vasquez (1993) and Senese and Vasquez (2008). The remaining portion of 
this chapter reemphasizes how the steps-to-war theory provides a more systematic and 
accurate account of how states become involved in militarized conflict especially during 
arms races. 
As I have discussed to this point, beyond the recent slowdown of quantitative 
research and the apparent lack of empirical consistency in earlier studies the arms race 
literature has also suffered (perhaps more acutely) at the theoretical level. The lack of a 
strong, consistent theory debilitates the researcher's ability to credibly defend a set of 
empirical results while inviting detractors to dismiss the outcomes as either wrong or 
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attributable to some other theory. Sample (1998b) expresses this sentiment clearly in 
noting "Perhaps the most important step forward will be theoretical. There needs to be 
more thorough consideration of why military buildups might lead to conflict in light of 
what we do know about escalation processes" (125). 
Given this, the first and most foundational part of my theoretical approach is the 
importance of issues for states and their international relations with one another. As I 
have discussed, there is a strong theoretical and empirical record suggesting a majority 
of the hostility, conflict, and war between states can be traced to the salience of issues 
in international relations. The presence of important issues of contention between 
states causes them to develop aggressive or fearful relationships with one another 
which can lead quickly to military buildups. Most importantly, I make the assumption 
the antagonism felt by a pair of states towards one another drives the arms race and is 
the result of grievances over some issue/issues. The steps-to-war theory begins by 
emphasizing the role of contentious issues in driving the relationships states have with 
one another. 
3.2 The Steps to War 
The steps-to-war theory (Vasquez, 1993; Senese and Vasquez, 2008) remains a 
highly influential account of the processes that lead states into militarized conflict with 
one another. The power of this theoretical approach is that it does not purport to 
identify the specific necessary conditions for interstate war but rather delineates a 
series of steps that will make war more (as opposed to less) likely. Understanding these 
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steps therefore makes it easier for scholars and policy makers alike to recognize the 
types of behaviors and strategies that if left unchecked are likely to lead states into 
conflict with one another. The steps-to-war theory itself continues with the issue based 
approach to international relations since a foundational assumption of the steps-to-war 
is that issues drive international politics and are the starting point along the path to war 
between states. I cover the role of issues in the context of the steps-to-war theory 
briefly below. I then lay out the specific steps-to-war as identified in Vasquez (1993) 
and Senese and Vasquez (2008) so that readers may understand how arms races - one 
of the steps-to-war - increase the probability of militarized conflict amongst states 
engaged in such competitions. 
The Rise of Security Issues 
A critical assumption made by the steps-to-war authors is although not all issues 
end in war, all wars are the result of salient issues. I note here that since arms races are 
one of the several steps-to-war then arms races are by definition the result of 
contentious issues; this theoretical reality is consistent with much of my earlier 
arguments about how contention and tension drives the arming patterns of states and 
therefore arms races cannot occur between states where no contentious issues exist. 
Returning to the broader argument, the steps-to-war theory highlights the role of issues 
between states as Vasquez (1993) states clearly "All wars begin with issues" (124). 
The role of issues are important to the extent they may threaten the security of 
leaders and their states. In this regard, there are indeed a multitude of issues that can 
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do just this: diplomatic, economic, and issues related to the military policies of states 
are all potentially incendiary policy areas over which states might develop fears and 
concerns over their security.33 What is important to understand is all types of issues 
provide opportunities for policy makers and leaders of states to make decisions about 
how best to resolve such salient issues. Senese and Vasquez (2008) believe how a state 
"...handles issues between itself and those that contend with it..." (13) is a critically 
important foreign policy decision that at the very outset can set a state or states along 
the path to war. 
Unfortunately, the presence of salient issues all too often provides an 
opportunity for state leaders to test the resolve of one another (Vasquez, 1993; Maoz, 
1983; Leng, 1980). Leaders engage in coercive behavior and threats because they 
believe it is these types of behaviors that are most likely to credibly signal to opponents 
that a state is willing use its own capabilities - force, if need be - in order to maintain a 
certain status quo over an issue in play or to change and settle the issue in its own favor. 
In other words, "...actors believe that victory is most likely to be associated with some 
demonstration of resolve..." (Vasquez, 1993: 158). Instead, however, the coercive 
behavior heightens the threat perception of those involved and encourages actors to 
pursue certain realpolitik strategies in the context of some disputed issue. Thus begins 
the interactive process referred to as the steps-to-war. 
Of course, most readers familiar with the steps-to-war research program know that territorial issues 
have been suggested theoretically and supported empirically as those issues most likely to lead states 
down the path to militarized conflict. 
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Components of The Steps to War: Realpolitik Strategies 
The steps-to-war theory continues to be an important theoretical framework 
because it is a parsimonious account that highlights the role of issues and several 
specific strategies states often pursue that increase the probability of militarized 
conflict. Vasquez and Valeriano (2010) reiterate this point succinctly: 
"The steps-to-war explanation assumes that it is not just that certain issues or 
grievances, like territorial issues, produce war, but how they are handled that is 
critical. Wars arise not only because of goals that are worth fighting over, but 
because certain processes that states engage in make war likely. The steps-to-
war explanation is useful because it specifies in detail what those processes are" 
(10). 
Thus, when contentious issues arise between states it is the decisions (which I discuss in 
more detail later) each state makes about how to deal with their issues that steers them 
either towards or away from conflict. When states choose to pursue specific realpolitik 
behaviors and strategies then the march towards war has begun. Such realpolitik 
strategies constitute the steps-to-war and they are broadly defined as: hardliners using 
power politics and coercive threats, alliance making, and arms races. 
Power politics behavior, alliance formation, and arms races are the unique steps 
that make militarized conflict between states more likely. Before discussing each step in 
more detail, it is useful to recognize at least two other important theoretical 
assumptions constituting the steps-to-war theory. First, Vasquez (1993) explicitly 
constructs the steps-to-war theory as an interactive process of events. This means the 
steps-to-war are driven by the interactive and reactive decisions of states over time and 
not by systemic conditions (as realists would argue). This is an important assumption 
because it reiterates a point the authors make (and that I have highlighted earlier) 
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throughout the steps-to-war research program which is the assumption by realists that 
foreign policy is a constant struggle for power when, in fact, this is not the case. 
There is not constant struggle as the systemic theory of realism predicts; rather, 
states become embroiled in disputes and crises only to the extent salient issues are 
present (Senese and Vasquez, 2008). Since these issues vary over time and by issue 
type, for example, militarized conflict is driven by decisions made at the state level 
about how states will interact with one another to settle their outstanding issues. The 
decisions and subsequent interactions of states - not the structure of the system -
therefore determine whether war becomes more or less likely; hence, if states choose 
to pursue realpolitik strategies such as power politics, alliance making, and arms races 
then militarized conflict becomes more likely. However, if states can avoid such 
strategies then the prospects for peace increase dramatically regardless of systemic 
conditions. 
A second important assumption to highlight involves the sequencing of the 
steps-to-war themselves. Part of the broad explanatory power of the steps-to-war 
theory stems from the fact that although each of the steps can occur in various orders 
the impact on the probability of conflict always remains positive. Senese and Vasquez 
(2008) address this directly: 
"The language of steps implies a sequence of actions or even transitions across 
phases...What is important to keep in mind...is that the presence of more than 
one step, regardless of its order, results in an increase in the probability of war. 
What is crucial is not the sequence of the steps, but that they are mutually 
reinforcing. Alliances may precede or follow military buildups, and militarized 
disputes are likely to punctuate the entire relationship, thereby occurring before 
and after certain practices are adopted; however each increases the risk of war" 
(23). 
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The authors reemphasize that contentious issues are, of course, always the very first 
component of the steps-to-war theory. However, once states choose to adopt 
realpolitik strategies to deal with their issues then power politics behavior, alliances, 
and arms races must not occur in any specific order. What matters theoretically is the 
presence of any and all strategies means the likelihood of militarized conflict becomes 
higher than otherwise would be expected. 
I draw attention to this feature of the steps-to-war theory because it is relevant 
to the overall research goal of this dissertation. Recall my primary interest is the 
relationship between arms racing and the onset of militarized conflict. As I have just 
reviewed, each of the steps-to-war components is theorized to have independent and 
positive effects upon the likelihood of militarized conflict regardless of sequencing. This 
means I can 'cleanly' test the relationship between arms races and conflict since the 
steps-to-war theory assumes a direct relationship between both of these variables 
despite the presence of the other steps-to-war or their chronological sequencing. With 
this in mind, I now present each of the steps-to-war. 
Power Politics and Domestic Actors 
An important component of the steps-to-war theory is the role of domestic 
political leaders. The leaders of states make the decisions that will either heighten or 
lessen the prospects for conflict. They are the actors that drive the most crucial 
interactions between states involved in a crisis over some contentious issue and as I 
have noted interaction is a key concept in the steps-to-war theoretical approach. 
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Domestic leaders have a direct effect on the severity of a crisis and their decisions at the 
domestic political level influence the actions and decisions made by opponents. 
Vasquez (1993) identifies two distinct domestic political actors that through their 
actions can determine whether war becomes more or less likely: accommodationists 
and hard-liners. 
Accommodationist leaders are those who for various personal reasons and 
dispositions are wholly opposed to the use of force as a means of conducting policy or 
resolving outstanding issues. Accommodationists therefore pursue foreign policies that 
will steer their states away from warfare. To do so, they often favor the use of peaceful 
bargaining, negotiations, and compromise over salient issues. Furthermore, 
accommodationist leaders are likely to be active proponents of the creation of rules and 
norms of behavior that can be used to guide international political interactions in a 
peaceful manner. Ultimately, accommodationists will avoid inflammatory displays of 
resolve or threats of force and will seek to settle the issue at hand through peaceful and 
mutually acceptable means (Vasquez, 1993; Valeriano, 2003). 
Hard-liners employ opposite political strategies than do accommodationists. 
Hard-liner domestic leaders have personal predispositions that tend to favor strategies 
of non-compromising and strong-arm negotiation tactics when dealing with adversaries. 
Above all, these types of domestic political leaders actually prefer to signal their resolve 
and commitment to use force as they believe threats, coercion, and military 
engagements are all effective and useful foreign policy tools that can help settle salient 
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issues in their own favor. Indeed, hard-liners view the use of force as a relatively simple 
strategy for resolving issues with competitors (Vasquez, 1993). 
The problem according to the steps-to-war theory is hard-liners tend to 
dominate crisis situations. That is, when security issues arise between states it is hard-
line leaders that tend to thrive in such situations; furthermore, once hard-liners have 
established political control they are instrumental in breeding more domestic political 
hard-line leaders. Hard-liners in power are likely to be in constant disagreement with 
accommodationist policy makers. Due to the nature of hard-line political leaders, they 
are also much more likely to shape the political discourse of the moment by suppressing 
accommodationist pleas for prudence and restraint and instead suggesting and 
promoting inflammatory policies of non-compromise and direct threats to use force 
against an opponent. In the end, hard-line political leaders are risk-acceptant in the face 
of potential war and "...once hard-liners are in power, or are highly influential in the 
domestic environment, power politics practices will be favored over other practices" 
(Vasquez, 1993: 207). 
Thus, hard-liners increase the probability of war. Domestically, they foster an 
image of their opponent that is hostile and threatening. They perpetuate and use this 
hostility and negative cognitive perceptions of their competitor to mobilize the citizenry 
for potential conflict. Hard-line tactics on both sides of a crisis therefore feed on one 
another and this interactive process escalates the situation closer towards war. Most 
importantly, however, hard-liners use power-politics tactics and adopt the realpolitik 
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strategies that make militarized conflict imminent. These realpolitik strategies are 
alliance formation and arms races and they are the heart of the steps-to-war theory. 
Alliances 
Alliance formation is believed to be one of the major steps-to-war (Vasquez, 
1993). The steps-to-war theory identifies alliance formation as one possible policy 
choice states can make in the face of ongoing security issues. Although the decision to 
pursue and form alliances is borne out of the realist culture of war alliances themselves 
are not the inevitable products of the anarchic international system as realism assumes. 
Instead, they are but one strategy available to the leaders of states and the decision to 
form alliances can vary over time and by issue. Leaders thus choose to create alliances 
because the realist culture of war suggests they do so in order to deter external threats. 
Unfortunately, "Alliances do not prevent war or promote peace; instead, they are 
associated with war" (Vasquez, 1993: 159). The steps-to-war provides strong 
theoretical reasoning for this. 
First, the steps-to-war emphasizes that the path towards militarized conflict 
involves interactive processes such as alliance formation. The central problem is realist 
doctrine encourages states to form alliances in an effort to deter their external threats. 
As a result, a leader dealing with some salient issue will attempt to forge alliances with 
other states. The leader does this under the assumption that building up alliances 
partners is a direct means to increase the security of the state. What the leader fails to 
understand is the very presence of some ongoing contentious issue/s means some 
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significant amount of hostility and negativity is already in effect between both states. 
The opposition state therefore interprets the alliance as a direct threat to its own 
security and not as a deterrent strategy and responds similarly by pursuing and 
cementing counter-alliances with its own set of states. 
The interactive process creates two sets of hostile alliances. By forming separate 
alliance blocs each state has successfully offset the advantages of its competitor's 
alliance but at the sake of decreased security. Now, both states are less secure, more 
(rather than less) threatened by one another, and the overall destructive capability of 
both sides has increased dramatically. Suddenly, the decisions to form alliances and 
counter-alliances have moved both states farther from deterrence and peace and closer 
to preparations for conflict: 
"A counter-alliance can offset all, if not most, of the capability advantages 
created by the initial alliance. This eliminates the possibility of alliances acting as 
a kind of preventative (or "deterrent") of war through the marshaling of 
overwhelming power. Instead, it increases insecurity, because even if the 
alliances keep the relative balance the same, the absolute threat, in terms of the 
destructive power facing each side, has gone up. This can lead to a scramble for 
more allies which promotes an atmosphere that polarizes the system...alliance 
behavior has subtlely shifted from a focus on war prevention to preparation-for-
war-if-it-comes" (Vasquez, 1993: 166-167). 
In addition to alliances increasing the probability of militarized conflict the steps-
to-war also argues that the severity and longevity and any subsequent conflicts are 
likely to be much more intense and protracted. This is because alliances by their very 
nature involve more states than would otherwise be present in a dyadic dispute. The 
result is the potential for war to spread and persist. Hence, the steps-to-war theoretical 
approach shows clearly how the realpolitik strategy of alliances very quickly replaces 
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deterrence with insecurity and crisis escalation. Leaders form alliances because the 
realist tradition suggests they do so in order to deter threats. The actual outcome, 
however, is a dangerous interaction where states rapidly find themselves with more 
destructive power but with less security and on the threshold of militarized violence. 
Arms Races 
In the midst of domestic hard-liners and alliance formation arms races remain 
another major step-to-war states often take during an ongoing crisis. Arms races, like 
the other steps-to-war, are the product of salient and contentious issues between 
states. Just as domestic political leaders (hard-liners) adopt realpolitik strategies in their 
pursuit of interstate alliances so too do they exploit the threats and image of the enemy 
to begin increasing their state's military power.34 This encourages the opposing state to 
react similarly and begin increasing its own military capabilities. Given this dynamic, 
arms races are perhaps the most pernicious representation of the interactive nature of 
the steps-to-war model. Indeed, in discussing the nature and war-proneness of each of 
the steps-to-war Senese and Vasquez (2008) suggest "...if one has to choose on the basis 
of the theory, arms racing would be seen as slightly more dangerous, because 
involvement in an arms race might be perceived as being at the top rung of the 
escalation ladder..." (27). 
For example, Vasquez (1993) notes "...decision makers are unlikely to get domestic support without 
some concrete manifestation of the threat posed by the rival...In order to generate the necessary 
domestic mobilization for arms races - such as increased taxes, a shift in resources and spending, and the 
adoption of some form of conscription - leaders often exaggerate the external threat" (178). 
68 
This is because arms races in the context of some crisis over an issue cannot be 
interpreted as anything else but threatening to both parties involved. Once again, 
Vasquez (1993) and Senese and Vasquez (2008) argue the realist tradition of 
international politics consistently presents mutual arming as a strategy that can help 
one state deter the dangerous and opportunistic intentions of another. The steps-to-
war theory recognizes the logic of this strategy to be contained primarily within the 
security dilemma (Herz, 1950; Schelling and Halperin, 1961; Jervis, 1978). The security 
dilemma - or spiral model - assumes that states involved in a crisis wish to increase 
their security. Rational decision making informs domestic leaders that to increase their 
security they should build up their military forces. 
An increase in security by one state, however, means a decrease in the security 
of the opposing state by definition of zero-sum security.35 Thus, both states engage in 
repeated rounds of arming and an arms race is born. It is here where the mutual quest 
for security and deterrence is betrayed. The arms race fails to provide security for both 
parties and instead creates a reality in which both sides must now continue to arm lest 
they fall behind in military capability and risk attack. Yet, as the arms race continues 
each decision to arm is seen as another preparation for war. Given that (1) some 
salient, contentious issue continues to exist (2) domestic hard-liners are using power 
politics to create a "feverish pitch" (Vasquez, 1993: 199) and (3) alliances have been 
formed or are in the process of being solidified then the arms race itself appears to the 
35
 The term zero-sum security I use here is analogous to the more commonly understood concept of zero-
sum power. Realists often describe one state's gain in power as an equal loss in power for another state: 
thus, a zero-sum outcome. Similarly, any increase in security for one state (such as when it acquires more 
weapons) produces an equally large decrease in security for another competitor state. 
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leaders of both states to be simply another step-to-war. The step-to-war theory 
concludes clearly that: 
"...these practices do not produce peace and security, as realists maintain, but 
increased insecurity, coercion, and entanglement in a process and series of steps 
that may lead to war, Each step leads decision makers further and further into a 
trap (both globally and domestically) where they have little choice but to fight" 
(Vasquez, 1993:196). 
3.3 Why The Steps-to-War? 
The explanatory power of the steps-to-war is therefore the product of two 
general factors. First, the steps-to-war theory places salient issues at the forefront of 
international politics. Unlike the realist paradigm, states are not in a perpetual struggle 
for power and security and conflict and war are not inevitable outcomes of the anarchic 
international system. Rather, states only become involved in disputes and crises with 
one another to the extent there are highly salient and contentious issues present. Since 
the presence of such issues can vary, peace can quite often be the status-quo for states 
in the international system; only when contentious issues are present is there some 
probability that states will start down the steps-to-war. This is an important feature of 
the theory and it is consistent with my conceptualization of arms races that assumes 
arms racing can occur only between states where some contentious issue or issues is 
present. 
Besides the role of issues, the true power of the steps-to-war theory is it 
assumes leaders and states have different choices in handling international crises. 
Relationships between states are not simply defined by the structure of the 
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international system but by the decisions that leaders make in dealing with salient 
issues. It is in this respect that Vasquez (1993) and Senese and Vasquez (2008) are 
adamant that leaders always have a set of choices - a set of foreign policies - that may 
be used to deal with some contentious issue. In other words, "The steps-to-war, then, 
must be viewed as foreign policy decisions..." (Vasquez, 1993: 200). 
Unfortunately, realpolitik is one such available foreign policy (Vasquez, 1993). As 
a result, the decisions leaders make are all too often those utilizing realpolitik strategies. 
This, according to the steps-to-war, is because the realist culture of decision making 
suggests leaders should use power politics in their dealings with other states, form 
alliances, and build up their militaries in order to discourage external threats. Instead of 
providing deterrence and increasing security, however, power politics and realist 
strategies set states along the pathway to militarized conflict. Thus, leaders always have 
the ability to choose policies that will promote peace but instead regularly find 
themselves adopting the very strategies and behaviors popularized by the realist 
tradition that lead states towards war.36 
One of the central steps-to-war is the decision to engage in arms racing. Arms 
races and their impact on the likelihood of militarized conflict between states is the 
central focus of this dissertation. As seen in this chapter, decisions to increase military 
capabilities leads states into a hostile spiral of arms competition and increased mutual 
hostility. As both states perceive a loss of security and as the arms races continues the 
net effect is an overall increase in military capabilities for both states. The continually 
36
 Senese and Vasquez (2008) argue clearly that "...realist folklore can be seen as a set of constructed rules 
that guide diplomats and leaders" (25). 
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increasing military capabilities are interpreted as preparations for war. Thus, for these 
reasons the steps-to-war suggests arms races increase the probability of militarized 
conflict. 
More specifically, arms races are dangerous and make conflict more likely simply 
because they "...might encourage a preemptive strike" (Senese and Vasquez, 2008: 27). 
Since no two states involved in an arms race are likely to have the exact same military 
capability at any given time there is a continually shifting window of opportunity for one 
state to utilize its military advantage over its competitor and initiate militarized conflict 
on its own terms. Morrow (1989) advances this same argument in his explanation of 
how arms races lead to war noting that "Swings in military superiority between the 
racing powers provoked by the race create a motivation for war to exploit temporary 
advantages" (500).37 Therefore, the logic of the steps-to-war theory produces the 
following central hypothesis I seek to test in the remainder of this dissertation: 
Hypothesis 1: The presence of an arms race increases the likelihood of international 
conflict. 
My research goal, therefore, is not to provide a unique theoretical contribution 
to the field of international conflict. In this dissertation I will instead provide new 
empirical tests of an established theory of interstate conflict. My analysis of arms racing 
37
 Gleditsch and Njolstad (1990) echo this logic in their claim that "Armaments increase the risks of war, 
whether by making their possessors more belligerent, more reckless, or more likely to become the targets 
of pre-emptive wars, or by making 'war by accident' more probable" (352). 
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and the onset of militarized conflict will emphasize the necessity of contentious issues 
between states and incorporates the use of actual weapons stockpiles as the primary 
measure of arms racing; the role of contentious issues and the use of weapons 
stockpiles are two factors that have been largely absent from the majority of previous 
arms race studies. Hence, the steps-to-war theory suggests a positive relationship 
between arms racing and militarized conflict and in the following chapters I provide new 
and important empirical results in support of this relationship. 
3.4 Moving Forward 
I have presented a theoretical framework linking arms racing to conflict as 
contained within the logic of the steps-to-war research program. The theoretical 
arguments contain important concepts and ideas which need to be defined and 
operationalized in order to be implemented for empirical testing and evaluation. The 
following chapter isolates the relevant theoretical concepts and provides definitions and 
scientific operationalizations and measurements for each variable. Specifically, I 
develop a unique conceptual model of arms racing utilizing the three necessary 
conditions from the definition of an arms race used throughout this dissertation. I 
explain the data used to measure the primary explanatory variable, arms racing, and the 
dependent variable, international conflict, as well as the research design and 
methodology used to evaluate the central hypothesis developed above. 
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Chapter 4 
Designing a Statistical Model and Evaluation 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a discussion of the overall research design of this dissertation. It 
begins with a section describing the decision to conduct a regional analysis of minor 
power arms racing and conflict. I then begin the first portion of my research design and 
explain how I evaluate Hypothesis 1 - the relationship between arms racing and conflict 
onset - which is the central research question of this dissertation. This section of the 
chapter proceeds with a description of the variables including the model of arms racing 
developed for this dissertation and the measurements and data used to test Hypothesis 
1. I conclude with an overview of the methodological techniques I employ to evaluate 
my statistical models in the three empirical chapters that follow this chapter. 
4.2 Justifying the Regional Approach 
Portions of earlier chapters discussed briefly why a regional analysis is the 
preferred approach for this dissertation but my decision warrants further explanation 
here. The first reason is fairly straightforward and stems from a de facto geographic 
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reality: this study is about minor power arms racing and a significant portion of the 
system's minor powers are located within the three regions of Latin America, the Middle 
East, and Africa. This geographical arrangement means minor powers are really only 
ever concerned with other regionally located minor powers because they simply cannot 
exert influence very far beyond their own borders. There is an intuitive explanation for 
why this is the case and this reasoning is an important justification for the regional 
approach I adopt in my empirical analyses later in this dissertation. 
Minor Powers as Constrained States 
Given the geographical reality discussed above that faces most minor powers the 
true reason to study minor powers regionally is the fact that minor powers are primarily 
concerned with the immediate area around them as a consequence of their relatively 
constrained power and can therefore only ever really affect and influence events within 
this limited area. Even with the global financial crisis of 2008 a recent report by the 
Middle Eastern news channel Al Arabiya (February, 2009) reveals the massive amounts 
of weapons the Gulf States continue to develop and purchase. Al Arabiya indeed notes 
"The energy-rich Gulf region has been affected by the collapse of world oil prices from 
nearly $150 a barrel last July to below $40 a barrel...But concerns among Gulf countries, 
especially Saudi Arabia, over non-Arab power in the face of Iran's rising influence in the 
region is fueling an arms race" (Al Arabiya, 2009). 
This statement is an excellent example of the regional concerns minor powers 
are most preoccupied with. Al Arabiya's observation illustrates how Iran's actions are 
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perceived by and affect the behavior of Saudi Arabia, but the quotation is meaningful 
because it also draws attention to the potential for Iran's actions to extend beyond 
Saudi Arabia and impact other Middle East minor powers, or the Gulf region itself, as Al 
Arabiya claims. This is the essence of the regional focus used in this dissertation: what 
one state does in its region can and often does impact another state - or multiple other 
states- in the region. 
That minor powers are concerned with and able to interact primarily with other 
minor powers is borne out empirically, as well. In their comprehensive study of 
international rivalry and interstate war, Diehl and Goertz (2000) provide a typology of 
international rivalry from 1816-1992 based on militarized interstate dispute occurrence 
over certain spans of time. Of the three categories of international rivalry they develop, 
the enduring rivalry is most contentious and involves at least six MIDs in the span of 
twenty years: as a percentage, fully 52% of their enduring rivalries are between two 
minor powers. The two less disputatious categories, isolated and proto rivalries, are 
composed of 46% and 45% minor power dyads, respectively.38 Their analysis shows the 
most intense form of international rivalry, the enduring rivalry, is composed of over 50% 
minor power dyads, while the remaining two categories contain nearly 50% minor 
power dyads.39 Thompson (2001), another important contributor to the rivalry 
See Diehl and Goertz (2000) for operational definitions of the isolated and proto rivalries. 
39
 Major-major and major-minor dyads account for 18% and 30% of enduring rivalries, respectively, 
suggesting again that minor power dyads are responsible for the majority of highly disputatious rivalries. 
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literature, produces a list of one hundred seventy four strategic rivals40 from 1816-1999 
of which 74% are minor power dyads. 
These percentages provide strong evidence that minor powers are primarily 
interacting with other minor powers, but are such critical interactions involving rivalry 
and conflict occurring regionally as I have proposed throughout this dissertation? 
Indeed, a closer examination of the rivalry datasets from both Diehl and Goertz (2000) 
and Thompson (2001) suggests minor powers are in fact interacting with other 
regionally located, neighboring minor powers. An analysis of the thirty three minor 
power enduring rivalries from Diehl and Goertz shows only one minor power rivalry to 
be non-regionally located, the Spain-Morocco rivalry (though both are only 8.1 miles 
apart at their closest point).41 
Of the one hundred twenty seven minor power rivalries defined by Thompson 
only two involve minor powers not located within the same region, the Spain-Morocco 
rivalry and the Indonesia-Netherlands rivalry. The rivalry literature provides additional 
compelling empirical support to study minor powers within the distinct regions in which 
they operate. If minor powers are engaging in rivalry and conflict with one another at 
such high rates within their own geographic region then it is plausible that they engage 
in arms racing with their regional neighbors, as well. 
His list of 174 strategic rivals emerges "...from an identification process predicated on a rivalry definition 
that combines competitor status, threat perception, and enemy status and focuses on the extraction of 
information about decision-maker perceptions from historical analyses" (568). 
For my analysis of these rivalry datasets I used commonly accepted notions of geographic regions such 
as Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa, for example. In addition, I identified regions by COW nation 
numbers. 
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These examples show how minor powers are significantly concerned with and 
involved with other minor powers, especially at the regional level. Pooling minor 
powers together across regions would contradict the empirical reality just presented. 
What would a Syria-Paraguay or Morocco-Chile dyad tell us about arms racing and 
international conflict between minor powers? Would there even be the slightest reason 
to expect such pairs of states to engage one another in conflict or compete with each 
other in the context of arms racing? Of course not and this is because Syria is primarily 
concerned with and only capable of dealing with her immediate neighbors and regional 
cohorts. The same is true for Paraguay, Morocco, and Chile. 
Therefore, a minor power located in Latin America (for example) must view each 
of its regional neighbors as likely adversaries. Chile must decide whether Bolivian 
declarations of pursuing naval power or fortifications of ground forces are perhaps 
aimed at future plans for reclaiming a Bolivian Pacific coastline from Chile (Romero, 
2006).42 Grouping all of the states together over time - conducting a pooled time series 
analysis - would therefore muddle the dynamic outlined above; Bolivian grievances and 
attempts for naval military expansion is likely to influence the arming behavior of other 
Latin American states at some point in time but should be unrelated to the arming 
behavior of states located in Africa, for example. 
Romero (2006): Bolivia Reaches For A Slice of the Coast That Got Away. Available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/world/americas/24bolivia.html. 
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4.3 The Research Design 
The following three chapters of this dissertation present the empirical results of 
my analysis of minor power arms racing and international conflict in three separate 
regions: the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Although each region is covered in a 
separate empirical chapter the overall research design strategy is consistent for each 
region. I describe the dependent variable as well as the important control variables 
included in my empirical model of arms racing and conflict and how each of these 
variables is measured quantitatively. As well, I explain in detail the model of arms racing 
I develop and utilize in this dissertation. My model of a dyadic arms race involves three 
necessary conditions that follow directly from the definition of arms racing defined in 
chapter one and referenced throughout the dissertation. The following pages discuss 
the research design decisions and data used to test the central hypothesis of this 
dissertation: 
Hypothesis 1: The presence of an arms race increases the likelihood of international 
conflict. 
Dependent Variable: Interstate Conflict 
The following sections describe the variables, operationalizations, and data used 
to evaluate Hypothesis 1 above, the central research question of this dissertation. To 
begin with, I seek to explain international conflict and use as my dependent variable 
militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) as developed by the Correlates of War project. 
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Specifically, the dependent variable I use in my analysis is the onset of militarized 
disputes between a pair of minor power states in a given region. My unit of analysis is 
(by region) all non-directed dyads over the temporal domain 1970-2000. 
A militarized interstate dispute (MID) is a representation of interstate conflict 
between a pair of states. Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996) describe militarized disputes 
as "...united historical cases in which the threat, display or use of military force short of 
war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official 
representative, official forces, property or territory of another state" (168). Thus, the 
MID dataset represents a variety of interstate relations that range from militarized 
threats and disputes, military engagement, and interstate war as defined by Singer and 
Small (1972). The variable itself is a dichotomous measure of the onset of interstate 
conflict taking the value of 1 if conflict occurs within the dyad during a given year and 0 
otherwise.43 
Conceptualizing Issues 
Recall my central theoretical assumption is the presence of contentious issues 
drives the arming behavior of states. I have argued that such substantive disagreements 
- contention - over issues are always the first step in the path towards arms racing and, 
if it happens, conflict. A particularly salient issue can suddenly bring the political worlds 
of two states together. Sustained contention or disagreement over the issue is then 
The dependent variable data as well as data for the control variables used in this dissertation is 
obtained from Oneal and Russett (2005) who themselves generate the data using EUGene (Bennett and 
Stam, 2000). 
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what motivates states to begin arming against one another. This is because the 
presence of a contentious issue drives the interactions states will have with one 
another. 
As the steps-to-war theory suggests, if states are unable to resolve salient issues 
between them then their sense of security and mutually held perceptions of one 
another are likely to suffer. Such disagreement and tension renders arming an 
attractive policy choice and the continued failure to resolve outstanding issues 
perpetuates the mutual arming. To be clear, the presence of a contentious issue is not a 
sufficient condition for arms racing and conflict but it is indeed a necessary condition for 
the start and maintenance of any arms race. An issue based approach to arms racing 
thus allows the researcher to understand why states might arm against one another and 
identify which cases are indeed doing so. 
This is a critical component of my approach to arms racing and conflict: it makes 
little sense to discuss arms racing and the potential for conflict amongst states in which 
no substantive disagreement or tension exists. This is because identifying pairs of states 
holding grievances or ill-will towards one another reduces the likelihood of observing 
false-positives. For example, consider the England-France dyad during the Cold War. By 
any measure, both states were increasing their arms and militaries significantly over the 
span of several decades during the Cold War. Yet, no minimally informed person would 
argue France and England were involved in an arms race against each other and, most 
importantly, it is clear there was absolutely no chance of militarized conflict between 
these two states. Obviously, both states were arming against the ongoing Soviet threat 
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and attempting to mitigate the power of Soviet military expansion by increasing their 
own arms. An analysis based strictly on the arming patterns of pairs of states, however, 
would suggest France and England were preparing for militarized conflict with each 
other even though this was not the case. 
Unfortunately, correctly identifying pairs of states where there is some level of 
tension between them is far more difficult than the above example suggests. The 
France-England example may seem trivial but the difficulty in observing tension or 
grievances between states increases dramatically when analyzing pairs of states that are 
not as obviously friendly as with the France-England example. The problem has been 
especially acute in previous studies attempting to evaluate the relationship between 
arms racing and interstate conflict. 
As mentioned earlier, one strategy many scholars have employed in an effort to 
determine which pairs of states have tension and are thus arming against each other 
has been to select dyads already involved in disputes or crises with one another. Using 
this technique reassured scholars the increased arming in their selected dyads were 
actual arms races. For example, the Wallace (1979) and Sample (1998a) studies 
discussed earlier used pairs of major power states engaged in militarized disputes with 
each other and analyzed whether the presence of an arms race escalated these disputes 
to interstate war. 
However, given that Wallace's sample contained 99 dispute dyads and Sample's 
contained 257 dispute dyads the empirical results of both studies therefore explain only 
the specific dispute cases they chose. This type of research design - analyzing only 
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cases already involved in conflict - therefore severely limits the generalizability of their 
results. Additionally, the Wallace and Sample studies are problematic since it is likely 
the statistical results they obtained were biased since they selected only cases in which 
conflict was already occurring between dyads. Sample (1998a) is forthright about such 
problems with the arms racing and conflict research program and summarizes it clearly: 
"By addressing the effect of arming on disputes, we cannot determine whether 
there were cases in which arming deterred disputes altogether or, alternatively, 
whether military buildups led to militarized disputes that would not have 
occurred in their absence. To determine whether arming leads to disputes, it is 
necessary to overcome certain testing obstacles, including a means of 
determining whether relations between two states are sufficiently salient that 
the arming of one is viewed as relevant by the other [emphasis added]" (158). 
Beyond ignoring the role of issues their strategies produce several common 
problems associated with preselecting cases to be analyzed. First, by preselecting a 
sample of dyads based on dispute involvement these studies are automatically 
constrained in the generalizability of their empirical results.44 Additionally, selecting 
dyads already engaged in a type of behavior (conflict) which the investigation is trying to 
predict (conflict escalation, war) jeopardizes the robustness of any empirical results. 
Any statistical relationship between arms racing and the escalation of conflict is 
therefore almost certain to be positively skewed in these studies (and others similarly 
constructed) because their analyses failed to include dyads in which no conflict was 
present. 
If the researcher wished to apply their results to future cases it would need to be shown that any 
additional cases are very similar to the original samples used. 
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As I have discussed in earlier chapters, however, issues have been and remain a 
central theme in the research of some of the most important and influential scholars in 
international relations. Even though previous arms racing and conflict studies have 
realized the importance of ensuring pairs of states engaged in high levels of arming are 
doing so in response to one another they have avoided developing a theoretical 
approach based on the salience of issues to construct their research designs and 
empirical models of arms racing and interstate conflict. 
Measuring Contentious Issues 
Thus, I have argued throughout this dissertation that without contentious issues 
it makes little sense to discuss arms racing or conflict between states; salient issues 
provide the political context in which states become concerned about one another and 
can become involved in arms racing and potentially militarized conflict. I therefore use 
United Nations General Assembly roll call vote data to measure the extent to which 
states are in contention with one another over a broad range of issues. The use of 
UNGA roll call data to understand the interstate relations and policy preferences of 
states has gained traction with international relations scholars over the past decade 
(Kim and Russett, 1996; Gartzke, 1998; Voeten, 2000, 2004; Reed et al., 2008). 
Theoretically it is important to understand what United Nations General 
Assembly voting tells us about the relationships between states. I argue that United 
Nation general assembly roll call votes are reasonable indicators of the overall 
preferences of states over a wide variety of issues. In a given year a state votes on a 
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range of international issues. Some issues may be relatively minor while many issues 
will carry significant international consequences. Furthermore, United Nations General 
Assembly votes are useful because during a given year states vote on a plethora of 
issues such that an overall policy position (ideal point) can be determined and used to 
understand one state's general policy preference and world view relative to other states 
in the international system during that year. 
Of critical importance to understand here is that contentious issues between 
states produce both tension as well as specific voting decisions in the UNGA; however, 
(although certainly possible) the UN votes may not necessarily be related to the actual 
issues in contention. What is important is the UN votes themselves can be used as a 
representation of the disagreements and contention between states. This notion of 
variation in policy preferences/world views as represented by differences in UN voting is 
therefore a defensible measure of the presence of contentious issues between states. 
Beyond the theoretical importance and utility of using General Assembly roll call 
votes there are additional reasons to use these votes in the context of minor powers 
and small states. Many agree the United Nations serves as an especially important 
formal institution where such states have an equal opportunity to vote on issues and 
concerns that directly affect their standing within the international community.45 
Voting on issues in the United Nations is also important for minor powers because a 
large proportion of minor power states are unable to maintain embassies or a formal 
diplomatic presence with every other country in the international community. In 
45
 Voting in the UNGA is egalitarian in the sense that a vote by the United States is equal to a vote by 
Paraguay, for example. 
85 
describing the importance of the United Nation General Assembly Voeten (2000) notes 
"...it is the only forum in which a large number of states meet and vote on a regular 
basis on issues concerning the international community...studying this interaction over a 
long period of time and across different issue areas should reveal changes in the 
behavior of states..." (185-186). 
Given my objective, I employ ideal points calculated from United Nations roll-call 
votes as a measure of whether pairs of states have dissimilar policy preferences over 
some issue/s. These data are from Reed et al. (2008). In this recent study the authors 
use raw United Nations roll call data46 to produce ideal point estimates for each state in 
the system over the temporal domain 1946-2000. That is, they use the roll-call data to 
estimate a single dimension of state preferences. Since Reed et al. (2008) is a relatively 
recent publication and since many readers may not be familiar with their data set I will 
explain the steps they utilized to construct the ideal point estimates for each state. 
The process they use to obtain the ideal points for each state involves several 
steps. First, to capture as many states as possible in their sample they include any state 
that voted at least twice in a given year within the General Assembly. The next step is to 
determine the population of roll call votes to be analyzed. The authors use the strategy 
employed by Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and exclude all votes in which fewer than 2.5% 
of the states voted either "yes" or "no". The authors also consider the issue of 
abstentions and note there is a general lack of agreement amongst scholars about how 
to interpret the meaning of abstaining. Given the different ways scholars have 
See Voeten (2000; 2004) for a comprehensive overview of the characteristics and implementation of 
United Nations roll call data. 
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interpreted abstentions, Reed et al. (2008) decide to code abstentions in General 
Assembly voting as missing values because they are "...interested in only revealed 
preferences directly associated with decisions on issues" (1208). They argue this is the 
least controversial strategy to evaluate state preferences since it involves only the 
actual revealed preferences of states voting in the General Assembly; since their sample 
is quite large, they believe coding abstentions as missing values does not produce any 
significant statistical problems. 
Having obtained the appropriate sample of states and General Assembly roll-call 
votes the authors then proceed to estimate the ideal points. The process is somewhat 
complex and so - as Reed et al. (2008) suggest - I supply a link below to the online 
appendix containing the exact steps and technical specifications the authors employed 
in obtaining their ideal point estimates.47 As a basic overview, after obtaining the ideal 
point estimates the authors then use Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation 
techniques to produce large enough samples from the joint posterior density of the 
parameters such that summary statistics can be calculated and then used for 
inference.48 Therefore, the authors set priors for the ideal points of the United States to 
" - 1 " and for Russia (Soviet Union) to "+1" and assign a prior of "0" to all other states as 
well as "...uniform priors (1.0, -1.0) to the density over the ideal points. These uniform 
priors have the nice property of constraining ideal points to the interval of 1.0 and -1.0" 
(Reed et al., 2008: 1209). 
The online appendix containing the exact steps and technical decisions made in generating the ideal 
points can be found at http://web.utk,edu/~whwang/jopappendix.pdf. 
48
 In Bayesian estimation techniques, the joint posterior density refers to the product of the prior density 
or distribution of a set of parameters and the likelihood. 
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As a result, the MCMC estimation technique provides an estimate of the 
posterior distribution and the resulting mean is therefore used as the revealed ideal 
point for all states in each year of analysis. Hence, the ideal point for any state can be 
arranged spatially from -1 to +1 along the single dimension of United Nations General 
Assembly votes. I assume contention or tension between states increases as the 
distance between their individual ideal points increases while more amiable 
relationships (preference similarities) are present when ideal points are located closer 
together. The following explanation details how I classify ideal point distances amongst 
dyads as either contentious or not. 
In order to calculate the distance between states' ideal points and determine 
whether these distances represent contention I perform the following steps for each 
dyad in each year: 
1. For every dyad in an individual region I obtain an absolute value of the 
difference between their respective ideal points. For example, if in 1990 one 
state in a dyad has an ideal point of +0.5 and the other state has an ideal 
point of -0.5 then the absolute Euclidean distance between these two states 
is+1.0. 
2. Using the absolute distance in ideal points for each dyad in each region I then 
calculate the mean distance from the set of individual dyadic distances for 
each region. This produces an average Euclidean distance in ideal points for 
the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa over the period 1970-2000. 
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3. Having obtained an average ideal point distance for each region I determine 
that a difference in ideal points for any single regional dyad that is at least 
one standard deviation higher than the overall mean value of that region 
represents tension between a pair of states. 
Therefore, distances between ideal points are used as the primary empirical 
indicator of whether two states are in contention with one another over some issue or 
issues. That is, if the distance between two states' ideal points is large enough then 
there is tension between them and both states are candidates to be involved in an arms 
race; however, if there is no tension between a pair of states then there can be no arms 
racing, no matter what the arming pattern of a pair of states turns out to be. 
Additionally, I reiterate that mean ideal point differences are calculated separately for 
each of the three regions I analyze. This is an appropriate coding decision since it allows 
me to determine whether two states in Latin America (for example) are in a high level of 
contention with one another based on the overall average level of policy divergence in 
that region. 
There are a couple of other important points to make here. First, the authors at 
the outset performed an analysis of the roll call data in order to gauge the relative 
heterogeneity of issues over which states are voting. Their analysis lead them to 
conclude the large number of votes since 1946 are indeed distributed over a similarly 
large number of issues such that no particular issue (such as Israel or North Korea, for 
example) dominates the roll call votes. They therefore argue this ensures the final ideal 
point estimates are not significantly skewed but rather reflect the underlying 
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preferences of the many states that have had the opportunity to vote in their self 
interest on a variety of issues in the United Nations General Assembly: 
"States have specific political goals having to do with the extent to which they 
agree or disagree with other states, and they can pursue those goals in votes 
that do not pertain specifically to them, or to their allies or enemies. Instead, 
states use UN votes to express their preferences on issues related to positions 
taken by blocs of states, and on issues related to ongoing dyadic disagreements" 
(Reed et al., 2008: 5-6). 
In addition, I reemphasize a critical distinction made earlier. The differences in 
ideal points serve as indicators of the underlying tension between states. This tension, 
however, may not be directly related to the actual issues up for vote in the General 
Assembly. In other words, it is possible a pair of states is in contention over some 
specific issue and this issue is indeed up for vote in the General Assembly. It is also 
possible a pair of states is in contention over some issue or range of issues that are 
specific to them and not up for vote in the General Assembly. Regardless, if two states 
are systematically voting differently within the General Assembly then this (the 
difference in their ideal points) is a reasonable indicator of tension and contention over 
issues between them. 
The Explanatory Variable: Arms Racing 
The primary explanatory variable is the presence of an arms race. Perhaps most 
important, however, is the use of military stockpiles categorized as either land, sea, or 
aerial forces allows for specific types of arms races to be coded. This is an important 
advantage over the more common use of defense expenditure data. As previously 
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discussed defense expenditure data is often difficult to compare cross-sectionally (by 
state) and over time due to an inability to confidently know exactly what constitutes 
each state's defense expenditures. Furthermore, while it is theoretically possible to 
disaggregate expenditure data by weapons type this would require a significant amount 
of work and would ultimately rely upon the availability and quality of individual states' 
defense expenditure budgeting data. As a result, the majority of large-N statistical 
studies of arms racing have used a single yearly figure representing the overall defense 
expenditure of a given state. 
While a reasonable approach, using a general defense expenditure figure also 
glosses over the nuances of arms racing as such data can only be used to code a 
'generic' conception of whether an arms race between states is present or not. The use 
of weapons stockpile data, however, provides a useful increase in precision: over which 
weapons systems (land, sea, or air) are individual states devoting resources and 
increasing from year to year? What types of arms races are states involved in with one 
another? Most importantly, which types of arms races are positively associated with 
militarized conflict? The use of weapons stockpile data thus provides increased leverage 
over research related to arms races and their consequences. Using such weapons 
stockpile data helps transition away from traditional empirical analyses based on 
expenditure data to more detailed and precise analyses of specific types of arms racing 
and their individual effects upon conflict. 
I measure the size of a state's military using the actual armament stockpiles of 
the state over the period 1970 through 2000. The Military Balance lists in detail the 
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stockpile figures for a variety of weapons, weapons systems, and military vehicles for all 
states in the international system. The stockpile reports for each state are organized 
broadly along land, sea, and air based weapons. From these reference guides I collected 
data on almost all forms of weapons and combat vehicles over the three general 
categories of land, sea, and air. Each of these three weapons indices are created by 
tallying specific weapons as follows (Appendix 4A at the end of this chapter contains the 
coding manual for this procedure): 
1. Land forces: to create a measure of the general ground based weapons of a 
particular state I tallied together all main battle tanks (MBT), armored 
infantry vehicles (AIFV), armored personnel carriers (APC), reconnaissance 
vehicles (RECCE) and all guns or mortars listed as self-propelled (SP). 
2. Naval forces: to create a measure of the general naval based weapons of a 
particular state I tallied together only all destroyers, frigates, and corvettes 
(Principal Surface Combatants), all missile craft, torpedo craft, and armed 
patrol craft (Fast Action Combatants). 
3. Air forces: to create a measure of the general aerial based weapons of a 
particular state I tallied together all fighters, fighter ground attack aircraft 
(FGA), bombers, and all combat helicopters. 
These weapons stockpiles categorized as three separate indices (arms variables) 
are used to determine whether pairs of states are racing one another. Specifically, 
there must be some larger than normal increase in the arming of each state in the dyad 
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over a period of time. There are several steps to determine the specific increases in 
armaments of states over time and whether these increases are abnormally large: 
1. I calculate the difference in levels of weapons of a state from time t-5 and t. 
For example, I subtract the number of naval forces for Brazil in 1991 from its 
naval forces in 1996, the number of naval forces in 1992 is subtracted from 
those in 1997, and so on for each year of my analysis. This means the change 
in weapons for a state are calculated from 1970 to 1975,1971 to 1976,1972-
1977, and so on such that the change in weapons for all states is calculated 
for all possible five year windows. 
2. This method provides the changes in weapons for each state over any five 
year window from 1970-2000. For example, there is a numeric figure 
representing the change in each type of weaponry for Argentina from 1970-
1975,1971-1976,1972-1977, and so on, as well as for Brazil, Chile, and every 
other state in the region of Latin America. 
3. Next, the individual changes in arms for all states over any five year period 
are averaged by region to produce a numeric figure that is the mean change 
in weapons for a particular region over the period 1970-2000. To use 
another example, this means the average five year change in ground 
weapons for each state in Latin America is added together and averaged to 
produce a single figure that is the average change in ground weaponry for 
the entire region of Latin America. This procedure is used to calculate the 
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mean change in weapons for ground, sea, and aerial forces for each of the 
three regions analyzed. 
4. Using these mean values I set the threshold for racing at 25% higher than the 
mean value of arms increases. For example, the mean change in air 
weaponry over any five year period for my sample of Middle Eastern states 
1970-2000 is approximately 38%.49 
5. If tension is present at t between two states then I observe whether there is 
at least one year of simultaneous extraordinary arming (as defined above) 
between both states between t and t+5. If so, the arms race variable for that 
type of armament (land, sea, or air) is coded. For example, if two states are 
in a contentious relationship in 1980 then I determine whether there is an 
instance of extraordinary arming between both states during any one year 
up to 1985. If so, then an arms race is present. This is a reasonable coding 
decision because the theory does not attempt to predict precisely at which 
year an arms race should break out; rather, I assume serious contentious 
issues produce a lagged effect in which tension between states is likely to 
linger at least for several years afterwards and during which any 
extraordinary bilateral arms increases should be linked to this tension. 
To reiterate, the entire process begins with the presence of contentious issues 
between states. Only if there is some level of underlying tension present do any 
subsequent increases in bilateral arming matter. I believe five year windows are long 
49
 So, for air weapons, the exact threshold would be .25*.38=.095; adding 9.5% to 38% means the 
threshold is approximately 48% for a state to be racing. 
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enough to allow for states to actively and consciously increase their arms stockpiles. 
This strategy is similar to that found in Senese and Vasquez (2005) who employ a 5 year 
window in their analysis of militarized interstate dispute escalation to war. In this study 
the authors evaluate the likelihood of a dispute escalating to war within a five year 
window. They argue that because war is a process, it takes time to observe whether 
disputatious relationships develop into interstate war. In the context of arms racing, I 
am making a similar argument: arming and arms racing takes time to develop, and so I 
believe five year windows offer an appropriate length of time to observe the presence 
of contentious issues as well as increases in bilateral arming and to determine whether 
these arms races are leading states into militarized conflict. 
For the purposes of this study, I therefore observe changes in arms as well as 
tension levels over any five year period of time. The following flow chart simplifies the 
steps involved in my index construction described above: 
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Figure 4.1 
Charting the Conditions for Arms Racing 
Contentious Issues at / 
No/ 
No Arms Race 
Yes 
Extraordinary Bilateral Arming by t+5 
Yes 
No Arms Race Arms Race 
Unlike previous studies I do not preselect a set of cases to analyze based on 
rivalry history or incidences of repeated crises or conflict. Instead, all dyads in a 
particular region are potential candidates for arms racing. As the flow chart above 
shows, the very first condition that must be met is the presence of contentious issues 
between a pair of states. If there is no tension between states, then there can be no 
arms race between the states; I note again, the lack of contentious issues does not 
preclude a pair of states from arming increases but if there is a lack of tension I assume 
that the states' increased arming is not directed at each other. However, if there is 
tension between a pair of states then there must also be some level of extraordinary 
arming within a certain period of time in order for an arms race to be present. Hence, 
each of these conditions helps ensure that actual arms races are being identified and 
not just cases in which states are arming but not against each other or cases where 
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states are indeed arming against each other but not at high enough levels and within a 
certain timeframe. 
In addition, my use of percentage thresholds as a measure of extraordinary 
arming over time has a precedent in previous quantitative arms race studies. For 
example, Wallace (1979) observed whether bilateral defense expenditures increased 
more than 10% over a ten-year period; Morrow (1989) defined arms races as all cases in 
which the military expenditures of two states exceeded 4% per year over his various 
windows of time; and in Gibler et al. (2005) the authors analyze arms races amongst 
interstate rivals and require at least an 8% increase in the military expenditures (or 
personnel) by two states in every year of a three-year period. With regards to their 8% 
threshold the authors note "We do not assume that 8% has any particular significance, 
but we believe that...this level allows for a sample size that is reasonably large for 
inference but still small enough to establish interdependence" (Gibler et al., 2005:138). 
Hence, I share their sentiment as I believe my threshold of a 25% increase in 
weaponry for two states over any five year period is an appropriate measure that is 
neither too restrictive as to eliminate real cases of arms racing nor too lax as too capture 
false-positives. Also, it is important to note the specific threshold I use is robust to 
either higher or lower changes. That is, the empirical results I report and discuss later 
but for one small exception do not change if a smaller (20%) or larger (30%) threshold is 
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used to estimate the statistical relationship between arms racing and militarized conflict 
instead of the original 25% threshold.50 
The Covariates 
Beyond the primary explanatory variable of interest I include two theoretically 
relevant covariates in the set of statistical models I estimate. Many international 
relations scholars have informally identified a set of 'usual suspects', or control 
variables, that should be included in conflict studies empirical models. In her book on 
reputation and deterrence Anne Sartori (2005) addresses this practice noting: "It has 
become customary in statistical analyses of international relations to include a number 
of variables that are irrelevant to the theory being tested; these are 'controls' suggested 
by competing or complementary theories" (88). 
Sartori's comment is just part of a debate urging researchers to be more wary of 
including any ostensibly relevant variables into multivariate models (Achen, 2002; Ray, 
2003). Their argument is additional covariates should be included only if the researcher 
can explain why the relationship between the primary explanatory variable and the 
dependent variable might be meaningfully different with the inclusion of a specific 
covariate; thus as a general rule Achen (2002) actually suggests including no more than 
three total variables in an empirical model. Sartori (2005) indeed utilizes this strategy in 
her own work acknowledging: "For these reasons and others, methodologists are 
beginning to question the use of the regression equation as a dumping ground for 
50
 The one small change involves Africa in which the positive and significant relationship between naval 
arms races and conflict onset weakens slightly to about p <, .10 when the 20% threshold is used. 
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unwanted variables. Achen (2002) suggests 'A Rule of Three' (ART): no more than three 
independent variables per equation (in the absence of formal theory that points to 
more)" (88). 
In light of this debate it is important to note scholars cannot definitively 
conclude the extent to which Achen's (2002) ART claim is meant to be literally applied. 
At the very least, it is an important cautionary warning against casually dumping every 
seemingly relevant control variable into empirical models of interstate conflict. In the 
context of statistical analysis the debate is particularly important because it calls into 
question the conventional wisdom that argues "additional control variables cannot 
artificially inflate the estimated impact of our variable of interest" (Gelpi and Feaver, 
2002: 783). In a recent related discussion of methodological concerns Clarke (2009) 
discusses specifically the nature of omitted variable bias. He makes no strict claim 
about the number of control variables researches should incorporate but notes: "Just as 
we are likely never in the position of working with a correctly specified model, we are 
likely never in the position of considering a single omitted variable or a single set of 
omitted variables...By including additional control variables in our specifications, we 
could very easily be making the bias on the coefficient of interest worse" (63). 
Indeed, Clarke (2005; 2009) demonstrates mathematically how the inclusion of 
ostensibly relevant control variables can either increase or decrease the bias on the 
estimated coefficient of interest. In other words, "Including more variables in a 
regression, even relevant ones, does not necessarily make the regression results more 
accurate" (Clarke, 2009: 57). Thus, given the inability for any theory to accurately 
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specify all relevant variables along with the mathematical potential for control variables 
to increase the bias upon the variable of interest it becomes far less appealing to utilize 
a 'garbage can' approach to regression analysis. 
As a result, I conduct my empirical analyses in the following three chapters using 
the strategy employed by Sartori (2005). The primary empirical models I estimate and 
the results I present in the body of each empirical chapter report the relationship 
between arms racing and interstate conflict with two control variables I have 
determined to be most relevant for my particular analyses. I now explain the two main 
covariates I include in my main empirical models, the justification for including these 
two, and their measurements. 
Power Parity 
An important theoretical tradition in the conflict literature has argued states 
with relatively equal power capabilities are more likely to engage in conflict with one 
another since neither side is assumed to have a clear advantage. Numerous conflict 
scholars have argued accordingly that power parity is the scenario most likely to 
facilitate militarized conflict between states (Oneal and Russett, 1997; Sample, 1998a; 
Reed, 2000; Sample, 2002; and Senese and Vasquez, 2008). Parity increases the 
likelihood of conflict because under such conditions "...both sides see a prospect for 
victory...With the alternative capability distribution - preponderance - the weaker 
cannot afford to fight, and the stronger usually does not have to in order to achieve its 
goals" (Geller, 2000: 263). Still, arms racing is a unique form of interaction between 
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states that warrants independent theoretical and empirical consideration. The 
relationship between arms racing and conflict should maintain meaningful explanatory 
power even when the power parity control variable is present in my empirical 
specifications. 
The inclusion of a measure of power distribution between a dyad is especially 
important for this study because weapons themselves are measures of state power and 
capability. One of the strongest counter arguments to the arms race hypothesis is that 
the power distribution of the dyad is driving the onset of conflict, not their arming 
behavior. Sample (1998a) includes a power parity control variable in her own arms race 
research for this exact reason noting that accounting for power parity "...is important 
because it offers an alternative theoretical explanation for the observed escalation of 
disputes characterized by mutual military buildups...the arms buildup might be less 
important intrinsically than the fact that it often represents the countries' move toward 
parity..." (167). 
Thus, I include a control variable that is the natural log of the capability ratio of 
the strongest state to the weakest state in the dyad. In this sense, the variable is 
actually a measure of power disparity since it represents how divergent two states' 
capabilities are from one another. The natural log of a dyad's capability ratio offers a 
useful representation of both state's relative capabilities reflected in an assertion by 
Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004) who note "We take the natural logarithm of 
the variable [capability ratio] since power arguably has diminishing returns to scale" 
(21). 
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I measure capability using the Composite Index of National Capabilities values 
from the National Material Capabilities dataset (v3.0) over the period 1816-2001 that I 
borrow from the study conducted by Oneal and Russett (2005). This dataset provides a 
measure of annual state power constructed over six primary components: energy 
consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditure, urban population, and 
total population. Each component is assigned a specific value based on data collected 
by the Correlates of War project. For each state each of its six individual indicators are 
reconfigured as a proportion of the total system's capability (power) for that year. 
These six separate proportions are then averaged together to produce a single 
numerical figure that is the overall capability of a state as a proportion of the entire 
international system. 
Contiguity 
The relationship between distance, contiguity and international conflict is an 
important dynamic in international relations research. Empirical studies relating both 
distance and contiguity to interstate conflict have been consistent in their findings that 
the closer states are together the more likely there is to be conflict. In comparing the 
average intercapital distances between fighting states to the entire population of states 
in the system from 1816-1965 Gleditsch and Singer (1975) reported the overall distance 
between fighting states to be much lower. Gochman (1990) showed that between 
1816-1976 states that shared a common border (contiguous) or were separated by 150 
miles or less of water accounted for about two-thirds of the militarized disputes during 
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that period. These and other studies show interstate conflict is often about the 
opportunity to wage battle against challenger states; clearly, shorter distances and 
direct borders increase the opportunity for states to fight one another. Still, which 
concept - distance or contiguity - should be controlled for in my analyses of arms racing 
and conflict? Consider the following simple diagram: 
Figure 4.2 
Thinking About Distance Versus Contiguity 
Group A Group B 
Recall interstate distance is commonly measured by intercapital distances. The 
states in Group A represent a situation where intercapital distance appears relatively 
large - that is, the capitals marked by X are as far apart as possible - yet both states are 
still contiguous with one another. The states in Group B show a different situation. 
Here, the states on the left and right of the middle state have capital cities quite close to 
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one another but they are not contiguous as evidenced by the tall, narrow state 
separating them. So while a distance variable would suggest both states are extremely 
proximate and could ostensibly get to one another easily it would miss the fact that they 
are not actually contiguous; the lack of a direct border therefore makes it much more 
difficult to wage conflict directly especially since there is no guarantee the buffer state 
(the tall narrow state above) would be sympathetic to either state's desire to cross 
through its borders. 
Hence, contiguity has been an important covariate in a variety conflict studies 
throughout the years and the positive relationship between contiguity and conflict is 
supported by a number of strong empirical findings (for example: Most and Starr, 1980; 
Bremer, 1992; Lemke, 1995; Hensel, 2000; see a concise review of contiguity studies in 
Senese and Vasquez, 2008: 105-108).51 Controlling for contiguity is important because 
states might both arms race and fight one another because they are proximate. That is, 
some could argue contiguity leads states to arm against one another which then may 
provoke conflict onset between such states. Although I argue throughout this 
dissertation that states tend to have regional and not simply 'neighborly' concerns the 
potential for contiguity to influence arming as well as contiguity's demonstrated strong 
and positive effects on conflict suggests contiguity (as opposed to other potential 
control variables) is an appropriate covariate for my model. 
51
 It is important to note here again Vasquez (1993; 1995; 2000) has produced compelling empirical 
support suggesting it is the territorial claims of neighboring states that best explains the effects of 
contiguity upon interstate conflict. In their most recent comprehensive study Senese and Vasquez (2008) 
conclude "The results produced by our analysis lend strong support to the unified territorial explanation 
of conflict and war. It was found that pairs of states with an outstanding territorial claim are significantly 
more likely to engage in militarized disputes than are dyads with no outstanding territorial claims" (100). 
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Thus, if arms races are driving interstate conflict then they should explain a 
reasonable amount of variance in the outcome variable even when contiguity is 
included as a control variable. I use a measure of direct contiguity as developed by the 
COW project and obtained from the study by Oneal and Russett (2005). It is a 
dichotomous measure of contiguity where a value of 1 indicates direct contiguity and 0 
represents no shared border. 
Methodology 
In each of the three empirical chapters that follow I utilize logistic regression to 
evaluate the central hypothesis of this dissertation: the relationship between arms 
racing and conflict onset. Since the data is binary time series and cross-sectional there 
is a potential for the temporal independence assumption to be violated. I adopt a 
strategy as suggested by Carter and Signorino (2007) and generate a set of variables that 
tracks the number of peace years preceding the onset of a militarized interstate 
dispute.52 Specifically, I generate a cubic polynomial that represents the length of non-
eventful binary occurrences (the number of peace years). The authors provide empirical 
examples showing how the cubic polynomial often outperforms the use of time 
dummies and splines popularized by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). The results are 
clustered on the dyad due to the possibility of intra-cluster correlation. In addition, the 
results section in each of the empirical chapters also contains a set of predicted 
For a technically detailed account see their unpublished manuscript at 
http://www.rochester.edu/college/psc/signorino/research/CarterSignorino2007.pdf 
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probabilities for conflict onset using the statistical package CLARIFY as developed by 
King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000). 
106 
Appendix 4A 
Coding Manual: The Military Balance 
Overview 
This is the coding manual for The Military Balance reference series detailing the 
variables and coding procedures used for recording and organizing the data obtained 
from The Military Balance. The Military Balance is a reference series published yearly 
since 1965 which reports detailed figures for the weaponry and weapons systems for 
states in the global community. The detailed arms data used in this project were 
obtained solely from The Military Balance reference series over the years 1970-2000. 
The Military Balance contains individual yearly entries for states in the global system 
organized by region (Europe and Africa, for example). This project focuses upon three 
primary geographic regions: the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. The Military 
Balance contained detailed arms data on the number and types of weapons held by the 
states in each of these three regions. 
The primary goal of this portion of the project was to code only the most relevant, 
offensively geared arms and weapons for each state. This means not every piece of 
military hardware or weapon listed for each state is actually counted in the final tally. 
For example, helicopters explicitly listed as combat or attack helicopters were tallied 
while transport and medical helicopters were not counted and included in the final tally 
of a state's military. This also means only weapons listed under a state's 'Armed Forces' 
or 'National Armed Forces' are considered for tally; forces categorized by The Military 
Balance as part of a state's 'Paramilitary', 'Civilian Force', 'Forces Abroad' or 'Police 
Force', for example, are not considered for tally in the state's final weapons total. 
Weapons for each state's national military force in The Military Balance are primarily 
organized under several broad headings consisting of 'Army', 'Navy', and 'Air Force' with 
occasional subheadings of 'Marines' or 'Naval Air Force'. This categorization is 
consistent with the goal of analyzing three various forms of weaponry and, ultimately, 
arms racing: land, sea, and aerial based weaponry and racing. Thus, data is recorded as 
variables which reflect these three broad types of weaponry. The following section 
describes the variables coded from The Military Balance. 
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Variables 
state - the Correlates of War three letter country abbreviation 
ccode - the Correlates of War three number country code 
year - the year from which a state's data was collected 
ground - the primary land based weapons of a state. This tally includes the following 
land based weaponry: 
MBT- main battle tanks 
AIFV- armored infantry vehicles 
APC- armored personnel carriers 
RECCE- reconnaissance vehicles 
SP - any guns or mortars explicitly listed as self-propelled 
navy - the primary sea based weapons of a state. This tally includes the following sea 
based weaponry: 
PSC - Principal Surface Combatants. This includes major warships such as 
destroyers, frigates, and corvettes 
FAC - Fast Action Combatants. The number of smaller combatant vessels of a 
state that includes missile craft, torpedo craft, and armed patrol craft. Inshore 
patrol craft, lake/river patrol, mine warfare/countermeasure craft, and support 
craft are not included in this tally 
air- the primary aerial based weapons of a state. This tally includes the following air 
based weaponry: 
FGA - Fighters and Fighter Ground Attack. These are the primary combat 
aircraft of a state. Reconnaissance, transport, and training aircraft are not 
included in this tally 
Heli - the number of combat helicopters of a state. This includes only combat 
oriented, weapons outfitted helicopters and not transport, support, or medical 
helicopters 
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Notes on Coding 
Weapons tallied in this data set are organized always by their physical function, not 
always by their location in The Military Balance. For example, combat helicopters listed 
under a state's army branch would be tallied in the air variable, not the ground variable. 
Combat aircraft listed under a state's naval air force would also be tallied in the air 
variable, and not the navy variable. 
Any weapons listed as 'in reserve' are included in the final tally for that variable. 
Any weapons listed as 'to be delivered in June of 19xx', for example, are not included in 
the final tally for that variable. Only weapons physically possessed by the state are 
coded. 
Any weapons listed as 'in retrofit' or 'undergoing modernization' are included in the 
final tally for that variable. 
Population figures or defense expenditures from any other year but the current year 
being coded are recorded as missing data. 
In some rare cases, The Military Balance does not/cannot report an actual numerical 
number for some weapon or weapon system. For example, it will list 'some combat 
aircraft'. In these cases, the variable is recorded as missing data. 
Chapter 5 
Arms Racing and Conflict in the Middle East 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains the empirical results for Hypothesis 1 as evaluated for the 
minor power states located within the Middle East from 1970 to 2000. As I will do for 
the African and Latin American regions I begin with an introductory description of the 
Middle East involving rivalry, number of militarized interstate disputes and wars, and 
the proportion of global military spending of the region at 1985 (a halfway point of my 
temporal domain). In so doing my intention is to give the reader a substantive overview 
of the region in terms and concepts familiar to conflict scholars. 
After this general account of the Middle East I move on to some descriptive 
statistics about the prevalence of arms racing as well as the distribution of arms racing 
across the three primary categories. The second section presents empirical results 
regarding the central relationship between dyadic arms racing and the likelihood of 
interstate conflict. I also report predicted probabilities linking the presence of various 
forms of arms racing to conflict when the control variables take several different values. 
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5.2 The Middle East, 1970-2000 
My analysis of the Middle East over this time period involves all states located in 
the Middle East including Iran and Egypt but not including Turkey.53 The list of countries 
used can be found at the end of this chapter in Appendix 5A. As I discussed earlier, the 
rivalry literature has shown minor power states to be involved in rivalries with one 
another to a fairly high degree over the years. Referenced in chapter four Thompson 
(2001) provides a list of states involved in a strategic rivalry that covers the period 1816 
through the year 1999. An investigation of his list of rivalries reveals there are nineteen 
strategic rivals present at some point during my period of study 1970-2000. The 
following table lists the strategic rivals from the Middle East as well as the years active 
for each rivalry: 
53
 There continues to be come controversy over the political and geographic classification of Turkey as a 
part of the Middle East region. Clearly, its land borders with several Middle Eastern states provides a 
context for important interactions (such as issues relating to Kurdish independence and migration in 
Eastern Turkey) with some Middle Eastern states. However, Turkey's secular culture and membership in 
organizations such as NATO and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
lead many to classify it as a Westernized, European state (officially, it is part of both Europe and Asia). 
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Table 5.1 
Rivalries of the Middle East, 1970-1999 
Rivalry 
Bahrain-Qatar 
Egypt-Iran 
Egypt-Iran 
Egypt-Iraq 
Egypt-Israel 
Egypt - Libya 
Egypt - Syria 
I ran-I raq 
I r a n - Israel 
Iran -Saudi Arabia 
Iraq -Israel 
Iraq -Kuwait 
Iraq -Saudi Arabia 
Iraq-Syria 
Israel-Jordan 
Israel-Syria 
Jordan-Syria 
Oman - Dem. Rep Yemen 
Saudi Arabia-Yemen 
Years Active 
1986-
1955-1971 
1979-
1945-
1948-
1973-1992 
1961-1990 
1958-
1979-
1979-
1948-
1961-
1968-
1946-
1948-1994 
1948-
1946-
1972-1982 
1990-
This table shows the extent to which states in the Middle East have engaged one 
another in rivalries over the years. Not surprisingly, almost every state in the Middle 
East has been involved in a rivalry with a regional partner for at least some period of 
time since 1970. Some of these rivalries have started and ended in my period of study, 
such as the Egypt - Libya rivalry that lasted from 1973-1992 or the Oman - Democratic 
Republic of Yemen rivalry spanning 1972-1982. Most of the rivals listed above, 
however, are far more longstanding with origins dating back to around the end of World 
War II. As well, many of these same rivalries are ongoing with no clear end date as of 
1999 which is the last year of Thompson's (2001) coding for strategic rivals. 
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To investigate the presence of militarized disputes I use MID version 3.04 as 
obtained from Oneal and Russett (2005) and count the total number of MIDs in the 
Middle East in which there was at least one Middle Eastern state on both sides. 
Although the newest MID data exists as version 3.10 after consulting this newer version 
I find no significant differences between both data sets (such as the addition and/or 
subtraction of MIDs). During the period 1970-2000 there were 105 militarized 
interstate disputes (MIDs) in the Middle East. Given my temporal domain is thirty years, 
this equates to exactly 3.5 militarized disputes per year between states in the Middle 
East. 
Of these militarized disputes, the Correlates of War Interstate War Data (v3.0) 
reports four wars in the Middle East during my period of study: Yom Kippur (1973), Iran 
- Iraq (1980-1988), Israel - Syria/Lebanon (1982), and the Gulf War (1990-1991). Lastly, 
I report the Middle East's total military expenditures as a proportion of the total global 
military expenditures for the year 1985 (the halfway point of my temporal domain). In 
1985, the Middle East accounted for approximately 8.1% of the total global military 
expenditures for that year. For comparison, the states comprising the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1985 accounted for roughly 43% of global military 
expenditures.54 
54
 Of this figure, the United States comprises 31% of NATO's 43% share of the total global military 
expenditure. 
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5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
A survey of the data for my sample of Middle Eastern states over the period 
1970-2000 shows that there are 11 ground based arms races, 16 sea based races, and 7 
air based races.55 This distribution should not be entirely surprising considering there 
are no landlocked states in the Middle East and so these states are maintaining and 
expanding at least some form of naval forces.56 The following table shows the 
correlations for the three primary arms racing variables in the Middle East along with 
contiguity and capability ratio, the two primary control variables: 
Table 5.2 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Ground, Sea, and Air Arms Racing 
Model 
Variables 
Ground 
Sea 
Air 
Contiguity 
ln(Capability 
Ratio) 
Ground 
1.00 
Sea 
-0.002 
1.00 
Air 
0.39 
-0.02 
1.00 
Contiguity 
-0.006 
0.002 
-0.06 
1.00 
ln(Capability 
Ratio) 
-0.02 
-0.02 
0.03 
0.03 
1.00 
IN = 2783 
These figures show the correlation between ground races and sea races as well 
as the correlation between sea racing and air racing to be nearly 0 (both coefficients are 
only slightly negative). The correlation between ground based arms racing and aerial 
Although a possibility there were no cases in which all three forms of arms racing were present 
simultaneously in the Middle East during this period. 
It should be noted here that many of the Middle Eastern navies are equipped for primarily coastal 
defense and would not be considered sea-faring navies similar to some European countries or the United 
States navy. For example, most Middle Eastern states employ small fast action combatant vessels such as 
torpedo or missile boats that stay relatively close to shore and are not intended for major sea faring naval 
warfare the way major warships such as destroyers or frigates are. 
114 
arms racing, however, is positive at 0.39. While this is not a particularly strong 
correlation it does suggest that at least part of the time states are engaging in both 
ground and aerial arms races with one another. To a certain extent this makes some 
sense considering that many militarized operations are ground based but with some 
form of aerial support. In fact, some might have expected this correlation to be much 
higher than the figure I report here. 
Still, it is important to remember the constraints many small states face; while 
larger, more powerful states may be able to engage in multiple forms of arms racing 
simultaneously smaller states have scarce resources making it difficult to expand and 
compete within multiple types of military weaponry if they are able to expand their 
militaries at all. In addition, the correlation matrix indicates almost no multicollinearity 
between any of the arms race variables and the two control variables or between both 
control variables themselves. Lastly, I present some basic statistics regarding the overall 
pattern of arming across all three types of weapons in the Middle East from year to year 
in the following table: 
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Table 5.3 
Likelihood of Increasing Arms in Following Year 
Arms Type 
Ground 
Sea 
Air 
Increase in Arms at t+1 
62% 
31% 
51% 
N = 2783 
These simple percentages indicate the likelihood that any state in the Middle 
East over the period 1970-2000 will increase its weapons from one year to the next. To 
calculate these figures I simply divide the number of times states increased their 
weapons from t to t+1 by the total number of observations where an observation is a 
state's particular weapons inventory from one year to the next (Iran's naval weapons 
from 1980 to 1981, for example). The figures indicate that approximately 62% of the 
time states increased their ground forces from one year to the following year. For sea 
based forces an increase in weapons from one year to the next occurred 32% of the 
time and 51% percent of the time for aerial weapons. 
5.4 Empirical Results: Hypothesis 1 
HI: The presence of an arms race increases the likelihood of international conflict. 
The following table lists the empirical results for the central research question of 
this dissertation: the relationship between arms racing and international conflict. What 
I assume is that contentious issues propel states into dangerous patterns of bilateral 
arms competitions. An arms race occurs when two states are in contention over some 
issue/s and proceed to increase their arms at a level that is far higher than the average 
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arms increases for all states in a particular region, in this case, the Middle East. As a 
result, the presence of an arms race between two states should increase the likelihood 
of conflict onset. 
Furthermore, I have argued one of the primary contributions of this research is 
the ability to estimate separate effects of arms racing across three different types of 
weaponry. To review, the data are analyzed by observing whether instances of arms 
races between states are followed by a militarized interstate dispute at t+1. As such the 
table below reports the individual estimated impacts of ground, naval, and aerial arms 
racing on the likelihood of conflict. Each model includes a measure of direct contiguity 
and power capability ratio as I have argued these covariates represent two of the most 
theoretically salient robustness checks on my primary independent variables. 
I also note the empirical results below are not obtained just from all cases in 
which contentious issues were present; rather, the models are estimated over the entire 
number of potential observations including cases in which tension was not present and 
extraordinary arming and conflict occurred anyway, for example. In other words, I 
analyze all dyad years but code a 0 for the arms race variable if there were no 
contentious issues present between two states (even if they indeed had extraordinary 
bilateral arming). All models are evaluated using logistic analysis and although not 
shown in the table all model coefficients are estimated with the cubic polynomial term 
that is the number of peace years in between conflict. This is included in order to 
counteract potential temporal dependence in my binary time series cross-sectional 
data. The statistical results are as follows: 
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Table 5.4 
Multivariate Models for Conflict Onset 
Three Types of Arms Racing, 1970-2000 
Variable 
Arms Race Type 
Contiguity 
ln(Capability Ratio) 
Constant 
N 
Log-likelihood 
Pseudo-R2 
Model 1 
Ground Races 
1.253(0.397)*** 
1.443 (0.311)*** 
-0.086 (0.153) 
-2.158 (0.355) 
2783 
-351.84 
0.213 
Model 2 
Sea Races 
0.782 (0.442)* 
1.392(0.300)*** 
-0.084(0.152) 
-2.105(0.353) 
2783 
-354.02 
0.208 
Model 3 
Air Races 
0.159(0.951) 
1.427(0.316)*** 
-0.108 (0.160) 
-2.030 (0.364) 
2783 
-355.61 
0.205 
*p < .10, ***p < .01, robust standard errors in parentheses 
As the previous literature has shown, contiguity exhibits the highest level of 
statistical significance in each of the three models above. The variable itself is measured 
as a dichotomous value that takes the value of 1 for direct contiguity and 0 otherwise. 
The results above therefore suggest that in all three models the presence of direct 
contiguity is positively associated with the onset of interstate conflict. Even in spite of 
the strong effects of contiguity, two of the three individual arms race variables exhibit 
statistical significance and in the expected direction. Ground based arms races are 
associated with conflict onset at the p < .01 level of significance while naval arms racing 
is significant at the p < .10 level of statistical significance. Although the coefficient for 
aerial arms racing is positive and in the expected direction the impact of this variable is 
not significant making it impossible to reject the null hypothesis for aerial arms racing 
and conflict onset in the Middle East. It is possible the air arms race variable is not 
significant due to the moderate correlation (0.39) between the ground and aerial arms 
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race variables reported earlier; since ground and aerial racing occur together with some 
frequency any independent effects of aerial arms racing upon conflict likely wash out. 
Additionally, both ground and naval arms racing exhibit statistical significance 
with conflict onset even in the context of the power parity control variable which itself is 
not significant with conflict onset in any of the three models estimated. This is 
encouraging given the argument that arms and weapons may simply be a function of 
overall state power and capability (the endogeneity critique). My results above, 
however, suggest two of the three independent arms race variables - ground and sea -
are predicting variance in the dependent variable of interstate conflict. I believe these 
are relatively robust findings considering the correlation coefficients reported earlier 
show almost no multicollinearity at all between the power parity control variable and 
any of the independent arms race variables. 
Most importantly, these coefficients indicate the importance of studying and 
evaluating the effects of specific types of arms races. A fundamental argument I have 
advanced throughout this dissertation is the importance of categorizing arms races 
broadly by ground, sea, and aerial based weaponry in order to observe their potential 
for independent effects on militarized conflict. My empirical results for the Middle East 
clearly reveal variation in each of the three types of arms races that would be otherwise 
indiscernible using a generic conception of arms racing where all weapons systems are 
collapsed into one single category. Such variation will be an important result to observe 
and interpret in the next two chapters when I evaluate arms racing and conflict in Africa 
and Latin America. 
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Moving along it is important to ask whether these empirical results have face 
validity. A quick survey of the actual data suggests the model of arms racing employed 
here indeed captures many instances where arms racing would be expected and where 
conflict later occurred. Israel, not surprisingly, engages in ground, air, and sea based 
arms racing with a majority of the Middle Eastern states from 1970-2000. Specifically, 
Israel is involved in some form of arms racing with Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iraq - three 
of the five participant states - prior to the 1973 Yom Kippur War.57 Israel and Syria 
engage in ground and sea arms racing in the 1970's and early 1980's in the lead up to 
their war in 1982. 
Alternatively, there are no arms races between Iraq and Kuwait or any of the 
Middle Eastern coalition forces in the lead up to the Gulf War that began in 1990. Given 
the massive amount of economic and military losses suffered by Iraq during the Iran -
Iraq war throughout the 1980's it makes sense Iraq would have little ability to expand its 
military forces quickly against any enemy in the Middle East (such as Kuwait or other 
coalition states) after such a crushing stalemate with Iran. Indeed, a quick investigation 
of the weapons data for Iraq shows that Iraqi forces across all three weapons categories 
(ground, sea, and air) either stagnated or decreased in the several years leading up to 
the outbreak of the Gulf War. For example, from 1984 to 1988 Iraq's total air force 
(combat fighters and helicopters) decreased from 580 to 500 and only slightly increased 
to 513 in 1989 on the eve of the war. This suggests Iraq was incapable of engaging in 
Egypt and Lebanon, the remaining two states involved in the Yom Kippur War, are not involved in arms 
racing with Israel. 
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any form of arms racing, regardless of any contentious issues that were present, and so 
no arms races are identified previous to the Gulf War. 
Hence, in this case, the model does not predict the onset of the Gulf War (the 
initial conflict between Iraq and Kuwait) since there were no rapid bilateral arms 
buildups; beyond the lack of bilateral arming, an examination of the United Nations 
voting data shows that in both 1989 and 1990 the distance in ideal points between Iraq 
and any of the Middle Eastern coalition states, which includes Kuwait, never reached a 
high enough threshold to be considered seriously contentious as I have defined for this 
dissertation. The absence of severe tension as reflected by United Nations voting may 
very well be related to the fact the invasion itself caught much of the world by surprise. 
A BBC News (2000) review of the Gulf War notes "The suddenness of the strike took the 
world by surprise"; in a more detailed account Crystal (1995) explains in a book length 
account how "The Iraqi invasion caught Kuwait by surprise...relations appeared to have 
been improving in recent years. Throughout the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980's, a de facto 
alliance had been forged between the two states, with Kuwait supplying Iraq with $13 
billion in direct support..." (171). Given these reactions to the outbreak of the Gulf War, 
then, it becomes easier to understand why the model would not predict the particular 
conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. 
Interestingly enough, with respect to the Iran - Iraq War fought from 1980-1988 
there appears to be little arms racing prior to the outbreak of violence as well. Both 
states engage in a naval arms race from 1970-1975 but there are no other instances in 
the years leading up to the start of the war in 1980. An investigation of the data reveals 
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an unexpected finding: the level of policy divergence between Iraq and Iran during 
several years preceding 1980 never reaches a critical level. Recall that the average 
distance in ideal points for any two states in the Middle East during my period of study 
is approximately 0.32. The average difference in United Nations ideal point estimates 
for Iran and Iraq during this period and throughout their eight year war never gets much 
larger than approximately 0.40, nowhere near the critical level needed that would 
indicate serious tension. 
There may be an explanation for this interesting finding, as well. The pro-
Western monarchy of the Shah of Iran begins to dissolve in December 1978 and by 
January of 1979 the Ayatollah's Islamic fundamentalist regime assumes leadership of 
Iran. Clearly, at some point there should be a noticeable divergence in the preferences 
exhibited by Iran and Iraq in the United Nations General Assembly voting. It is the 
timing of the Iranian revolution, however, that has implications for Iran's behavior in the 
UNGA. This is because the Shah's ambassador to the United Nations Feyerdun Hoveyda 
(as well as other key diplomats) is officially dismissed from service on January 17, 1979 
(BBC, 1979). Nonetheless, it is unclear at what point the new Islamist Iranian 
government sends diplomats to the UN to cast votes on its behalf (votes that would 
ostensibly be more contradictory to Iraqi votes); for example, I might expect to see 
Iran's new policy preferences to be reflected in their UN votes at least by 1980. 
Digging deeper into Iran and Iraq's United Nations roll call data indeed provides 
some support for my expectation that Iran's new policy preferences may not have been 
reflected until 1980. Using roll call votes obtained from Voeten and Merdzanovic (2009) 
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I conduct simple correlations between the voting records of Iran and Iraq for the years 
1979 and 1980. Their data set contains individual voting records organized by year and 
United Nations resolution number. Thus, I merge the votes of both Iran and Iraq by 
resolution number and year in order to ensure the correlations reflect the votes cast by 
both nations for the proper resolutions. In so doing, I find Iran and Iraq's voting records 
for 1979 to be positively correlated at approximately 0.47 meaning nearly half of the 
time they voted the same in the General Assembly. Running the same correlation for all 
votes cast in 1980 shows both nations votes to be correlated at only 0.30. 
Analyzing the actual roll call votes of both Iran and Iraq therefore shows that 
even in 1979 Iran and Iraq are still voting similarly about half of the time. It is not until 
the beginning of their war in 1980 - fully one year after the Ayatollah assumes power in 
Iran - that the similarity between Iranian and Iraqi voting in the United Nations drops 
significantly to about 0.30 suggesting that less than one-third of the time are both states 
voting the same. There is little doubt serious and long standing issues precipitated their 
war including issues such as territorial claims, Arab and Persian ethnic tensions, and the 
religious ideological competition between newly Islamist Iran and Saddam's primarily 
secularized Iraq. Yet, even though contention over highly salient issues was clearly 
present this tension does not appear to translate into any meaningful divergence in 
both states' United Nations roll call voting until 1980 and even then the overall tension 
is still less than my adopted threshold.58 
58
 In 1980, the start of the war, the Euclidean distance between Iraqi and Iranian UN ideal points 
approaches 0.60 which indicates a fairly high level of tension but still lower than one standard deviation 
from the mean, my coding threshold for tension as discussed in chapter four. 
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The result, therefore, is my model does not predict the beginning of the Iran-Iraq 
war but, again, for good reason: the policy divergence that would be expected between 
Iraq and the new Iranian regime does not actually occur until 1980, one year after the 
revolution, and even then does not reach the level as to be captured by my model's 
critical threshold for tension. Having discussed in detail the two specific cases of the 
Gulf War and the Iran-Iraq war it is important to recognize the overall fit of my model 
for the Middle East region is reasonably good as indicated by the empirical results 
reported at the outset. 
Before continuing along, some readers may notice Appendix 5B indicates many 
of the arms races - 21 of 34 - occurring in the Middle East from 1970-2000 involve 
Israel. For transparency, it is indeed important to understand what effect Israeli cases 
of arms racing have on the broader empirical results. For example, a quick analysis of all 
dyads in contention with one another shows approximately 95% of those cases in which 
tension over issues is present involve Israel and some other Middle Eastern state. 
Taking this a step further, it is possible to reevaluate the relationship between arms 
racing and interstate conflict when all cases involving Israel are dropped from the 
sample and the empirical models reestimated. 
Doing so indeed produces some variation from the original model estimates 
listed in Table 5.4. The most dramatic change occurs between ground based arms 
racing and conflict; the original coefficient obtained over the entire sample of states was 
strongly positive and significant. When all cases involving Israel are dropped from the 
analysis, however, the ground race variable is dropped from the estimation and the 
relationship goes away entirely. This means that when Israeli dyads are dropped from 
the analysis there are no ground based arms races that lead to conflict. Or, 
alternatively, all ground races that ended in conflict in my sample from 1970-2000 
involved Israel. 
Contradictory to the effect on ground based arms racing, eliminating Israeli 
dyads actually improves the estimated coefficient for sea based arms racing and its 
impact on militarized conflict. Essentially, the association strengthens from an original 
statistical significance of p < .10 to an improved level of significance of p < .01. An 
examination of the list of naval arms races shows almost all of the naval arms race dyads 
involve Israel. Thus, it is likely many of the naval arms races involving Israel do not 
eventually lead to militarized conflict and as a result the statistical association between 
naval arms racing and militarized conflict becomes stronger when Israeli cases are 
dropped from the analysis. Lastly, there is no relevant impact on the aerial arms race 
variable; similar to the original analysis, the coefficient remains positive but does not 
approach any meaningful level of statistical significance when Israeli dyads are dropped 
from the estimation. 
I present these specific results as an opportunity for readers to understand as 
much as possible the dynamics at work in the Middle East. That Israel plays such an 
important role in the arming and conflict behavior of the Middle East, however, should 
not be taken as evidence against the general theory of arms racing and militarized 
conflict advanced in this dissertation. Almost any political research involving the Middle 
East, for example, will be strongly affected by the presence and actions of Israel (in fact, 
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perhaps no other region in the world is as consistently affected by the actions of one 
state as in the Middle East). Yet, theories of political phenomenon must be general (as 
is my theory of arms racing and conflict) in order to provide the most leverage over 
relationships between important concepts. Although it so happens a majority of arms 
races do involve at least one specific state (Israel) it should also be noted that - for the 
most part - Israel and its competitors behave as the theory expects. 
Moving along, the question of substantive impact on conflict onset arises. The 
relationship between explanatory variables and a binary outcome variable is not linear 
meaning that logistic coefficients and their effects upon the dependent variable cannot 
be easily assessed using their values alone. Predicted probability calculations are 
needed in order to understand how changes in the independent variables affect the 
likelihood of observing the presence of the dependent variable. The final table shows 
the predicted probabilities for observing conflict onset (a MID) when various types of 
arms racing are present and with different values for the control variables contiguity 
and capability ratio: 
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Table 5.5 
Probability of Conflict Onset, 1970-2000 
Estimates Obtained from Table 5.4 
Variable 
Baseline: 
Arms Race 
Contiguity 
ln(Capability Ratio) 
Ground Race 
Sea Race 
Air Race* 
Treatment 
0 
0 
X 
1 
1 
1 
Pr(Conflict Onset) 
1.2% (0.004) 
4.2% (0.017) 
2.9% (0.015) 
2.0% (0.019) 
% Increase 
-
250% 
142% 
67% 
Variable 
Baseline: 
Arms Race 
Contiguity 
ln(Capability Ratio) 
Ground Race 
Sea Race 
Air Race* 
Treatment 
0 
1 
X 
1 
1 
1 
Pr(Conflict Onset) 
4.9% (0.013) 
16.1% (0.072) 
10.9% (0.050) 
8.2% (0.083) 
% Increase 
-
229% 
122% 
67% 
*estimated coefficients not significant 
In the first portion of the table the baseline probability of a militarized interstate 
dispute in the Middle East from 1970-2000 with the natural log of the capability ratio set 
to its mean and with no direct contiguity and no arms racing of any kind is 1.2%. This is 
consistent with scholars' understanding that interstate conflicts (and especially wars) 
are relatively epiphenomenal events. Nonetheless, the presence of a ground race 
increases the likelihood of conflict onset to 4.2%. This figure may suggest the overall 
likelihood remains relatively low, but the presence of a ground arms race produces a 
250% increase in the chance for conflict - more than triple - from the baseline figure. 
The next most conflict prone form of arms racing involves naval arms competitions. 
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States engaging in naval arms racing have a 2.9% overall likelihood of militarized 
conflict. This translates into a 142% increase over the baseline probability for interstate 
conflict when a naval arms race is present. Aerial arms racing exhibits the weakest 
impact, likely for reasons discussed earlier, and the substantive impact of aerial arms 
racing should not be taken with much confidence given its estimated coefficient does 
not approach any level of statistical significance. 
The second portion of this table investigates the chances for conflict onset when 
there is direct contiguity between pairs of states. Ground based racing is again highly 
influential and this time the impact is only slightly less at 229% which is still more than 
triple the likelihood of conflict in the absence of a ground arms race. Similar to the 
substantive effects in the first portion of this table naval arms racing is again the second 
most conflict prone form of arms racing. Among contiguous states, the presence of a 
naval arms race still increases probability of conflict to roughly 11% for an overall impact 
that is about 120% greater than otherwise would be. Thus, the substantive impact of 
ground and sea based arms racing on militarized conflict is positive and significant and 
the effects do not diminish drastically when controlling for the effect of contiguity. At 
the very least, arms racing doubles - and in some cases more than triples - the chances 
that states will end up in militarized conflict with one another. 
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5.5 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter represents the first empirical test of the relationship between the 
central theoretical claim that suggests arms racing increases the probability for conflict 
between states. In this the first empirical chapter I believe the statistical results gleaned 
from the Middle East region support the theoretical proposition that arms racing leads 
states into conflict with one another. In the Middle East it appears that ground based 
and naval arms racing are the strongest predictors of conflict onset. Both of these arms 
race variables are statistically significant even when controlling for contiguity and power 
parity. Although the impact of aerial arms racing is in the expected direction I cannot 
reject the null hypothesis for this type of arms racing. As discussed, the inability for 
aerial arms racing to exert a strong impact upon conflict onset may be due to some 
multicollinearity with the ground based arms race variable: since both ground and air 
arms races occur together with some frequency it appears there is little independent 
impact by aerial based arms races upon interstate conflict. 
Substantively, ground based arms racing was most likely to significantly increase 
the probability of interstate conflict for minor power states in the Middle East. Naval 
arms racing was the second most important predictor of conflict onset while aerial arms 
races - although positively associated with an increased likelihood for conflict - did not 
achieve any level of statistical significance. In general, the entirety of the empirical 
results for the Middle East are consistent with what might be intuitively expected: 
ground based forces are the foundation for most militaries and so it is not surprising 
ground based arms racing exhibits strong effects and is most likely to provoke 
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militarized conflict. Related to this, a significant amount of ground based military 
offensives are conducted simultaneously with air support which may partially explain 
the lack of a strong and independent effect for the aerial arms race variable in my 
empirical analyses for the Middle East. 
Lastly, there are no landlocked states in the Middle East and so it is reasonable 
to expect these states to expand and compete militarily through the use of naval 
weaponry. The empirical results indicate states in the Middle East indeed do so and 
that the presence of naval arms races is positively related to conflict onset and at a 
statistically significant level. Above all, however, it is important to reemphasize how the 
statistical results vary across the three types of arms racing analyzed in this chapter. 
That ground, naval, and aerial arms racing each exhibit varying degrees of impact upon 
militarized conflict provides early justification for studying different types of military 
weapons independently. 
This dissertation is about studying the relationship between arms racing and 
conflict amongst minor power states of which the Middle East is just one arena. 
Chapter six and chapter seven apply the model of arms racing used here to the regions 
of Africa and Latin America over the same period of 1970-2000, respectively. As 
explained in earlier chapters the findings obtained from the Middle East region of states 
should be generalizable to both Latin America and Africa. That is, the theoretical 
expectation about the relationship between dyadic arms racing and conflict amongst 
minor powers does not vary by region. Thus, while I expect all three forms of arms 
racing will be positively associated with conflict onset in all regions I fully anticipate 
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observing interesting variations in the likelihood of interstate conflict over the individual 
forms of arms racing (ground, sea, and air) analyzed in this research. 
Appendix 5A 
Countries of the Middle East 
The Middle East, 1970-2000 
Bahrain 
Egypt 
Iran 
Iraq 
Israel 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Syria 
United Arab Emirates 
Yemeni Arab Republic 
Yemeni People's Republic 
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Appendix 5B 
List of Arms Races, 1970-2000 
Dyad 
Iran -Syria 
Iran - Israel 
Iran-Kuwait 
Iran-U.A.E. 
I ran - Iraq 
I ran-Dem. Rep. 
Yemen 
I r aq - Lebanon 
I r aq - Israel 
Syria- Israel 
Lebanon - Israel 
Israel-Saudi Arabia 
Israel- Kuwait 
Israel -U.A.E. 
Israel -Yemen Arab 
Rep. 
Israel- Dem. Rep. 
Yemen 
Israel-Bahrain 
Israel -Oman 
Ground 
1973-1977 
1973-1977 
1973-1977 
1973-1977 
1980-1984 
1971-1977 
1970-1977 
1970-1976 
1972-1977 
1973-1977 
1973-1977 
Sea 
1977-1982 
1992-1997 
1970-1975 
1977-1986 
1978-1986 
1982-1986 
1992-1996 
1979-1985 
1977-1985 
1982-1986 
1979-1985 
1992-1997 
Air 
1972-1977 
1972-1976 
1973-1978 
1973-1978 
1974-1978 
Egypt-Syria 1979-1987 
Egypt-Israel ' 1979-1986 
1993-1997 
Egypt - Dem. Rep. 1979-1985 
Yemen 
Jordan - Kuwait 1973-1977 
Jordan-U.A.E. 1973-1977 
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Chapter 6 
Arms Racing and Conflict in Africa 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I continue my empirical evaluation of Hypothesis 1 in Africa from 
the period 1970-2000. The first portion of this chapter again presents an overview of 
the African region in terms of rivalries and militarized conflict. I then move on to the 
descriptive statistics section in which I provide information regarding the numbers and 
distribution of ground, sea, and aerial based arms races in Africa. In the final portion of 
this chapter I present the statistical results concerning the relationship between arms 
racing and conflict onset. To conclude my investigation of the African region of minor 
states I discuss the substantive effects of the three different forms of arms racing on the 
likelihood of militarized conflict as done previously for the Middle East. 
6.2 Africa, 1970-2000 
For my analysis of Africa I include all states located on the continent as well as 
several nearby island nations such as Madagascar, Cape Verde, and Seychelles. The full 
list of states used for my analysis of Africa is available in Appendix 6A at the end of this 
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chapter. Furthermore, I include Egypt in my analysis of Africa here just as it was for the 
analysis of the Middle East in chapter five. Most would agree Egypt plays an important 
political role in both the Middle East and Africa as it does share land borders with 
nations from both regions (Libya and Sudan in Africa, Israel in the Middle East). It is the 
only country included in multiple regions in my entire study. 
Using the list of strategic rivals from Thompson (2001) again reveals there are 
twenty nine rivalries in Africa that were present for some portion of the period 1970-
1999. I list these rivalries and their dates in the following table: 
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Table 6.1 
Rivalries of Africa, 1970-1999 
Rivalry 
Angola - South Africa 
Angola-Zaire 
Burkina Faso- Mali 
Cameroon - Nigeria 
Chad -Libya 
Egypt-Libya 
Egypt-Sudan 
Eq. Guinea-Gabon 
Eritrea-Ethiopia 
Eritrea-Sudan 
Ethiopia-Somalia 
Ethiopia-Sudan 
Ghana - Ivory Coast 
Ghana-Togo 
Guinea-Bissau - Senegal 
Kenya-Somalia 
Kenya- Uganda 
Libya-Sudan 
Malawi -Tanzania 
Malawi-Zambia 
Mauritania-Senegal 
Mozambique - Rhodesia 
Mozambique - South Africa 
Rhodesia-Zambia 
Sudan - Uganda 
Sudan - Uganda 
Tanzania-Uganda 
South Africa - Zambia 
South Africa - Zimbabwe 
Years Active 
1975-1988 
1975-1997 
1960-1986 
1975-
1966-1994 
1973-1992 
1991-
1972-1979 
1998-
1993-
1960-1988 
1965-
1960-1970 
1960-1995 
1989-1993 
1963-1981 
1986-1995 
1974-1985 
1964-1994 
1964-1986 
1989-1995 
1975-1979 
1976-1991 
1965-1979 
1963-1972 
1994-
1971-1979 
1965-1991 
1980-1992 
This list shows Africa has experienced a significant amount of rivalry in the post 
World War II era and that minor states in Africa, much like the Middle East, are engaging 
each other in rivalries fairly frequently. Many of these rivalries are consistent with 
African states known to have poor relations with each other such as Angola's rivalries 
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with South Africa (1975-1988) and Zaire (1975-1997), Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Zambia 
(1965-1979), and Ethiopia's extensive rivalry with Somalia (1960-1988) to name only a 
few. 
To what degree has militarized conflict plagued the African region from 1970-
2000? Here again I use MID version 3.04 from Oneal and Russett (2005) and count the 
total number of MIDs in Africa in which there was at least one African state on both 
sides of the conflict; I also note again no significant differences between MID version 
3.04 and version 3.10 data sets. During this period of time there were 183 militarized 
interstate disputes between African states or about 6 MIDs per year. Although this 
figure is higher than the 3.5 MIDs per year for the Middle East (105 total MIDs) during 
this same period it is not as high as might be expected considering there are 
approximately three times more independent states in Africa than the Middle East. 
Theoretically, the larger amount of independent states in Africa provides many more 
opportunities for interstate conflict especially when considering the increased number 
of dyadic relationships present. 
However, the 183 militarized conflicts in Africa is not even double the number of 
conflicts experienced by the much smaller Middle East region suggesting the African 
region, in general terms, may indeed be less conflict prone over the period 1970-2000. 
Furthermore, there were two interstate wars fought during this period according to 
COW data: the Ethiopian - Somalian War from 1977-1978 and the Ugandan - Tanzanian 
War from 1978-1979. With respect to overall military expenditures, states composing 
the African region accounted for roughly 1.7% of the world's total military expenditures 
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in the year 1985. Again, considering the overall size of the African region, this figure is 
much smaller than the 8% total military expenditure figure reported for the Middle East 
in chapter five and is also much lower than NATO's 43% proportion of total military 
expenditures for the year 1985. Thus, it is clear Africa experiences far less external 
conflict (interstate conflict) than does the Middle East and this overall level of conflict 
would be even lower were Egypt to be counted as a member of only the Middle East. 
6.3 Descriptive Statistics 
An analysis of some descriptive statistics for the African region over the period 
1970-2000 shows there are 135 ground based arms races, 52 naval arms races, and 204 
air based arms races. In Africa it appears air based weapons competitions are the most 
prevalent form of arms races during the period of study. Ground based arms races are 
the second most common form of arms racing in Africa which is still somewhat 
consistent with the notion that land based weapons are foundational to most militaries. 
Lastly, almost one-third (14 states) of African nations are landlocked states which may 
contribute partially to the relatively small number of naval arms races occurring in the 
region from 1970-2000. Where appropriate these landlocked states are excluded in 
some of the statistical analyses that follow. The fourteen landlocked states are: 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
The ostensibly high number of aerial arms races in Africa is interesting; first, it is 
important to recognize the actual size of many of the air inventories of African states is 
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quite small. Some larger states (located mostly in Northern Africa) indeed have 
moderately sized air forces: in 1985, for example, Nigeria's total air force numbers 49 
with Angola having an even larger air force of 141. Yet, a majority of African states 
maintain only small numbers of aerial combat weaponry. For the same year of 1985 the 
air force of Gabon is only 11 combat planes strong; Ghana 10, Mali 5, and Rwanda just 4. 
The implication, therefore, is that a gain of just 2 or 3 aerial combat vehicles over 
the span of a few years represents a significant increase in the air forces of many African 
states and when such increases happen bilaterally and simultaneously then an aerial 
arms race is coded. Since I do not institute a minimum size threshold for states' air 
forces, for example, my measure of arms racing may be less suited for some of the very 
small air forces of African states resulting in arms races that involve increases of just a 
few weapons over a period of time. As a result, at least some of the aerial arms races 
identified in Africa may be more a consequence of my particular coding decisions than a 
reflection of true aerial competitions between some states. Nonetheless, the 
approximately 200 aerial arms races in Africa comes into focus a bit more when 
considering that for the thirty year period 1970-2000 this equates to roughly 7 aerial 
arms races per year. Given there are nearly fifty independent states on the African 
continent, the overall number of aerial arms races I report appears to be within reason. 
The following table shows the correlation coefficients for each of the arms race 
variables as well as the contiguity and capability ratio control variables included in my 
model of interstate conflict for Africa. Since there is a group of landlocked states in 
Africa performing the correlations without excluding such landlocked states (that have 
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no navies) might bias the coefficients. As a result, the following table is actually a 
combination of two separate correlations; any correlation cell below involving the 'Sea' 
variable has been calculated by excluding all landlocked states while all other cells are 
calculated using the full number of observations. For example, the correlation between 
ground and aerial racing is calculated over the entire N of 30766 while the correlation 
between sea racing and ground racing or sea racing and contiguity is calculated over the 
reduced N of 15168 since all landlocked states are removed from the analysis: 
Table 6.2 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Ground, Sea, and Air Arms Racing 
Model 
Variables 
Ground 
Sea 
Air 
Contiguity 
ln(Capability 
Ratio) 
Ground 
1.00 
Sea 
0.13 
1.00 
Air 
0.24 
0.31 
1.00 
Contiguity 
0.03 
0.06 
-0.07 
1.00 
ln(Capability 
Ratio) 
-0.07 
-0.06 
-0.11 
-0.11 
1.00 
N = 30766, 15168 
In general the coefficients above suggest virtually no correlation between any of 
the three arms race variables with either of the two control variables, contiguity and 
power capability ratio (with both control variables exhibiting little correlation with one 
another, as well). Similar to the correlation figures for the Middle East there appears to 
be some moderately positive correlation between ground based and aerial based arms 
racing at 0.24 though less than the 0.39 figure reported for the Middle East during the 
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same time period. Air arms racing is also correlated with naval arms races and at a 
slightly higher figure of 0.31. 
Overall, aerial arms racing is moderately correlated with both naval and ground 
based arms racing while there is little correlation between naval and ground arms 
racing. Again, the correlation between aerial arms racing and both other forms of arms 
racing (although not extremely high) is somewhat suggestive. This is because the 
resource constraints of minor powers states - especially in Africa - are high enough 
such that minor power states are unlikely to pursue multiple forms of arms 
competitions at any given time. As a result, even the moderate correlation between air 
arms racing and both ground and naval racing amongst African states hints at the 
importance states may place on aerial support when engaging in either ground or naval 
arms races. To conclude this section I provide a basic overview of the arming patterns 
of African states from 1970-2000 using the general percentages in the table below that 
indicate the likelihood any given state increased a particular form of weaponry from one 
year to the next: 
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Table 6.3 
Likelihood of Increasing Arms in Following Year 
Arms Type 
Ground 
Sea 
Air 
Increase in Arms at t+1 
45% 
24% 
35% 
N = 30766, 21199 
These percentages again show the variation in the likelihood of a state in Africa 
increasing its weapons from one year to the next. I again calculate these figures by 
dividing the number of times states increased their weapons from t to t+1 by the total 
number of observations. The figure for naval weaponry is obtained over a smaller set of 
observations (21199) since landlocked states are removed from the analysis. The above 
table indicates that approximately 45% of the time a state in Africa increased its ground 
based weapons during the following year. Additionally, states increased their aerial 
weapons from one year to the next 35% of the time while naval based weapons were 
increased from year to year 24% of the time. 
6.4 Empirical Results: Hypothesis 1 
HI: The presence of an arms race increases the likelihood of international conflict. 
This section reports the results for the relationship between arms races and 
international conflict. Once again, the theoretical assumption is that contentious issues 
provoke large increases in bilateral arming between states. This produces dangerous 
bilateral arms competitions - arms races - between such states and this increases the 
likelihood of two states becoming involved in militarized conflict with one another. The 
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following table represents the impact of arms races upon militarized conflict in the 
region of Africa over the period 1970-2000. Similar to the results from chapter five, I 
report separate effects for ground, naval, and aerial forms of arms racing and their 
impact on militarized conflict. Although not shown in the table all model coefficients 
are estimated with the cubic polynomial term that is the number of peace years in 
between conflict. Lastly, all estimates are obtained over the entire set of potential 
observations and not just cases in which contentious issues and extraordinary bilateral 
arming were present: 
Table 6.4 
Multivariate Models for Conflict Onset 
Three Types of Arms Racing, 1970-2000 
Variable 
Arms Race Type 
Contiguity 
ln(Capability Ratio) 
Constant 
N 
Log-likelihood 
Pseudo-R2 
Model 1 
Ground Races 
0.384(0.323) 
3.553 (0.234)*** 
-0.059 (0.084) 
-5.022 (0.293) 
30766 
-774.60 
0.309 
Model 2 
Sea Races 
0.960 (0.479)** 
3.848(0.347)*** 
0.107 (0.110) 
-5.724 (0.492) 
15168 
-360.16 
0.321 
Model 3 
Air Races 
0.851(0.262)*** 
3.496(0.233)*** 
-0.024 (0.083) 
-5.157(0.295) 
30766 
-767.69 
0.315 
**p <, .05, ***p < .01, robust standard errors in parentheses 
Consistent with the results reported earlier for the Middle East the above table 
shows that direct contiguity is again positively associated with conflict onset at the 
highest level of statistical significant (p < .01) in all three empirical models. Of the three 
primary arms race variables, naval and aerial based arms racing are positively associated 
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with militarized conflict in Africa. Both relationships are relatively strong with naval 
based arms racing increasing the likelihood of militarized conflict at the p < .05 level of 
statistical significance and air based arms racing being associated with interstate conflict 
in Africa at the p < .01 level. Although in the expected direction ground based arms 
races, however, do not appear to have any meaningful impact on the likelihood of states 
becoming involved in militarized conflict with one another (with the standard error 
almost as large as the coefficient estimate). 
In the interest of full transparency it is important to note here the actual average 
change in bilateral air weaponry over any five year period in Africa 1970-2000 turns out 
to be - 1 % , or basically no change. If this figure were to be used then any positive 
increase in bilateral arming would constitute an extraordinary arms increase. In order 
to provide a stricter test of the theoretical relationship I instead used 10% as the 
average bilateral increase in aerial weapons over any five year period and coded any 
dyad with a five year increase at least 25% higher than this figure (or, about 13%) as 
involved in extraordinary arming. Although the 10% threshold is an artificial substitute 
it helps eliminate the possibility of any positive bilateral increases being coded as arms 
races. In this regard, the threshold helps produce a more robust test of the relationship 
between aerial arms races and the onset of militarized conflict. 
Nonetheless, the individual coefficient estimates for each of the three arms race 
variables (ground, sea, and air) are noteworthy. Recall that in the Middle East over the 
same time period it was naval and ground based arms racing that increased the 
likelihood of interstate conflict while aerial based races had no significant impact. Here 
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in Africa, ground based arms races do not affect the likelihood of militarized conflict but 
naval and aerial races do. The inability to reject the null hypothesis for ground races is 
not due to the lack of ground based arms races occurring in Africa; as discussed earlier 
in this chapter ground arms races are indeed the second most common form of arms 
races in Africa from 1970-2000 behind aerial arms races. Hence, African states are 
engaging in ground based arms races but these particular forms of arms races do no 
appear to be ending in militarized conflict as the general theoretical account suggests. 
There is at least one intuitive explanation for this outcome. The large size of the 
African region itself means that states in contention with one another are likely to have 
much greater distances to travel than states located within the Middle East, for 
example. Even many of the states themselves are large enough such that the militaries 
of contiguous states may still need to travel long distances in order to strike at capital 
cities or important military and production facilities. As noted earlier, it is certainly the 
case my specific measure of arms racing identifies at least some aerial competitions in 
Africa that are simply much too small to be taken seriously but that are included in the 
overall tally of aerial arms races, nonetheless. Even with this in mind, however, the 
formidable expanse of the African continent is an alternative possible explanation for 
why aerial arms races outnumber ground and naval races in Africa. Some important 
examples indeed reflect the significance that aerial weaponry has had in militarized 
conflict in Africa. 
During the Angolan civil war of the 1970's and 1980's the FAPLA (Popular Armed 
Forces for the Liberation of Angola) had to fight off not just the UNITA (National 
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Movement for the Total Liberation of Angola) but also interventions by South Africa's 
formidable air force which was carrying out attacks in support of the UNITA insurgency: 
in 1984, for example, "The Angolan Government said that since the invasion [by South 
Africa] began, dozens of civilians had been killed in bombing raids on the towns of 
Cuvelai, Cahama and Caiundo, which are all about 100 miles north of Angola's border 
with South African-controlled Namibia" (Giniger, Freudenheim, and Douglas, 1984). 
In an attempt to repel such attacks, the FAPLA along with Soviet and Cuban 
assistance pursued a strategy of air superiority allowing them to execute strikes closer 
towards South Africa's border. In a detailed account, Turner (1998) explains: 
"The FAPLA air threat to UNITA lay with more and better fixed-wing aircraft and 
combat helicopters to support ground operations. Increased use of helicopter 
resupply and reinforcement to isolated garrisons and forward units diminished 
UNITA's effectiveness in interdicting overland routes. By the early 1980's FAPLA 
was commonly using the MiG-21 MF multi-role fighter, especially in the fighter-
bomber role, and was phasing out the older MiG-17. The older Mi-8/17 
transport and assault helicopters were augmented by the newer Mi-
24/25/35...FAPLA's combat helicopters provided fire support to ground 
operations as well as playing a major logistical role. They were also used to 
insert special forces and teams for deep reconnaissance behind UNITA lines" 
(116). 
The importance of aerial weaponry for many African states is seen in more 
recent examples, as well. Beginning in 1998 and escalating seriously in the year 2000, 
Eritrea and Ethiopia again found themselves involved in serious militarized conflict 
regarding a small area of disputed territory along their border. A significant amount of 
the militarized violence that occurred between both states involved strategic air strikes 
against targets. Jane's Information Group (2009) reports both Eritrea and Ethiopia were 
actively engaged in a competition for aerial superiority in the lead up to their conflict 
146 
with the Eritrean air force purchasing a group of MiG-29 Fulcrum combat aircraft only to 
be countered by an acquisition of Su-27 Fulcrum long range fighters by the Ethiopian 
military. With over 500 miles between some of the major air bases in Ethiopia (Addis 
Ababa and Gondar) and Eritrea (Asmara) both states used extensive aerial combat to 
inflict damage during their territorial dispute. 
In 2004, one of South Africa's largest news outlets reported on the danger of an 
aerial arms race between some south African states, including South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe. The South African news service - News 24 - noted "Reports suggesting 
southern Africa faced a potential arms race because of Zimbabwe's purchase of $240m 
worth of Chinese fighter jets were alarming..." (2004). The most recent example of the 
importance of aerial weaponry and air superiority in Africa involves Algeria and 
Morocco, two North African states with long standing issues including border disputes. 
In 2008, Al Jazeera drew attention to recent major combat aircraft purchases by the two 
states. Al Jazeera reported: 
"At odds for decades, Morocco and Algeria have entered what some see as the 
fiercest arms race in North Africa in years. In 2006, the Algerian government 
signed a $1.3bn armament deal with Russia for the delivery of more than 34 
MiG-29 fighter jets. Morocco, for its part, has also decided to go shopping for 
weapons and signed a contract worth $2.4bn to purchase 24 F-16 fighter jets. 
The ongoing arms race comes against the backdrop of a growing deterioration in 
the two countries' relations. Algeria's foreign minister rejected a call by 
Morocco to reopen the borders between the two countries, saying the issue is 
not a priority for his country. For its part, Morocco accuses Algeria of backing 
the Polisario front which is fighting for a homeland in Western Sahara, now 
under Moroccan control" (2008). 
These are just several examples helping to illustrate the overall emphasis many 
states in Africa place upon aerial weaponry and air superiority. Depending on the states 
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involved, the acquisitions of air combat fighter jets (as well as combat helicopters) may 
be large or small. Regardless of the size of such expansions and competitions, however, 
the quest for air superiority and the aerial arms races that often follow as a result 
appear to be important factors in the military landscape of Africa during my period of 
study. With this in mind, the last case above involving Morocco and Algeria is an 
excellent example of not only the relevance of aerial weaponry in Africa but is also a 
concise reflection of the overall theoretical story of this dissertation: the presence of 
some contentious issue or issues (a border dispute between Morocco and Algeria) leads 
to a tit-for-tat arms competition over some period of time (in the case above, Algeria's 
purchase of a group of fighter jets is followed closely by Morocco's own expansion of its 
air force). 
Hence, it becomes easier to understand the strong association between aerial 
arms racing and conflict: states in contention with one another likely understand the 
most efficient means to wage conflict against a competitor state is with aerial means of 
offensive weaponry. Aerial arms competitions may be less important in the relatively 
more contained and proximate distances for states in the Middle East (again, where 
aerial arms races are not statistically significant) where ground based forces can be 
quickly and effectively deployed across shorter distances. However, the empirical 
results above suggest a much lower utility for the use of ground based weaponry to 
carry out militarized conflict over the expansive African continent; it is true African 
states engage in ground based forms of arms racing but this behavior appears to be 
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more saber rattling since it is aerial arms races (along with naval races) that much more 
often than not develop into militarized conflict.59 
Taken broadly, the empirical results also offer some face validity when 
considering many of the areas in Africa that have been plagued by militarized conflict in 
recent history. Although arms racing appears to be relatively widespread throughout 
Africa there are at least several especially conflict prone areas where arms races should 
be particularly conspicuous. In northern Africa, Libya, Sudan, and Egypt have been a 
source of ongoing tension and periodic conflict; Table 6.1 earlier shows serious rivalries 
between all three states including Libya and Sudan, 1974-1985, Egypt and Libya, 1973-
1992, and Egypt and Sudan, 1991 and onward. 
Indeed, Libya and Egypt engaged in a naval arms race from 1979-1987 as well as 
an aerial arms race from 1978-1983. Libya and Sudan undertook arms races both on the 
ground (1971-1975) as well as in the air (1971-1976 and 1979-1985) and Sudan and 
Egypt engaged in an extensive aerial arms race from 1988-1997. In west-central Africa 
Nigeria and Cameroon have experienced repeated militarized conflicts that started in 
the 1980's. Their violent clashes were due at least in part to the disputed Bakassi 
peninsula, a resource rich area of land in the Gulf of Guinea that had been administered 
by Nigeria since it gained independence. Throughout this period of contentious 
relations both states were involved in ground based arms races from 1974-1978 and 
1984-1988 as well as an aerial arms race from 1985-1992. 
59
 A majority of African states are coastal and so the strong relationship between naval arms races and 
conflict is not surprising. Although many of these navies are not comprised of large war ships or vessels 
that could be sent across oceans most of these same navies are adequately equipped for coastal 
offensives with nearby states. 
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In central Africa, the military junta of Mobutu Sese Seko dominated the 
leadership of the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1965-1997. The totalitarianism 
and military rule kept tensions high and plunged the DRC into militarized conflict with 
many of its neighbors. Issues were key instigators for many of these arms races, none 
more so than Sese Seko's own fear and international accusations concerning communist 
expansion (especially the Soviet Union's relationship with Angola). Conversely, many 
neighboring states held grievances regarding Sese Seko's totalitarian, one-party 
dictatorship (BBC, 2009). Given these issues that surrounded the central African nations 
during this period there were various instances of arms racing: the DRC, for example, 
participated in naval arms racing (1980-1984) and aerial arms racing (1980-1991) with 
both Congo and Angola and an aerial arms race with Uganda from 1971-1975. 
The Horn of Africa continues to exhibit high levels of contention between states 
as well as frequent episodes of militarized conflict. Though some definitions vary Sudan, 
Eritea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya are generally considered to be the major 
inhabitants of this region of eastern Africa. Among these states, serious rivalries have 
involved Ethiopia and Somalia from 1960-1988, Ethiopia and Sudan since 1965, Kenya 
and Somalia from 1963-1981, and Kenya and Uganda from 1986-1995. Territorial 
claims, political dictatorship, and ethnic issues are some of the primary underlying 
factors that have contributed to the ongoing instability for many of the states in this 
specific region of Africa. 
As a result, there has been a significant amount of military expansion and 
competition here from the period 1970-2000: between Kenya and Ethiopia a ground 
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arms race from 1973-1982, a naval arms race from 1984-1991, and an aerial arms race 
from 1974-1988; Ethiopia and Sudan engaged in aerial arms racing from 1979-1988 and 
again from 1990-1998; a ground race from 1973-1977 and an aerial arms race from 
1973-1978 occurred between Uganda and Kenya; Kenya and Sudan pursued aerial arms 
races from 1972-1976 and again later from 1985-1992; lastly, an aerial arms race 
between Kenya and Somalia continued from 1972-1978. 
Indeed, both of Africa's interstate wars as listed by the Correlates of War from 
1970-2000 involved states located within the Horn of Africa. Militarized conflict erupted 
between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977 over the disputed Ogaden region of Ethiopia. In 
this case, only an aerial arms race was involved beginning in 1977 and lasting until 1987. 
The data show Ethiopia made reasonably large increases in its ground based military 
forces along with its air force in the several years leading up to the war; Somalia, 
however, was able to enlarge only its aerial weaponry immediately before the outbreak 
of conflict.60 The second war during this period of time involved Uganda and Tanzania 
from 1978-1979. In this particular case, no arms racing of any kind preceded the 
militarized conflict between both states. 
Basic accounts suggest rising tension between Uganda and Tanzania began with 
Idi Amin's rise to power in 1971. Tanzania responded by offering political asylum to the 
victim of Amin's coup thus setting off the deterioration in relations between the two 
states. However, the contention between both Uganda and Tanzania during the period 
60
 Somali ground forces did show some significant increases in several years after the beginning of the war 
probably as a response to Ethiopian ground supremacy but was nonetheless unable to match Ethiopian 
ground fortifications in the several years leading up to the war. 
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is not reflected in their United Nations ideal point estimates. From 1971 until the 
outbreak of hostilities the largest difference in UN ideal points is approximately 0.18, 
still below the overall average distance for Africa of 0.20. 
Most surprising, there appears to be little bilateral arms competition between 
each state during this same period of time. Uganda appears to double its ground based 
forces and increase slightly its aerial weaponry in the lead up to the war but Tanzania is 
unable to match these increases in either ground or aerial weaponry. Thus, this specific 
case does not appear to conform to the theory developed earlier: contentious issues 
were present (though not captured by United Nations voting) but no extraordinary 
bilateral arms increases occurred between Uganda and Tanzania. That is, in this 
particular case, militarized conflict was not preceded by any form of arms racing. 
Still, the empirical results provide good support for the claim that arms racing is 
positively associated with militarized conflict. The discussion above indicates that 
various types of arms races have indeed occurred across parts of Africa where 
contentious issues and conflict have been most prevalent. The following section moves 
towards a substantive examination of arms races and interstate conflict by investigating 
the likelihood of observing militarized interstate disputes when different types of arms 
races - ground, sea, and air - are present: 
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Table 6.5 
Probability of Conflict Onset, 1970-2000 
Estimates Obtained from Table 6.4 
Variable 
Baseline: 
Arms Race 
Contiguity 
ln(Capability Ratio) 
Ground Race* 
Sea Race 
Air Race 
Treatment 
0 
0 
X 
1 
1 
1 
Pr(Conflict Onset) 
0.1% (0.0002) 
0.2% (0.001) 
0.3% (0.002) 
0.2% (0.001) 
% Increase 
-
100% 
200% 
100% 
Variable 
Baseline: 
Arms Race 
Contiguity 
ln(Capability Ratio) 
Ground Race* 
Sea Race 
Air Race 
Treatment 
0 
1 
X 
1 
1 
1 
Pr(Conflict Onset) 
3.4% (0.005) 
5.0% (0.015) 
10.4% (0.043) 
7.0% (0.017) 
% Increase 
-
47% 
206% 
106% 
*estimated coefficients not significant 
The top portion of Table 6.5 reports the baseline probability of a MID in Africa 
from 1970-2000 when the capability ratio is set to its mean and when there is no direct 
contiguity and no arms racing present. Under these conditions, there is only one-tenth 
of 1% likelihood for conflict - that is, virtually no chance at all. This figure is especially 
low due to the large number of potential dyadic relationships for each state in Africa 
over the thirty year period 1970-2000 and the relatively small number of MID incidents 
(183). Thus, while the presence of a naval arms race produces a 200% increase in the 
probability of interstate conflict over the baseline probability the overall likelihood of 
conflict is still just three-tenths of 1%, or 0.3%. Similarly, an aerial arms race makes 
153 
interstate conflict 100% more likely but produces an overall probability of only two-
tenths of 1%. Additionally, I report the effects for ground based arms racing though it 
should be noted this particular arms race variable does not reach any level of statistical 
significance and therefore the substantive effects above should not be taken with much 
confidence. 
The potential effects change significantly, however, when direct contiguity it 
present. Using this model specification, the baseline probability of observing a 
militarized interstate dispute is approximately 3.4%. When African states engage in 
naval arms racing the overall probability of interstate conflict is 10.4%, a 206% increase 
over the baseline probability. Aerial arms races also exhibit a strong impact as they 
produce a 106% increase in the likelihood of militarized conflict for an overall chance of 
7%. Again, ground based arms races make interstate conflict more likely but because 
the coefficient estimate is not significant its impact on conflict propensity cannot be 
readily accepted. 
Since coefficients obtained from a logistic regression analysis only suggest the 
direction of the impact (positive or negative) I refer to substantive impacts of an arms 
race as the actual affect on the likelihood two states will experience conflict. The 
substantive impacts presented above suggest a similar story as in the Middle East. 
Recall that in the Middle East, the actual probability of militarized conflict was higher in 
the presence of an arms race and contiguity than with an arms race and no contiguity. 
For example, a ground race between non-contiguous states produced a 4.2% probability 
of an MID while a ground race coupled with contiguity increased this likelihood to 
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16.1%. Although for Africa over the same time period I find similar results the overall 
likelihood for interstate conflict is dramatically higher when arms racing occurs in 
conjunction with direct contiguity. Table 6.5 above shows naval arms races involving 
non-contiguous states have a likelihood of producing conflict of just one-third of 1%. 
When these states are contiguous, however, the probability of militarized conflict jumps 
to 10.4%, or more than thirty times more likely. 
This regional variation in substantive impacts is provocative because it shows the 
effects of arms racing in the presence of direct contiguity is weaker in the Middle East 
but much stronger in Africa. One potential explanation for this finding is consistent with 
a theme explored earlier in this chapter: interstate distances and the sheer size of the 
African region may mean that while arms racing (naval and aerial) is positively 
associated with militarized conflict they are only especially conflict prone when states 
are actually near (contiguous) with one another. So while contiguity does increase the 
impact of arms racing on the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East is appears to be a 
much stronger conduit for conflict in Africa. 
6.5 Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter I have presented and discussed the empirical results for 
Hypothesis 1 - the impact of arms races on conflict onset - for the region of Africa, 
1970-2000. Having explored and empirically evaluated two of the three regions 
originally proposed some encouraging patterns and thought-provoking findings have 
begun to emerge. First, I find good support again for my central thesis regarding the 
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relationship between arms racing and interstate conflict. In Africa, I find that it is naval 
and aerial arms racing that positively associated with militarized conflict at statistically 
significant levels. It is important to note African states also engage in ground based 
arms racing; however, even though the ground race variable's estimated coefficients is 
positive and in the expected direction it does not reach any appreciable level of 
statistical significance and as a result I cannot reject the null hypothesis for ground 
based arms racing and its effect on interstate conflict. 
Above all, empirical results obtained over two regions now (the Middle East and 
Africa) seem to offer some justification for studying separate forms of arms racing and 
through a regional analysis. In the Middle East it was ground based and naval based 
arms races that were positively associated with militarized conflict with aerial arms 
races failing to reach a statistically significant effect. Empirical results obtained for the 
region of Africa in this chapter, however, indicate little relationship between ground 
based arms racing and conflict but positive and statistically significant associations 
between both naval and aerial arms races and interstate conflict. One possible 
explanation for this regional variation proposed earlier involves the relatively large 
expanse of the African continent which perhaps makes aerial weaponry a more efficient 
means by which to conduct militarized conflict. 
Similarly, besides the actual variation in the statistical relationship between 
different forms of arms racing and conflict there are important differences in the 
generated predicted probabilities (substantive effects) across regions so far. Whereas 
the presence of direct contiguity increased the impact of arms races upon conflict in the 
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Middle East the effect is much stronger for the African region. Here, arms races61 
increase the likelihood of militarized conflict but the effect is noticeably more powerful 
with direct contiguity. This means arms races are especially pernicious when states are 
contiguous with one another in Africa. Again, a finding that is perhaps consistent with 
the reality of Africa's vast size but a finding that is nonetheless possible only through 
individual analyses of specific forms of arms racing over individual regions of minor 
powers. 
The final empirical task involves an exploration of arms racing and interstate 
conflict in the region of Latin America during 1970-2000 in chapter seven that follows. 
Once again, the theoretical expectations do not change: I assume issues drive 
extraordinary bilateral arms increases between states and arms races to increase the 
likelihood of militarized conflict amongst states in Latin America. If the empirical results 
to this point are any indication, however, there may be interesting variations between 
the individual arms race variables themselves and their statistical and substantive 
relationships with militarized conflict. 
61
 By arms races I am referring to naval and aerial arms races, the arms race variables that are statistically 
significant for my model of interstate conflict in Africa. 
Appendix 6A 
List of Countries 
Africa, 1970-2000 
Algeria 
Angola 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Botswana 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Ivory Coast 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Congo 
Djibouti 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
Egypt 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritea 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guinea 
Kenya 
Liberia 
Lesotho 
Libya 
Mauritania 
Madagascar 
Mauritius 
Malawi 
Mali 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nigeria 
Niger 
Rwanda 
South Africa 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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Appendix 6B 
List of Arms Race, 1970-2000 
Dyad 
Guinea-Bissau -
Cameroon 
Guinea-Bissau-
Angola 
Guinea-Bissau -
Congo 
Guinea-Bissau -
Ethiopia 
Guinea-Bissau -
Libya 
Guinea-Bissau-
Malawi 
Mali - Ivory Coast 
Mali-Angola 
Mali-Nigeria 
Mali-Congo 
Mali-Kenya 
Mali-Ethiopia 
Mali -
Mozambique 
Mali-Libya 
Mali-Tunisia 
Senegal-Algeria 
Senegal-Angola 
Senegal- Benin 
Senegal-Congo 
Senegal-Ethiopia 
Senegal- Kenya 
Senegal- Libya 
Senegal-
Madagascar 
Senegal-
Mozambique 
Ground 
1983-1988 
1984-1988 
1973-1977 
1973-1978 
1976-1981 
1973-1978 
1978-1982 
1978-1983 
1973-1978 
1980-1986 
1980-1984 
1979-1984 
Sea 
1980-1984 
1980-1984 
1980-1984 
1980-1984 
Air 
1983-1989 
1982-1990 
1982-1986 
1973-1977 
1985-1990 
1982-1988 
1982-1988 
1973-1977 
1982-1986 
1973-1977 
1982-1987 
1979-1991 
1979-1991 
1980-1988 
1985-1991 
1979-1986 
1981-1985 
1982-1988 
All 
Benin- 1980-1984 
Mauritania 
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Dyad 
Benin -Togo 
Benin -Cameroon 
Benin -Nigeria 
Benin -Gabon 
Benin-Chad 
Benin-Kenya 
Benin-Tanzania 
Benin-Rwanda 
Benin-Somalia 
Benin-
Mozambique 
Benin-Zambia 
Benin- Malawi 
Benin- Botswana 
Benin-Tunisia 
Mauritania-
Congo 
Mauritania-
Ghana 
Mauritania-
Ethiopia 
Mauritania -
Mozambique 
Mauritania- Libya 
Mauritania-
Sudan 
Niger-Congo 
Niger- Ethiopia 
Niger-
Mozambique 
Niger- Libya 
Ivory Coast -
Algeria 
Ivory Coast -
Angola 
Ivory Coast -
Guinea 
Ivory Coast -
Nigeria 
Ground 
1980-1986 
1982-1987 
1980-1984 
1980-1984 
1984-1988 
1980-1984 
1980-1984 
1982-1988 
1980-1984 
1980-1984 
1980-1984 
1984-1988 
1983-1987 
1983-1988 
1976-1984 
1977-1982 
1978-1984 
1978-1981 
1980-1984 
1977-1982 
1978-1984 
1977-1982 
1971-1977 
1972-1977 
Sea 
1975-1979 
1984-1988 
1975-1979 
Air 
1990-1994 
1990-1994 
1983-1987 
1996-2000 
1983-1989 
1983-1989 
All 
Ivory Coast- 1976-1981 
Congo 
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Dyad 
Ivory Coast -
Dem. Rep. Congo 
Ivory Coast -
Uganda 
Ivory Coast -
Kenya 
Ivory Coast -
Somalia 
Ivory Coast -
Ethiopia 
Ivory Coast -
Mozambique 
Ivory Coast -
Tunisia 
Ivory Coast -
Libya 
Ivory Coast -
Sudan 
Ivory Coast -
Zambia 
Ivory Coast -
Zimbabwe 
Guinea-Angola 
Guinea-Congo 
Guinea-Morocco 
Guinea-Nigeria 
Guinea- Dem. 
Rep.Congo 
Guinea- Ethiopia 
Guinea- Kenya 
Guinea -Tunisia 
Guinea- Libya 
Guinea-Sudan 
Ghana-Algeria 
Ghana-Angola 
Ghana-Congo 
Ghana- Ethiopia 
Ground 
1971-1975 
1972-1977 
1973-1977 
1971-1975 
1973-1982 
1978-1983 
1971-1976 
1971-1982 
1971-1975 
1973-1977 
1971-1975 
1973-1977 
1971-1975 
1971-1977 
1976-1981 
1976-1982 
Sea 
1984-1988 
1975-1981 
1980-1984 
1980-1984 
1980-1984 
1980-1984 
1972-1976 
1980-1985 
1980-1985 
1979-1984 
Air 
1983-1987 
1983-1988 
1983-1989 
1996-2000 
1983-1989 
1985-1989 
1984-1989 
1979-1991 
1979-1983 
1971-1979 
1971-1975 
1979-1983 
1972-1976 
1985-1992 
1971-1976 
1971-1983 
1988-1992 
1977-1982 
1986-1991 
1978-1982 
1977-1982 
All 
1980-1981 
1979-1982 
Ghana- Malawi 1989-1993 
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Dyad 
Ghana -
Mozambique 
Ghana-Kenya 
Ghana-Libya 
Ghana- Uganda 
Togo-Angola 
Togo - Congo 
Togo-Ethiopia 
Togo-
Mozambique 
Togo-Sudan 
Cameroon -
Algeria 
Cameroon -
Angola 
Cameroon-
Ethiopia 
Cameroon -
Nigeria 
Cameroon -
Congo 
Cameroon -
Kenya 
Cameroon -
Mozambique 
Cameroon-
Zimbabwe 
Cameroon -
Malawi 
Cameroon-
Madagascar 
Cameroon -
Seychelles 
Cameroon -
Somalia 
Cameroon -
Sudan 
Cameroon - Libya 
Nigeria-Angola 
Ground 
1978-1983 
1977-1982 
1976-1984 
1976-1981 
1979-1984 
1974-1978 
1984-1988 
1980-1984 
1974-1978 
1980-1984 
1982-1988 
1984-1988 
1983-1988 
1983-1988 
1974-1978 
Sea 
1977-1985 
1980-1987 
1980-1987 
1980-1987 
1980-1987 
1980-1986 
Air 
1978-1982 
1986-1992 
1977-1982 
1974-1978 
1986-1991 
1987-1991 
1988-1992 
1983-1987 
1983-1991 
1983-1987 
1985-1992 
1987-1991 
1985-1992 
1983-1990 
1985-1990 
1983-1987 
1983-1991 
1979-1991 
All 
1977-1982 
Nigeria-Congo 1976-1984 1980-1986 1979-1986 1980-1984 
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Dyad 
Nigeria-Dem 
Rep.Congo 
Nigeria- Uganda 
Nigeria-Ethiopia 
Nigeria- Kenya 
Nigeria-
Mozambique 
Nigeria- Malawi 
Nigeria-
Madagascar 
Nigeria - Libya 
Nigeria-Sudan 
Gabon-Algeria 
Gabon-Angola 
Gabon-Congo 
Gabon-Ethiopia 
Gabon-Kenya 
Gabon - Libya 
Gabon-
Madagascar 
Gabon-
Mozambique 
Gabon-Sudan 
Cen. African Rep. 
-Madagascar 
Chad-Angola 
Chad -Congo 
Chad -Kenya 
Chad-
Madagascar 
Chad-Seychelles 
Chad-Sudan 
Congo- Botswana 
Congo-Dem. 
Rep.Congo 
Congo - Egypt 
Congo-Kenya 
Congo-Tanzania 
Congo-Somalia 
Ground 
1974-1978 
1972-1977 
1977-1982 
1978-1984 
1984-1988 
1984-1990 
1977-1982 
1980-1984 
1979-1984 
1983-1988 
1984-1990 
1984-1990 
1976-1984 
1976-1984 
1980-1984 
Sea 
1979-1986 
1977-1986 
1981-1986 
1981-1986 
1979-1986 
1979-1986 
1980-1984 
1982-1987 
Air 
1979-1988 
1985-1992 
1982-1988 
1979-1986 
1984-1992 
1982-1987 
1981-1991 
1981-1991 
1982-1988 
1985-1992 
1981-1986 
1981-1985 
1982-1988 
1988-1992 
1986-1991 
1987-1991 
1986-1992 
1988-1992 
1987-1991 
1980-1991 
1978-1983 
1987-1991 
1978-1991 
1980-1986 
1979-1986 
All 
1979-1982 
1979-1982 
1981-1984 
Congo-Zambia 1980-1984 1978-1985 
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Dyad 
Congo- Malawi 
Congo-Morocco 
Congo-Sudan 
Congo-Tunisia 
Congo -
Zimbabwe 
Dem. Rep. Congo 
-Angola 
Dem. Rep. Congo 
- Egypt 
Dem. Rep. Congo 
- Ethiopia 
Dem. Rep. Congo 
- Kenya 
Dem. Rep. Congo 
-Somalia 
Ground 
1976-1981 
1976-1981 
1976-1980 
1974-1978 
1971-1975 
Sea 
1980-1987 
1980-1986 
1980-1984 
1979-1984 
Air 
1978-1986 
1979-1985 
1981-1991 
1981-1986 
1980-1991 
1971-1975 
1973-1978 
1987-1992 
1971-1975 
All 
1980-1981 
1980-1982 
Dem. Rep. Congo 
- Ethiopia 
Dem. Rep. Congo 
- Morocco 
Dem. Rep. Congo 
- Madagascar 
Dem. Rep. Congo 
- Mozambique 
Dem. Rep. Congo 
-Tunisia 
Dem. Rep. Congo 
- Libya 
Dem. Rep. Congo 
-Sudan 
Dem. Rep. Congo 
- Uganda 
Dem. Rep. Congo 
-Zimbabwe 
Uganda - Egypt 
Uganda-Kenya 
Uganda-Burundi 
Uganda -
Morocco 
1978-1982 
1978-1982 
1971-1975 
1971-1982 
1971-1975 
1973-1977 
1995-2000 
1979-1984 
1980-1988 
1971-1975 
1980-1985 
1984-1988 
1971-1977 
1971-1985 
1971-1975 
1984-1992 
1971-1975 
1984-1991 
1971-1978 
1973-1978 
1971-1975 
1979-1982 
Uganda - Tunisia 1972-1976 1971-1977 
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Dyad 
Uganda-Libya 
Kenya -Burundi 
Kenya -Angola 
Kenya - Botswana 
Kenya-Algeria 
Kenya-Ethiopia 
Kenya - Egypt 
Kenya-Sudan 
Kenya -
Madagascar 
Kenya -
Mozambique 
Kenya - Malawi 
Kenya - Libya 
Kenya - Morocco 
Kenya -Tunisia 
Kenya-Somalia 
Kenya-Zambia 
Kenya -
Zimbabwe 
Tanzania-Angola 
Tanzania-
Ethiopia 
Tanzania - Libya 
Tanzania-
Mozambique 
Tanzania- Malawi 
Burundi-Angola 
Burundi-Ethiopia 
Burundi-Rwanda 
Burundi-
Botswana 
Burundi- Egypt 
Burundi-
Morocco 
Burundi-Sudan 
Ground 
1972-1977 
1973-1982 
1978-1984 
1976-1981 
1973-1982 
1978-1982 
1978-1984 
1976-1981 
1995-2000 
Sea 
1984-1989 
1984-1991 
1979-1983 
Air 
1971-1978 
1985-1989 
1977-1991 
1987-1992 
1972-1976 
1982-1987 
1974-1988 
1972-1976 
1986-1992 
1972-1976 
1985-1992 
1980-1984 
1978-1990 
1972-1986 
1985-1989 
1985-1992 
1972-1978 
1972-1978 
1985-1990 
1985-1991 
1980-1986 
1980-1986 
1980-1986 
1982-1986 
1985-1989 
1993-1998 
1993-1998 
1993-1998 
1992-1998 
1992-1996 
1990-1998 
All 
1980-1982 
Burundi-Tunisia 1994-1998 
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Dyad 
Burundi -
Zimbabwe 
Rwanda -
Madagascar 
Rwanda-Sudan 
Somalia-Angola 
Somalia- Ethiopia 
Somalia -
Morocco 
Somalia-
Mozambique 
Somalia-Tunisia 
Somalia- Libya 
Ethiopia-Zambia 
Ethiopia-Malawi 
Ethiopia-
Morocco 
Ethiopia-Tunisia 
Ethiopia- Libya 
Ethiopia — 
Zimbabwe 
Ethiopia-Sudan 
Ethiopia-Egypt 
Mozambique-
Egypt 
Mozambique -
Zambia 
Mozambique-
Morocco 
Mozambique-
Zimbabwe 
Mozambique -
Algeria 
Mozambique -
Sudan 
Mozambique -
Tunisia 
Zambia- Libya 
Zambia- Morocco 
Ground 
1983-1989 
1979-1984 
1971-1975 
1971-1975 
1978-1982 
1976-1981 
1976-1982 
1976-1982 
1973-1978 
1978-1984 
1978-1983 
1978-1983 
1978-1983 
1978-1982 
Sea 
1978-1983 
1980-1987 
1979-1986 
1979-1987 
Air 
1993-1998 
1993-1998 
1979-1987 
1977-1986 
1971-1975 
1982-1987 
1971-1977 
1971-1986 
1978-1984 
1975-1988 
1982-1988 
1974-1978 
1982-1988 
1979-1988 
1990-1998 
1978-1983 
1978-1982 
1978-1982 
1978-1988 
1982-1988 
1978-1987 
1983-1988 
1982-1988 
1972-1985 
1975-1979 
All 
1980-1982 
1982 
Zambia-Tunisia 1972-1977 
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Dyad 
Zimbabwe -
Algeria 
Zimbabwe- Libya 
Zimbabwe-
Malawi 
Zimbabwe-
Sudan 
Malawi -
Madagascar 
Ma law i -
Seychelles 
Malawi-Algeria 
Malawi-Tunisia 
Malawi - Libya 
Madagascar-
Tunisia 
Madagascar-
Morocco 
Morocco-Algeria 
Morocco - Libya 
Morocco-Sudan 
Tunisia-Libya 
Tunisia-Sudan 
Libya - Egypt 
Libya-Sudan 
Angola-Zambia 
Angola -
Zimbabwe 
Angola-
Botswana 
Angola-
Madagascar 
Angola - Morocco 
Angola-Algeria 
Angola-Tunisia 
Ground 
1984-1988 
1984-1988 
1984-1988 
1977-1981 
1984-1988 
1976-1981 
1983-1988 
1977-1983 
1976-1982 
1971-1982 
1971-1975 
1971-1975 
Sea 
1980-1987 
1977-1986 
1979-1987 
1980-1987 
1980-1986 
Air 
1996-2000 
1981-1986 
1993-1998 
1980-1985 
1976-1987 
1971-1986 
1971-1975 
1992-1996 
1971-1975 
1981-1986 
1971-1976 
1988-1992 
1994-1998 
1978-1983 
1971-1976 
1979-1985 
1977-1990 
1981-1991 
1987-1991 
1980-1984 
1978-1989 
1977-1987 
1981-1991 
All 
1980-1982 
1981-1982 
Angola-Sudan 1979-1991 
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Dyad 
Angola - Egypt 
Botswana -
Madagascar 
Botswana-Sudan 
Algeria -Tunisia 
Algeria - Libya 
Algeria - Egypt 
Ground 
1983-1987 
Sea 
1982-1987 
1972-1976 
1979-1983 
Air 
1978-1991 
1988-1998 
1972-1976 
1982-1987 
1972-1976 
1972-1976 
1978-1983 
All 
Sudan-Egypt 1988-1997 
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Chapter 7 
Arms Racing and Conflict in Latin America 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter represents the final test of my theory involving arms racing and 
international conflict amongst minor power states. As I have done previously, I begin 
with an overview of the Latin American region describing some of the major interstate 
rivalries and the prevalence of militarized interstate disputes from 1970-2000. I then 
report empirical results for Hypothesis 1 - the central theoretical research question -
and discuss these statistical relationships as well as the substantive impacts of arms 
races on the probability of conflict onset. The remainder of chapter seven utilizes 
recent examples of how arms races have developed and affected the relations of Latin 
American states over time. In the concluding chapter that follows I summarize the 
statistical findings from all three empirical chapters in an effort to identify some broad 
patterns and suggest some conclusions about the relationship between arms races and 
militarized conflict. 
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7.2 Latin America, 1970-2000 
I investigate the region of Latin America stretching from Mexico, through Central 
America, and including the South American continent.62 The full list of states comprising 
Latin America I analyze can be found in Appendix 7A at the end of this chapter. The 
region of Latin America, much like the previous two regions of the Middle East and 
Africa, contains a group of minor power states that have also experienced interstate 
rivalries with one another. Revisiting Thompson's (2001) list of strategic rivals shows 
there were eleven rivalry cases over the period 1970-1999, the final year of his data. 
Table 7.1 below lists the eleven rivalries in which both states were located regionally in 
Latin America along with the years active for each rivalry: 
Table 7.1 
Rivalries of Latin America, 1970-1999 
Rivalry 
Argentina- Brazil 
Argentina-Chile 
Belize-Guatemala 
Bolivia-Chile 
Colombia - Nicaragua 
Colombia - Venezuela 
Costa Rica - Nicaragua 
Ecuador-Peru 
El Salvador - Honduras 
Guyana -Venezuela 
Honduras - Nicaragua 
Years Active 
1817-1985 
1843-1991 
1981-1993 
1836-
1979-1992 
1831-
1948-1992 
1830-1998 
1840-1992 
1966-
1980-1987 
Though some classifications include Caribbean nations as part of Latin America I do not include these 
states in my analysis. 
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The table above reveals Latin America to be the region least plagued by serious 
interstate rivalry, at least during the period 1970-1999; although containing 
approximately one-third more states than the Middle East nations located within Latin 
America experienced about half the number of rivalries as did occur in the Middle East, 
the smallest region of my study. Still, there have been important and some particularly 
long standing rivalries in Latin America. Argentina and Brazil were involved in a rivalry 
lasting well over one hundred fifty years from 1817-1985. Similarly, Argentina and Chile 
engaged each other in a rivalry from 1843-1991. There are two rivalries - Bolivia and 
Chile along with Colombia and Venezuela - that originated in the early nineteenth 
century and as of 1999 are still ongoing. Two other rivalries between Ecuador and Peru 
and El Salvador and Honduras also stem from the nineteenth century but have only 
recently ended in 1998 and 1992, respectively. 
Consistent with the previous two regions analyzed I use MID version 3.04 and 
count the total number of MIDs in Latin America in which there was at least one Latin 
American state on both sides. An examination of MID version 3.10 shows no pertinent 
differences between the data sets such as the addition or subtraction of disputes. 
Moving along there were 68 militarized interstate disputes in Latin America during the 
period 1970-2000. Calculated as MIDs per year, this equates to approximately 2.3 
interstate disputes per year over my thirty year period of study. This is by far the fewest 
number of interstate conflicts out of the three regions included in this study even 
though Latin America itself contains the second most number of sovereign states. The 
relatively low number of interstate disputes is consistent with the broader assertion that 
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Latin America has, in fact, been a region especially free of interstate conflict in the 
twentieth century. That is to say, much of Latin America's conflict has occurred 
domestically through civil conflicts, violent political revolutions, and intrastate conflicts 
between rebel guerrilla groups and even violent drug cartels (particularly in specific 
Latin American states). In his work on power transition and war amongst minor power 
states, Lemke (2002) similarly notes: 
"The reason [for peace] is South America more convincingly fits the pattern of 
state development and interstate conflict...South American states frequently 
fought wars in the nineteenth century, and seemed to do so to decide where 
their borders would be, who could control mineral resources, who would have 
access to important waterways, etc. Those issues have been resolved and South 
America's states are much more established than are Africa's. Further, power 
relationships in South America are more stable than in Africa, and not 
surprisingly war has become rare" (162). 
Correspondingly, the Correlates of War Interstate War Data (v3.0) shows no wars 
between strictly Latin American states in the region during my period of study. The 
Falklands War was fought was off the coast of Argentina in and around the Falklands 
Islands but involved Argentina and the United Kingdom and, thus, was not a war 
between two Latin American states.63 Finally, an analysis of the Correlates of War 
military expenditures data shows that the Latin American region accounted for 
approximately 1.1% of the total global military expenditures for the year 1985 and by 
comparison is significantly less than NATO's 43% proportion of total global military 
expenditures. Of the three regions in this study, Latin America's proportion of global 
expenditures is less than both Africa (1.7%) and the Middle East (8.1%). 
63
 The Football War between El Salvador and Honduras, however, was fought in the summer of 1969 just 
before the beginning of my temporal domain. 
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7.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The first descriptive statistic I report is the distribution of arms races by weapons 
category. During the period 1970-2000 there are 49 ground based arms races, 13 naval 
arms races, and 71 aerial arms races between states in Latin America. Latin America 
also contains two landlocked states, Bolivia and Paraguay. As with Africa, aerial arms 
races outnumber ground based arms races in Latin America - a relatively large region 
itself - while naval arms racing is the most infrequent form of arms competition. Table 
7.2 below displays the correlation matrix for the ground, naval, and aerial arms race 
variables as well as both contiguity and capability ratio controls. Although not as many 
as Africa, Latin America's two landlocked states of Bolivia and Paraguay are excluded 
from all correlations that involve the naval arms race variable. Thus, the following table 
again contains two separate correlations. All correlation cells below involving the 'Sea' 
variable have been calculated by excluding the landlocked states of Bolivia and Paraguay 
and results in the smaller N of 4449 as listed underneath Table 7.2. All other cells are 
produced using the full number of observations: 
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Table 7.2 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Ground, Sea, and Air Arms Racing 
Model 
Variables 
Ground 
Sea 
Air 
Contiguity 
ln(Capability 
Ratio) 
Ground 
1.00 
Sea 
0.07 
1.00 
Air 
0.25 
0.21 
1.00 
Contiguity 
-0.03 
0.03 
-0.02 
1.00 
ln(Capability 
Ratio) 
-0.09 
-0.07 
-0.08 
-0.03 
1.00 
N = 5563, 4449 
The correlation coefficients shown above for the three arms race variables are 
similar to correlations reported earlier for the regions of Africa and the Middle East. 
There is nearly no correlation between ground and naval arms racing (r = 0.07) and 
some moderate correlation between naval and aerial arms racing at 0.21. Although not 
extremely high, ground based arms races and aerial arms races exhibit the highest level 
of correlation at 0.25. This means for two of the three regions included in this 
dissertation ground arms races and air arms races are the highest correlated arms race 
variables: the Middle East (r = 0.39) and Latin America (r = 0.25); in Africa, ground and 
aerial arms races produce the second highest correlation (r = 0.24). Finally, I provide 
some very general statistics indicating the likelihood any state in Latin America will 
increase its weapons from one year to the next in an effort to shed some insight on the 
overall arming patterns of Latin American states during my period of study: 
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Table 7.3 
Likelihood of Increasing Arms in Following Year 
Arms Type 
Ground 
Sea 
Air 
Increase in Arms at t+1 
48% 
29% 
48% 
N = 5563, 4991 
In Table 7.3 each percentage figure indicates the likelihood that any state in Latin 
America increased a specific form of weaponry over the span of one year. Since I 
remove landlocked states from my analysis of yearly changes in naval weaponry this 
percentage is obtained over a smaller set of observations (4991). The percentages 
above indicate a Latin American state on average increased its naval weapons 29% of 
the time. The percentage of states that increased either their ground or aerial 
weaponry from one year to the next is the same at 48%. Hence, as do states in the 
Middle East and Africa states in Latin America increase their weapons from year to year 
with some frequency. 
7.4 Empirical Results: Hypothesis 1 
HI: The presence of an arms race increases the likelihood of international conflict. 
The following table reports coefficient results for the estimated impact of arms 
racing on militarized conflict. I test the same theoretical argument applied to the 
previous two regions of the Middle East and Africa: the presence of an arms race should 
increase the chances for interstate conflict amongst states in Latin America. I again 
estimate three separate empirical models in an effort to observe the individual impact 
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of ground, naval, and aerial arms racing on conflict. Once again, the relationship 
between naval arms racing and conflict is estimated without the two landlocked states 
of Bolivia and Paraguay. In addition, I utilize all potential observations (not just the 
subset of cases in which tension or arms races are present) in each statistical model 
below: 
Table 7.4 
Multivariate Models for Conflict Onset 
Three Types of Arms Racing, 1970-2000 
Variable 
Arms Race Type 
Contiguity 
ln(Capability Ratio) 
Constant 
N 
Log-likelihood 
Pseudo-R2 
Model 1 
Ground Races 
0.261 (0.530) 
3.848(0.781)*** 
-0.268 (0.084)** 
-4.928 (0.293) 
5562 
-229.32 
0.368 
Model 2 
Sea Races 
0.815(0.831) 
3.779(0.777)*** 
-0.211(0.112)** 
-4.847 (0.750) 
4448 
-215.48 
0.373 
Model 3 
Air Races 
0.744 (0.457)* 
3.852(0.776)*** 
-0.277(0.146)** 
-4.977 (0.743) 
5562 
-227.65 
0.372 
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01, robust standard errors in parentheses 
The statistical results above for the region of Latin America are considerably 
different than the results reported for Hypothesis 1 in both chapter five and six. First, of 
the three primary arms race variables only one type of arms race achieves some level of 
statistical significance with militarized conflict; Table 7.4 shows that aerial arms racing 
has a positive effect upon interstate conflict at the p < .10 level of significance. Recall 
earlier Latin American states engage in all three types of arms racing with one another -
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especially ground and aerial - but these results suggest that only aerial arms races are 
reasonably likely to end in interstate conflict. 
Indeed, aerial arms competitions are the most common form of arms races in 
Latin America and the only form of arms racing that has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on conflict onset. The data show aerial arms races between states 
known to have experienced strained relations such as Peru and Bolivia (1973-1977), 
Peru and Chile (1973-1979), Venezuela and Chile (1989-1993), and Mexico and 
Guatemala (1981-1986), amongst others. Furthermore, the importance and use of 
aerial weaponry such as fighter/bomber aircraft and combat helicopters in Latin 
America is evident in past and current events. 
For example, the pursuit of air superiority can be observed in the historically 
fragile relations between Honduras and Nicaragua. Recurrent disputes over their 
respective rights to a certain area of fishing waters along their Caribbean border have 
involved air force expansion attempts by both states. This border dispute between 
Honduras and Nicaragua was further complicated in the 1980's; Honduras desired 12 F-
5E fighters in order "...to offset the growing helicopter fleet of Nicaragua, its neighbor" 
whereas the Reagan Administration preferred to provide Honduras with the jets but for 
the purposes of fighting against Nicaragua's Sandinista rebels (Sciolino, 1987). 
The New York Times addressed clearly the potential for both states to become 
involved in an aerial arms race by noting: "The proposed sale...is expected to meet stiff 
opposition from members of Congress who question the American role in Central 
America and argue that such a sale would set off a regional arms race...Several members 
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of Congress have argued that the sale of the planes would provide Nicaragua with 
justification for obtaining MiG fighters from the Soviet Union" (Sciolino, 1987). One 
month after the original proposal the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 10-9 in 
June, 1987, to reject the proposed sale of F-5E combat aircraft to Honduras in order to 
avert "...a stepped-up arms race in Central America...Senator Christopher J. Dodd...the 
sponsor of the resolution, said the F-5's would...encourage Nicaragua to seek Soviet jet 
fighters" (Associated Press, 1987). 
Nonetheless, border tensions have persisted between Honduras and Nicaragua 
along with fears and suspicions regarding the acquisition and use of air weaponry. In a 
recent story about their shared border dispute Reuters describes how the pursuit of air 
superiority can place others on high alert: "Relations between Nicaragua and Honduras 
have been strained anew in recent months after Honduras said it would buy planes with 
U.S. aid, for use in hunting drug smugglers. Although Honduras told Nicaragua the 
planes were not a military threat, Nicaragua has insisted on keeping old anti-aircraft 
missiles to defend against its neighbor" (2007). Hence, this specific storyline involving 
Honduras and Nicaragua is a pertinent example of the role of combat aircraft in Latin 
America and plainly illustrates how political leaders understand the ease by which states 
can become involved in aerial arms races, for instance. 
More currently, a 2008 crisis between Colombia and Ecuador involved the use of 
strategic airstrikes by the Colombian air force against insurgent FARC targets located 
within Ecuadorian borders. Colombia's aerial invasion of Ecuador in turn entangled 
Venezuela's Hugo Chavez into his own tense border confrontation with the Colombian 
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government. Even before this most recent crisis Venezuela has been an active buyer of 
Soviet advanced combat aircraft. In 2006, the Chavez government took delivery of 24 
Sukhoi Su-30MK2 combat jets from Russia. In addition, the aerospace and defense 
analysis group Forecast International also noted "There has been an application, but no 
contract yet, for the purchase of Russian Mi-28 Night Hunter combat helicopters" (2008: 
5). 
Venezuela's emphasis on air force expansion has triggered fears in Brazil, as well. 
The Brazilian government has resurrected its original FX plan for air force expansion 
(now deemed FX-2) and is in negotiations with several contractors for approximately 36 
new combat fighters, or about $2.2 billion in air force defense spending. Forecast 
International (2008) explains: "Brazil is also concerned by neighboring Venezuela's rapid 
build-up of new fighters and helicopters. Recent Brazilian procurement activity has 
been the $60 million, five-year lease of 12 ex-French air force Mirage 2000C/Bs, the last 
of which arrive this year [2008]. Embraer is also upgrading the air force's Northrop F-
5E/Fs and AMX strike aircraft" (3). 
With respect to Peru, Forecast International reports "The air force acquired RSK 
MiG-29 fighters and Sukhoi Su-25 attack aircraft from surplus Belarus stocks in 1996-
1998, a move that sparked the last Latin American arms race and prompted neighboring 
Chile's purchase of F-16s" (2008: 5). Reflecting Latin America's recent flurry of air force 
expansions a Bloomberg news Latin American correspondent writes that "Latin 
American countries have gone on a military spending spree in recent years...Regional 
arms spending jumped 55 percent over four years to $38.4 billion in 2007, according to 
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the International Institute of Strategic Studies. The buildup comes amidst increased 
regional rivalries" (Walter, 2008). 
So although there is a statistically significant relationship between aerial arms 
racing and militarized conflict in Latin America there does not appear to be much of a 
relationship between the other two primary arms race variables. Even though both 
coefficients are in the expected direction, neither ground based nor naval arms races 
reach any acceptable level of statistical significance with militarized conflict. There are 
at least two likely reasons for the lack of statistical significance between ground arms 
races, naval arms races, and conflict. 
First, the relatively small number of interstate militarized disputes between Latin 
American states means cases in which ground and naval arms races did not lead to 
conflict are much more likely to affect the estimated coefficient such that a weak to 
negligible relationship is produced. Looking at the actual data reveals most Latin 
American states engage in only one form of arms racing most of the time and that when 
conflict is preceded by an arms race it is more often than not an aerial arms race. 
Although this again shows the important role aerial weaponry plays in Latin America (as 
discussed above) this fact also helps to explain the null finding between ground based 
and naval based arms racing, and militarized conflict. 
Second - and perhaps most interesting - are the statistical associations between 
the control variables and the likelihood of conflict in each of the models estimated in 
Table 7.4. Just the same as both the Middle East and Africa, direct contiguity is shown 
to have a strong positive and statistically significant relationship with conflict in Latin 
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America. In fact, this relationship holds for all three regions at p < .01. However, for the 
first time the capability ratio of states produces a coefficient both in the expected 
direction (negative) and statistically significant. This means that as the disparity in 
power between a pair of states increases the likelihood of conflict between them 
decreases (or, as parity increases the chances for conflict increases) and is consistent 
with the theoretical expectation presented in chapter three. Yet, while the coefficient 
estimates for capability ratio were in the anticipated direction for both the Middle East 
and Africa they were not significant at any level; in Latin America, power capability is 
now significant (p < .05) across all four models. 
Hence, the robustness of direct contiguity along with power a/symmetry is 
probably also 'to blame' for the lack of any relationship between ground and naval arms 
racing with conflict onset (as well as the relatively weak relationship between 
aerial/simultaneous arms racing and conflict). Given the overall low levels of interstate 
conflict (MIDs) in Latin America and the strong influence of both contiguity and dyadic 
power distribution it seems there is simply too little remaining variation to be predicted 
(in general) by arms racing. 
Now, simply because there is a relative scarcity of militarized conflict in Latin 
America does not by definition mean the arms race variables should perform poorly in 
predicting instances of conflict onset. However, since both control variables are 
exhibiting strong statistical effects it may very well be the case that both of these 
covariates have monopolized a majority of the variance in the outcome variable (conflict 
onset) which, ultimately, could contribute to the rather weak effects of the actual arms 
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race variables. Thus, while it is true Latin American states engage in all three types of 
arms racing with one another as a whole the presence of arms races do not appear to 
impact the likelihood of militarized conflict very much at all. 
Even in the face of these generally weak results there are still some especially 
contentious relationships between Latin American states that have involved arms 
competitions. One of the longer standing rivalries in Latin America involves Argentina 
and Chile from 1843-1991. During the 1970's and early 1980's both states engaged in 
repeated militarized conflicts primarily due to the ongoing Beagle dispute involving a 
group of islands along the southern cone of South America that offer strategic access 
between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.64 Indeed, Argentina and Chile were involved in 
all three forms of arms racing during this time: a ground race from 1972-1977, a naval 
arms race from 1974-1980, and an aerial arms race from 1972-1980. 
Another serious and lengthy contentious relationship existed between Ecuador 
and Peru from 1830-1998. Relevant to my specific period of study, border disputes 
plagued both nations during the late 1970's. These resulted in several episodes of 
militarized conflict including the Paquisha Indicent of 1980 in which Ecuador established 
several military outposts along its eastern mountainous border with Peru. Here again, 
arms racing occurred across all three types of weaponry with ground racing occurring 
between 1973-1978, naval arms racing between 1971-1975, and an aerial arms race 
from 1973-1979. Although some political disputes regarding the territory endured after 
the culmination of the Paquisha Incident an informal agreement was reached to draw 
64
 For the complete text of the arbitration and treaty between Argentina and Chile regarding the Beagle 
Channel conflicts please see: http://untreatv.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol XXI/53-264,pdf. 
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down both states' military forces. My data indicate no further arms racing between 
Peru and Ecuador after this point. 
While these cases provide some good substantive examples of arms races and 
conflict there are still many other cases in which arms races did not lead to militarized 
conflict between the participants which, as a result, contributes to the overall weak 
statistical results obtained for the relationship between arms racing and interstate 
conflict in Latin America. For example, I find no instances of arms racing of any kind 
(during my period of study) between El Salvador and Honduras even though both states 
have experienced repeated disputes from 1840-1992. Thus, even though I do not find a 
strong relationship between arms racing and conflict (when taken as a whole) I do find a 
statistically significant relationship between one specific type of arms racing - aerial -
and the likelihood of militarized conflict. With the statistical results from Table 7.4 I can 
calculate substantive effects in the form of predicted probabilities that will indicate how 
much more likely interstate conflict is to occur when Latin American states are involved 
in an arms race. The following table therefore presents some substantive effects that 
provide likelihoods for conflict under certain conditions: 
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Table 7.5 
Probability of Conflict Onset, 1970-2000 
Estimates Obtained from Table 7.4 
Variable 
Baseline: 
Arms Race 
Contiguity 
ln(Capability 
Ratio) 
Ground Race* 
Sea Race* 
Air Race 
Treatment 
0 
0 
X 
1 
1 
1 
Pr(Conflict Onset) 
0.07% (0.0007) 
0.08% (0.001) 
0.25% (0.004) 
0.1% (0.002) 
% Increase 
-
14% 
257% 
43% 
Variable 
Baseline: 
Arms Race 
Contiguity 
ln(Capability 
Ratio) 
Ground Race* 
Sea Race* 
Air Race 
Treatment 
0 
1 
X 
1 
1 
1 
Pr(Conflict Onset) 
2.3% (0.01) 
3.1% (0.019) 
7.2% (0.059) 
4.2% (0.024) 
% Increase 
-
35% 
213% 
83% 
*estimated coefficients not significant 
The first section of Table 7.5 shows the likelihood of interstate conflict with no 
arms racing and no contiguity present to be only seven-tenths of 1%. Militarized 
interstate disputes are rare events and as I have discussed earlier this is especially true 
for Latin America. Here the presence of an aerial arms race increases the overall 
likelihood of militarized conflict to a still extremely unlikely one-tenth of 1%, or an 
increase of 43% over the baseline probability. Realistically, however, the substantive 
effects I describe from the first portion of Table 7.5 suggest the base probability of a 
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MID to be so low (under these conditions) that the presence of an aerial arms race 
produces no meaningful impact. 
The numbers become more palatable when contiguity is present as the baseline 
expected value of a militarized dispute becomes approximately 2.3%. The presence of 
an aerial arms races generates a likelihood for conflict of 4.2% representing an 83% 
increase in the baseline probability of an MID. Lastly, although I report the effects of 
both ground and naval arms races neither figures should be interpreted with much 
confidence since both coefficients fail to reach any level of statistical significance in my 
empirical models of conflict. 
7.5 Summary and Conclusions 
This has been the final empirical evaluation of my theory of arms racing and 
international conflict. Consistent with the two previous empirical chapters I again find 
strong support for the notion that contentious issues increase the likelihood that two 
states will engage in extraordinary bilateral arming. Issues increase the likelihood of 
bilateral arming across all three forms of weaponry in Latin America during the period 
1970-2000. Most importantly, this finding serves to illustrate the fundamental 
importance of issues as a driving force in international politics and as a starting point for 
understanding the arming behavior of states. 
To begin, the results for Hypothesis 1 - the impact of arms racing on the onset of 
militarized conflict - are quite different. The generally positive and statistically 
significant relationship between various forms of arms racing and militarized conflict 
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drops off dramatically in Latin America. Here, both ground based and naval arms racing 
fail to reach any conventional level of statistical association with the likelihood of 
conflict onset. Only aerial based arms racing seems to increase the chances for 
interstate conflict (at p < .10). As discussed earlier with Africa, one possible explanation 
for this result might involve the overall size of the Latin American region; given its 
general expanse it becomes easier to understand why states in Latin America would 
choose to pursue their conflicts through the air. Nonetheless, the lack of strong support 
for Hypothesis 1 is commensurate with Latin America's historically low levels of 
interstate conflict. 
Perhaps most surprising is the capability ratio control variable 'turns on' in Latin 
America. In all three regions the contiguity control has been positively associated with 
conflict at p < .01 but only in Latin America does capability ratio suddenly reveal a 
positive and significant effect on the outcome variable and at the reasonably strong 
level of p < .05. This suggests Latin American states may be basing much of their 
decision to engage in conflict with one another using strict determinations of relative 
power (of which arms are certainly one component); that is, similarly powerful states 
(parity) are much more likely to engage in militarized conflict than are disparately 
powerful states (one state preponderant) in Latin America. 
As I proposed earlier, the strength of both control variables (contiguity and 
power parity) may be limiting the explanatory power of the arms race variables 
themselves. Even so, however, that a statistically significant relationship between the 
presence of aerial arms racing and conflict onset holds is perhaps telling of the overall 
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importance (and danger) of aerial weaponry in Latin America during my period of study. 
I discuss this along with other broader considerations and conclusions in the final 
chapter of this dissertation that follows. 
Appendix 7A 
List of Countries 
Latin America, 1970-2000 
Argentina 
Belize 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
El Salvador 
Suriname 
Venezuela 
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Appendix 7B 
List of Arms Races, 1970-2000 
Dyad 
Mexico- El 
Salvador 
Mexico -
Nicaragua 
Mexico -
Paraguay 
Mexico-Chile 
Mexico-
Guatemala 
Mexico-
Honduras 
Guatemala-
Salvador 
Guatemala -
Venezuela 
Guatemala -
Ecuador 
Guatemala -
Guatemala -
Brazil 
Guatemala-
Bolivia 
Guatemala -
Guatemala-
Argentina 
Honduras-
Guyana 
Honduras-
Suriname 
Honduras -
Bolivia 
El Salvador -
Nicaragua 
El Salvador-
Colombia 
El 
Peru 
Chile 
Ground 
1986-1990 
1978-1982 
1980-1984 
1987-1991 
1975-1979 
1974-1979 
1973-1981 
1973-1978 
1973-1979 
1977-1981 
1973-1981 
1973-1977 
1982-1986 
1985-1989 
1980-1986 
1978-1987 
1982-1987 
Sea 
1973-1980 
Air 
1973-1979 
1984-1991 
1983-1989 
1981-1986 
1974-1979 
1979-1985 
1981-1985 
1980-1984 
1978-1988 
1984-1991 
All 
El Salvador- 1975-1979 1984-1990 
Venezuela 1983-1987 
Dyad Ground Sea Air All 
El Salvador -
Guyana 
El Salvador -
Suriname 
El Salvador-
Ecuador 
El Salvador-
Brazil 
El Salvador -
Bolivia 
El Salvador -
Paraguay 
El Salvador -
Uruguay 
Nicaragua -
Colombia 
Nicaragua -
Venezuela 
Nicaragua -
Ecuador 
Nicaragua -
Bolivia 
Nicaragua-
Paraguay 
Nicaragua-Chile 
Nicaragua-
Argentina 
Nicaragua -
Uruguay 
Venezuela-
Paraguay 
Venezuela -Chile 
Guyana-
Paraguay 
Guyana-Chile 
Ecuador- Peru 
Ecuador- Brazil 
1982-1986 
1985-1989 
1975-1979 
1975-1979 
1982-1986 
1975-1979 
1983-1987 
1982-1987 
1981-1987 
1978-1983 
1978-1986 
1978-1988 
1978-1987 
1978-1982 
1980-1988 
1975-1979 
1975-1979 
1981-1986 
1981-1985 
1973-1978 
1973-1977 
1973-1980 
1986-1991 
1971-1975 
1973-1979 
1986-1991 
1973-1977 
1984-1991 
1973-1979 
1973-1979 
1979-1989 
1984-1989 
1979-1987 
1983-1989 
1978-1983 
1985-1989 
1983-1987 
1983-1987 
1981-1985 
1989-1993 
1973-1979 1973-1975 
Ecuador- 1975-1980 1973-1981 
Paraguay 
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Dyad 
Ecuador-Chile 
Peru- Brazil 
Peru-Chile 
Peru-Argentina 
Brazil-Paraguay 
Brazil -Chile 
Brazil -Argentina 
Chile-Argentina 
Mexico- Bolivia 
Mexico -
Paraguay 
Mexico-Chile 
Mexico- Uruguay 
Belize-Colombia 
Belize-Uruguay 
Guatemala -
Nicaragua 
Honduras-
Ecuador 
Honduras-Peru 
Honduras- Brazil 
Honduras-
Bolivia 
Honduras -
Argentina 
Honduras-
Uruguay 
El Salvador-Peru 
El Salvador-
Argentina 
Nicaragua- Brazil 
Colombia-Chile 
Colombia-
Uruguay 
Venezuela-
Uruguay 
Suriname-
Paraguay 
Ground 
1973-1980 
1971-1978 
1973-1977 
1971-1975 
1975-1979 
1973-1977 
1971-1977 
1972-1977 
Sea 
1976-1980 
1974-1980 
1990-1995 
1973-1980 
1988-1995 
1987-1995 
Air 
1973-1980 
1989-1993 
1973-1979 
1989-1993 
1972-1980 
1973-1977 
1973-1980 
1973-1980 
1973-1980 
1990-1994 
1991-1995 
1979-1985 
1974-1981 
1974-1979 
1985-1993 
1985-1991 
1974-1981 
1974-1981 
1989-1993 
1973-1979 
1973-1979 
1978-1989 
1989-1993 
1989-1993 
1989-1993 
1996-2000 
All 
1976-1977 
1974-1977 
Ecuador- Bolivia 1973-1977 
191 
Dyad Ground 
Ecuador -
Uruguay 
Peru- Bolivia 
Peru - Paraguay 
Peru - Uruguay 
Brazil-Uruguay 
Bolivia-Paraguay 
Bolivia-Chile 
Bolivia-
Argentina 
Bolivia- Uruguay 
Paraguay-Chile 
Paraguay-
Argentina 
Chile-Uruguay 
Argentina -
Uruguay 
Sea 
1990-1994 
1985-1991 
Air 
1972-1980 
1989-1993 
1973-1977 
1973-1979 
1973-1979 
1989-1993 
1973-1977 
1973-1977 
1973-1977 
1973-1977 
1973-1977 
1973-1981 
1973-1977 
1989-1993 
1973-1981 
All 
Venezuela- Peru 1971-1975 
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Chapter 8 
Considerations and Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
In this dissertation I addressed what has continued to be an elusive question: 
what is the relationship between arms races and the likelihood of conflict amongst 
states engaged in them? My investigation into the relationship between arms racing 
and militarized conflict involved important decisions made at the theoretical, research 
design, and methodological portions of this dissertation. Before reviewing the major 
findings of my research I believe it beneficial to revisit some of the more critical 
decisions and strategies that constituted the overall framework I used to evaluate the 
impact of arms races on conflict. The concise yet critically relevant piece by Diehl and 
Crescenzi (1998) introduced in chapter two helps guide the following section. 
8.2 Reconfiguring the Arms Race-War Debate 
Summarized earlier in my literature review, Diehl and Crescenzi's 1998 article 
"Reconfiguring the Arms Race-War Debate" offered a clear path forward for researchers 
interested in furthering the quantitative arms racing and conflict research agenda. To 
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be clear, in the very nascent stages of this dissertation I established some specific goals 
and intended contributions I wanted to achieve in my research endeavor. Having 
concluded my analysis I find that much of my own research deals with the key concerns 
and suggestions posited by Diehl and Crescenzi more than a decade ago. In their article 
the authors highlight several specific ways through which arms race studies can be 
improved. I list below these unique recommendations and follow with an explanation 
of how my research in this dissertation has addressed each of their concerns. 
'Longitudinal Studies' 
"One of the key problems with the original Wallace (1979) research design, and 
one duplicated by all his critics, has been to focus just on dispute escalation and 
therefore select only cases in which a dispute has already occurred...The prior 
presence of conflict in all the cases examined creates a risk of introducing a kind 
of selection bias...We are unable to assess the role arms races may play in the 
onset, termination, and reoccurrence of violent conflict. In order to address 
these concerns, we advocate the adoption of more longitudinal studies of arms 
races...One way would be to select arms races as the unit of analysis and trace 
whether conflicts arise, reoccur, escalate, and terminate over time and under 
what conditions" (Diehl and Crescenzi, 1998:115). 
To be fair, this concern does not suggest earlier works to be without substantive 
importance. Studies such as Wallace (1979) and other similarly designed investigations 
(flawed as they may be) tell us something about the nature of conflict escalation when 
arms races are present, for example. The 'problem', however, is this type of study does 
not get at the heart of what has persistently troubled many conflict scholars at least 
since the writings of Richardson (1960): are two states involved in an arms race more or 
less likely to begin a militarized conflict with each other. While understanding how arms 
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races may escalate (or terminate) ongoing conflict is an interesting theoretical question 
in its own right one of the most important tasks for conflict scholars is identifying factors 
that increase or decrease the likelihood of conflict in the first place. 
Thus, my goal in this dissertation was to provide evidence in support of the 
steps-to-war theory showing how the presence of an arms race increases the likelihood 
for the onset of militarized conflict. As a result, my analysis focused on the arms race 
itself and whether an arms race increased the chances for militarized conflict amongst 
states not already involved in ongoing disputes with one another. Again (and most 
importantly), the issue based approach utilized in this dissertation provided the 
theoretical guidance necessary to correctly observe states involved in an arms race 
against one another (those with disparate UN voting patterns); that is, arms races only 
occur between states with contentious issues. Since my measure of contentious issues 
- ideal points generated from United Nations General Assembly voting records - is not 
itself defined in terms of conflict or disputes I can make a clean assessment about the 
relationship between arms racing and conflict onset. 
For example, using rivalry to identify arms races would bias any potential 
inferences about the effect of arms races on conflict. This is because many operational 
definitions of rivalry are themselves based on militarized disputes.65 Thus, defining an 
arms race in terms of militarized disputes in order to predict future militarized disputes 
does not provide much insight into the problem at hand. Gibler et al. (2005) voice this 
As I have mentioned, Thompson's (2001) list of strategic rivals is created using qualitative historical 
accounts of the hostility and negative perceptions states have had of one another. Although using this 
dataset bypasses the problem of rivals that are defined by the density of their militarized conflicts with 
one another it still presupposes that arms races can and do occur only between rivals. This is an 
assumption I do not make in this dissertation. 
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concern noting that "As Diehl and Crescenzi (1998) point out, the most obvious place to 
look for competition is in the rivalry literature. Unfortunately for our purposes, most 
definitions of rivalry are based upon dispute density" (136). In adopting an issues based 
approach to my study of arms racing my analysis appears to satisfy Diehl and Crescenzi's 
interest in conflict onset but without the problems associated with defining an arms 
race in terms of conflict. 
'A Broader Spatial Domain' 
"A second research design limitation is that the arms race-war debate focused 
exclusively on major power conflict. There is no reason why the logic should not 
apply equally well to minor power conflict...Looking at minor power conflict 
greatly expands the number of cases, and thereby considerably lessens the 
likelihood that the results will be contaminated by contagion or controversial 
war dyad cases from the two world wars" (Diehl and Crescenzi, 1998:115). 
As I explained in the very beginning of this dissertation, my focus on minor 
power arms racing and conflict is above all motivated by the normative concerns 
expressed by Lemke (2002), amongst others. His fundamental point is that minor power 
states and their citizens comprise an overwhelming majority of the world's population, 
are indispensable actors in world politics, and ultimately deserve the same type of 
meticulous and probing research into the sources of conflict such that minor power 
conflict might be understood better and perhaps prevented. So while Lemke extended 
traditional power transition theory to minor powers I have similarly attempted to 
broaden the scope of arms race and conflict studies to include a large proportion of the 
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system's minor powers (though my own efforts in no way represent the first attempt to 
do so). 
Beyond the inherent importance of minor power states as political actors and 
homelands for millions studying these states also benefits the research agenda itself as 
alluded to above by Diehl and Crescenzi (1998). Lemke (2002) echoes the point made 
by Diehl and Crescenzi above in noting "...there may be something odd about great 
powers compared to the rest of the world's states which we thereby exclude ourselves 
from knowing if we only study the great powers" (6) and thus "...any scholar interested 
in understanding the causes of war should be interested in explanations of war that 
account for a larger proportion of the world's actors" (14). Hence, I investigated three 
minor power regions in this dissertation. Though not an exhaustive investigation, I 
believe the regions of Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East provided an 
appropriate and large enough set of cases over which to test the steps-to-war theory of 
arms racing and international conflict. As a result, the empirical results stand as a useful 
contribution to the growing body of research on minor power interactions and, 
specifically, factors that may promote conflict between them. 
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'Breaking the Reliance on Military Expenditure Data' 
"Traditionally, arms races have been measured by reference to abnormal 
increases in military expenditures...It is often difficult to get the necessary data 
on military expenditures, and the validity of precise estimates is further open to 
question when those data must be converted to a common currency...An 
analysis of arms races might be better conducted with an analysis of weapons 
stockpiles [emphasis added]...Because states are threatened by actual arms 
rather than arms budgets, this would allow greater validity in measurement and 
allow the analyst to detect weapons-specific arms races masked in the aggregate 
military expenditure totals" (Diehl and Crescenzi, 1998:116). 
This excerpt highlights one of the central decisions made before starting this 
dissertation. An important concern of mine was that arms races should be measured 
with arms stockpiles. Early on I noted that while previous studies using expenditure 
data were important contributions the use of actual weapons stockpiles would be a 
more faithful representation of the concept of an arms race and, most importantly, 
would "...allow greater validity in measurement..." as Diehl and Crescenzi note in the 
above quote. Although some earlier studies attempted this in a limited fashion - such 
as both McCubbins' (1983) and Ward's (1984) studies of American and Soviet strategic 
weapons stockpiles - one primary goal in this dissertation was to expand the use of 
weapons stockpile data over a larger temporal and spatial domain. 
Just as compelling, the use of weapons stockpile data facilitated an analysis of 
specific types of arms races: ground, sea, and aerial arms races. This, I believe, offers 
some progress forward towards a more nuanced understanding of the impact of various 
types of weapons on conflict that at best cannot be easily observed when working with 
very general aggregate expenditure data or, at worst, becomes completely obfuscated 
amongst a defense expenditure figure that is the sum of all military expenditures over 
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all weapons types (as Diehl and Crescenzi warn). Thus, even though the theory 
advanced earlier is about the positive relationship between arms races and militarized 
conflict the categorization of arms races into three separate types allowed for the 
potential to observe interesting variation in the impact of arms races by type and across 
regions: in other words, are certain arms races more conflict prone than others in each 
of the three regions? As my review of the findings later will show, this was indeed the 
case. 
'Multivariate Models' 
"Too many previous studies have only looked at bivariate associations between 
the key variables. Arms race studies must now catch-up with the rest of the 
international conflict field and recognize that no single variable (arms races or 
otherwise) is likely to explain all wars...including other variables as controls may 
be necessary in order to assess whether the alleged positive relationship 
between arms races and war remains or disappears...including other factors in 
the model permits an assessment of the relative strength of the arms race 
variable in predicting war, thereby allowing us to understand the 'substantive' as 
well as the 'statistical' significance of the impact of arms races on wars" (Diehl 
and Crescenzi, 1998:116). 
Clearly, the use of more advanced statistical models continues to be an 
important part of international relations research. Sample's (1998, 2002) research, for 
example, heeds the authors' advice above as her arms race studies are evaluated using 
a host of control variables. However, international relations scholars are now beginning 
to understand that while simple bivariate models may often be inadequate large 
'garbage can' statistical models where all ostensibly important controls are dumped are 
likely to produce coefficient estimates just as positively or negatively skewed for the 
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researcher. A reluctance to control for every single potential variable is an important 
debate that has emerged since the publication of Diehl and Crescenzi's suggestion 
above and is a topic I addressed in more detail in the research design of chapter four. 
Weighing the call for multivariate analyses in conjunction with the potential 
problems of overspecified models I argue my statistical evaluations achieve a 
reasonable balance between both camps. Rather than include any and all covariates 
with a previously demonstrated impact on interstate conflict I identified the two control 
variables - capability ratio and direct contiguity - I believed would provide the most 
robust test of my primary explanatory variable, the arms race. As specifically explained 
in chapter four, both control variables are not just associated with conflict but - more 
importantly - both variables are potentially correlated with arms racing itself. As a 
result, I choose to include these two controls in place of many others and believe the 
empirical findings reflect accurately the substantive and statistical impact - a concern 
raised by Diehl and Crescenzi - of arms races on interstate conflict. 
I have now outlined and discussed Diehl and Crescenzi's (1998) essential 
suggestions for future research. According to these authors, they represent some of the 
most important ways forward for the arms race and conflict research program. Of 
course, the list is not meant to be exhaustive; there are no doubt other relevant issues 
not mentioned by Diehl and Crescenzi or touched upon in this dissertation. Regardless, I 
have presented their proposals here as a means by which to demonstrate how my own 
analysis has dealt with their concerns and ideas. Lastly, their specific points have helped 
me to organize a succinct recapitulation of some of the major theoretical and research 
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design decisions and strategies I employed in this dissertation. Moving along, the 
following section is a concise review of the actual empirical results of obtained from my 
investigation. 
8.3 What Has Been Learned? 
While a significant amount of international relations scholarship has dealt with 
the causes and consequences of arms races the research program as a whole has 
remained without any clear answers. As I referenced in the opening chapter, Gibler et 
al. (2005) noted "...little conclusive social science evidence exists as to whether arms 
races deter, escalate, or are spurious to conflict" (1). This dissertation has therefore 
been a concentrated effort to provide large-N empirical evidence in support of the 
theoretical proposition that arms races increase the likelihood of conflict onset between 
states. The statistical evidence was gleaned from an investigation of arms racing and 
conflict over three separate regions: the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. The 
following sections revisit some of the major findings of this research. 
The critical question addressed in this dissertation, of course, was the 
relationship between arms races and the onset of militarized conflict. Overall, I find 
support for the claim that states involved in an arms race are more likely to experience 
conflict than otherwise would be expected. In the Middle East both ground based and 
naval arms races are positively associated with the onset of militarized conflict with 
further analysis showing ground based arms races to be the most conflict prone. In 
Africa, naval and aerial arms races significantly increase the probability two states will 
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start a conflict with one another and in this region it appears that naval arms races 
produce the highest likelihood of interstate conflict. 
The impact of arms racing on conflict is weaker in Latin America, the third region 
analyzed in this dissertation. Here, only aerial based arms races are associated with 
interstate conflict at a statistically significant level. Discussed in chapter seven, there 
are at least a couple of reasons for the weaker findings observed in Latin America. One 
explanation for this finding involves the role of the two key control variables of 
contiguity and the power capability ratio between states. Although the contiguity 
covariate is significant in all three regions capability ratio is positive and statistically 
significant for the first time in Latin America and for all three arms race models in this 
region. In conjunction with this fact is the recognition by many researchers and analysts 
that Latin America has been a region particularly absent of interstate conflict. The 
result, then, is that both the contiguity and capability ratio variables may be accounting 
for most of the variation in the dependent variable conflict which itself turns out to be a 
particularly rare event in Latin America. 
Thus, the predictive power of the arms race variables suffers and even though 
states in Latin America appear to engage in arms races with one another the overall 
prevalence of interstate conflict is low enough such that a strong statistical association 
is difficult to define. Interestingly enough, this dynamic serves to highlight even more 
the importance of the finding that aerial arms racing is the only type of arms race likely 
to produce interstate conflict in Latin America. Examples from chapter seven explained 
how aerial weaponry has played an important role in some of the more prominent 
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conflicts in Latin America; news stories from more recent years also indicate how many 
states in this region are pursuing defense contracts or using domestic production (in the 
case of Brazil's Embraer corporation) in order to achieve aerial superiority. The role of 
aerial arms races in previous conflicts along with the attempts of many Latin American 
states to acquire advanced aerial combat weaponry is consistent with the finding that 
only aerial arms races appear to increase the chances for conflict within this region. 
8.4 Limitations and Extensions 
An important part of any large research endeavor is to recognize and discuss 
some of the limitations encountered as well as possible research extensions. I begin by 
noting some limitations of this dissertation. As with most quantitative analyses, data is 
paramount. I strongly believe both the temporal and spatial domain used here provide 
a good test of the theory and, ultimately, defensible results. However, there were 
several data limitations. First, the United Nations voting data is current only to the year 
2000. This means I was unable to include nearly ten additional years worth of analysis 
due to the lack of data representing the 'issues' component of my theory. Data 
limitation is at work with the weapons stockpile data, as well. Although the United 
Nations data extends back to 1946 the reliability of weapons stockpile information for 
many of the minor power states breaks down rapidly before 1970; in addition, 
information for many of the system's minor powers is not even available before 1970. 
As a result, it becomes extremely difficult to extend the analysis back in time therefore 
suggesting updates to the analysis of arms racing and conflict will likely be forward 
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looking as United Nations voting records and weapons stockpile data continue to be 
available and more reliable. 
Beyond these noted limitations there are several obvious extensions, as well. 
First, there are some states not covered in my investigation of minor power arms racing 
here. These states are located primarily in central Asia (such as the former Soviet 
republics as well as the Indian subcontinent), Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Rim. 
Though not included in my analysis this time, they are no less important as ongoing 
contentious issues fuel dangerous arming between India and Pakistan along with the 
evolving crisis on the Korean peninsula, for example. Indeed, there remain ample 
opportunities for research on arms races and conflict processes. My analyses have dealt 
strictly with the propensity for arms races to produce interstate conflict. Yet, an 
important strain of international relations research now focuses on how conflict 
develops once started and how it ends. 
Scholars have investigated the impact of rivalry and regime type, for instance, on 
the duration of conflict as well as what factors promote durable peace agreements after 
conflict termination. Future arms race research would benefit from some of these same 
questions: are certain types of arms races likely to produce longer, more destructive 
conflicts? What types of arms races are likely to escalate ongoing disputes? How can 
negotiated settlements be reached after a costly and potentially deadly arms race? 
However, there are other important topics for future research such as extensions 
related to both the origins and outcomes of arms races that do not exclusively involve 
understanding international conflict. Below I list a few avenues for future research that 
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would greatly expand our collective knowledge about arms races beyond their role in 
provoking militarized disputes. 
First: on the origins of arms races, how are states acquiring their weapons? 
Clearly, the major powers of the international system are able to develop and 
manufacture the weapons comprising their large and technologically advanced 
militaries. This is most likely not the case with the minor power states analyzed in this 
dissertation. While perhaps only a handful of minor power states have the 
infrastructure to support some semblance of a defense industry (such as Brazil's 
Embraer company), the overwhelming majority of these states rely on negotiations and 
arms transfers from some of the major arms producing states of the world. In June of 
2009: 
"Saudi Arabia's Assistant Defence and Aviation Minister Prince Khaled bin Sultan 
received the Kingdom's first two Eurofighter Typhoon fighter aircraft at a 
ceremony hosted by BAE [British Aerospace] at its Warton plant near Preston on 
June 10. The Typhoon is among the most advanced and sophisticated jet fighter 
bombers in operation and Saudi Arabia will be the first country outside of Europe 
to take delivery of the aircraft" (Bailey, 2009). 
For the purposes of this dissertation the means and methods by which states 
may have acquired their weapons was unimportant; the central question was about the 
impact of arms races on conflict and not the origins of these weapons. However, a 
future project might investigate in more detail the arms transfer dynamic. What kinds 
of states are providing arms for these minor powers? Introducing the arms producing 
state complicates the theory in some interesting ways: what are the incentives of the 
donor state? Are donor states economically motivated or do they provide weapons to 
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client states in order that they may deal with threats and enemies of the donor state? 
On the other end, what - besides security concerns - motivates political leaders to seek 
large increases in weapons? A host of domestic political theories could suggest wide 
ranging incentives from the desire to maintain public support to the need to deter or 
suppress domestic political strife and opposition groups to list just a few examples. 
These questions alone can fuel a host of new studies and broaden our understanding 
about how and why states arm and the consequences of arms races. 
8.5 Final Thoughts 
Under different circumstances this could have been a dissertation about the 
perpetual need for man to arm himself. The small sampling of anthropological research 
cited in the opening pages of this dissertation only hint at the role weapons have played 
since humanity's earliest beginnings. That weapons have been an inherent desire for 
man throughout time is critical motivation for this research since states are simply the 
amalgamation of men and women. One hundred thousand years later the leaders of 
states harbor the same need for power and security that weapons provided to their 
ancestors. Unfortunately, the complexity of the international system along with the 
multitude of potentially incendiary issues between states means those involved in arms 
competitions with one another are in general more likely to experience conflict than 
peace. 
So what might be proscribed? Without a doubt, weapons and militaries will 
continue to be key features of states and the international system. Although 
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international relations scholars have grappled with determining the effect of arms races 
on militarized conflict the results offered in this dissertation support what many political 
leaders and statesman have long suspected, especially now more than ever: arms races 
are dangerous events between states that increase the probability for militarized 
confrontations and conflicts. While some types of arms races may be more conflict 
prone than others the policy proscription is simple: arms races must be dealt with as 
quickly as they arise. Given that issues appear to drive these competitions, leaders and 
peacekeepers alike would benefit from identifying the contentious issues at stake 
before an arms race can develop. Ongoing arms races should be addressed with even 
greater urgency either through third party interventions or intergovernmental 
organizations that can exercise political legitimacy and peacekeeping. 
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